42 U.S.C. § 1983 · C relations

fact · cuts-against The incident giving rise to Mr. Dye’s complaint occurred on 11 January 2002 and Mr. Dye filed his complaints against Chief Mando-poulos, the City and John Does 1-5 on 23 December 2003.

rule As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.

held Mr. Dye’s complaint falls within the appropriate time limit with regard to the Chief and the City, but as discussed below, not with regard to John Does 1-5.

rule A reasonable police officer would know, at a minimum, that such conduct violated clearly established statutory rights prohibiting adverse treatment of public employees without cause.

held If Plaintiff proves his allegations that he was defamed and demoted and kept from promotion, all without cause, it is likely that no qualified immunity will attach to the Defendants’ conduct.

held Upon resolving the factual disputes underlying the legal conclusion of qualified immunity at trial, the court may well yet find that some or all Defendants possess such immunity in their individual capacities.

rule We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.

held For these reasons, we are compelled to deny the invitation to extend absolute immunity to public defenders.

fact · supports . The portion of the complaint which names Polk County reads as follows: “Polk County is enjoined [sic-perhaps “joined” is meant] in this action because it is the political basis, and the source that authorized it’s [sic] political sub-divisions and it’s [sic] quasi-contractants to act in the manner prescribed in this complaint . . .

held Even though we interpret the allegations expansively, we are unable to say that the complaint alleges the necessary county involvement in the claimed unconstitutional conduct by virtue of the execution of county policy or custom.

fact · cuts-against On November 10, fourteen days after the call and ten days after the first visit, the social worker returned to the Calabretta house with a policeman.

fact · cuts-against Mrs. Calabretta did not open the door, and said she was uncomfortable letting them in without her husband at home.

fact · supports The police officer had the opinion that in any check on the welfare of children “there is an exigent circumstance” so no search warrant is needed.

fact · cuts-against The social worker and her department delayed entry into the home for fourteen days after the report, because they perceived no immediate danger of serious harm to the children.

fact · cuts-against The only reason the social worker and police officer did not seek a search warrant was that their subjective opinion was that they did not need one.

rule Anderson requires more particularized analysis, to determine whether, in these particular circumstances, notably the absence of emergency, a reasonable official would understand that they could not enter the home without consent or a search warrant.

rule The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.

held In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry.

held We conclude that on appellants’ first issue, whether they were protected by qualified immunity regarding their coerced entry into the Calabrettas’ home, the district court was right. They were not.

fact · cuts-against While the mother was still with the policeman in the other room, the social worker told the twelve year old to pull down the three year old girl’s pants.

fact · cuts-against The three year old was screaming and fighting to get loose, the mother looked at the social worker to see whether she would relent, but she did not, and the mother pulled down the three year old’s pants in obedience to the social worker’s order.

fact · cuts-against The twelve year old had already explained away the screaming and told the social worker that the children were not abusively disciplined.

fact · cuts-against By the time the social worker forced the mother to pull down the child’s pants, the investigation had contracted to the social worker’s personal opinion that any discipline of a child with an object must be against the law, and her puzzling mention of the family’s religiosity.

rule The strip search cannot be separated from the context in which it took place, the coerced entry into the home.

rule An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold.

held This case is like Good, not Darryl H.

fact · cuts-against However, she alleges only that she informed other supervisors, not Sheriff Caudill, of her ongoing wish to work patrol.

fact · cuts-against Similarly, Johnson describes a number of items of equipment that she requested verbally, but such requests were processed by office manager Sean Hurd, not Sheriff Caudill.

held These allegations may have been appropriate for a Title VII action, but lack sufficient connection to Sheriff Cau-dill’s actions to spawn individual-capacity liability under § 1983.

rule It was clearly established by 2008 22 that police officers violate Brady when they withhold exculpatory 23 evidence from prosecutors.

held we need not decide whether they violated clearly 30 established law; Lipson’s qualified immunity defense fails in any 31 event because he misled prosecutors.

fact · cuts-against Ross’s then-fiancée, Lori Magliaro, submitted an affidavit 31 attesting that Ross had since admitted that he had “contrived a lineup 32 where [Galloway] wore a baseball cap to conceal the difference in 33 hair” and “made adjustments” “to make [him] look taller”

rule It 22 was clearly established that police could not use identification 23 procedures that are unduly suggestive as to a particular investigation, 24 even if those same procedures would be textbook in another.

rule “[t]he salient question is whether the state of the law gave the 15 defendant fair warning that his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was 16 unconstitutional.”

held Qualified immunity does not shield Ross and Dluginski.

held Ross and Dluginski had such warning: every reasonable 18 officer would have understood that their lineup was unduly likely to 19 result in a misidentification

rule By 2008, it was clearly established 18 that police officers violate the due process right to a fair trial if they 19 rig witness identifications, coerce a witness to sign a fabricated 20 inculpatory statement, or ensure that the state withholds evidence of 21 the same from the defense.

held we find no error of law in the district court’s determination 32 that a rational jury could find all five individual defendants liable for 33 violating Galloway’s clearly established right to a fair trial.

rule State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.

rule officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue

held The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.

rule That is, the Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose “individual and personal liability” on state officials under § 1983.

held Insofar as respondents seek damages against Hafer personally, the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict their ability to sue in federal court.

fact · supports Upon the proper filing of a request, an insurer may withhold payment to health care providers for the particular services being challenged.

fact · cuts-against It authorizes, but does not require, insurers to withhold payments for disputed medical treatment.

fact · cuts-against the Bureau’s participation is limited to requiring insurers to file “a form prescribed by the Bureau,” 84 Pa. Code § 127.452, processing the request for technical compliance, and then forwarding the matter to a URO and informing the parties that utilization review has been requested.

fact · cuts-against nothing in Pennsylvania’s Constitution or statutory scheme obligates the State to provide either medical treatment or workers’ compensation benefits to injured workers.

rule Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”

rule Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.

rule a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state officials,” Tulsa, supra, at 486, cannot.

held We conclude that an insurer’s decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the State.