DEFENSE · 42usc1983:x-absolute-immunity
Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.
Exact element source
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at lawSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [404:460] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _whole accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 2 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 2; excluded context 0 | 2 | Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Shepard (public defender); subject: party=Shepard (public defender) | absolute-immunity/public-defender-akin-to-private-counsel | We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7155:7366] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.For these reasons, we are compelled to deny the invitation to extend absolute immunity to public defenders.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7844:7951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law Qualified (personal) immunity remains available on remand and was not decided. | absolute-immunity/state-executive-employment-decision | State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [12127:12218] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issueSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [11580:11696] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits, nor are state officers absolutely immune from personal liability under § 1983 solely by virtue of the “official” nature of their acts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [15978:16160] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issue
Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
officials seeking absolute immunity must show that such immunity is justified for the governmental function at issueSource:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [11580:11696] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.
interpretation
State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.
Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
State executive officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for their official actions.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [12127:12218] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.
interpretation
We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.
Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7155:7366] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.