United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980-08-26
42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil; pro se prisoner's complaint against county public defender, her supervisor, county board and county dismissed as frivolous (no state action / no personal involvement); plaintiff appeals; reversed and remanded except habeas-type injunction claim; result: remanded; claim:
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
Subsequent history is invisible: this color-of-law holding was reversed by the Supreme Court in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (annotator's knowledge, not in the pinned text; the law file's gloss now notes it). The case notation has no validity/overruled flag, so the color-of-law block is still an `instance` and feeds a bad variant into the catalogue.
Not-satisfied with leave to amend (policy, for the County) is a provisional pleading failure; holding+basis cannot express "deficient as pleaded, opportunity to cure".
Per-defendant matrix: four defendants (defender, supervisor, board, county) x elements (color-of-law, causation, policy) x defenses; v1 types the qualifier as `party`, but its value is still free text naming one or several defendants, so blocks are not machine-joinable per defendant.
Causation-by-rulemaking for individual supervisors is supported by a "Cf. Monell" cite, blurring `causation` (personal involvement) and `policy` (entity liability); the same allegation (established rules and procedures) suffices against the individuals and fails against the County.
The key color-of-law fact (lawyers are selected, paid, hired and fired by the County) is stated by the court as its own premise on a frivolousness dismissal, not found or even quoted from the complaint; [pleaded] is approximate, and polarity [supports] does not say whose assertion it is.
Dissent (from offset 16465) disputes both color-of-law and the degree of immunity. v1 could carry it as `scope dissent` blocks, but none of its text was quoted in v0 and the migration froze the quote set, so it remains unrecorded.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 20
Elements 7–12 of 20
| Case | Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) | Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity bar (official-capacity damages / retrospective relief) | Preiser / Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination and habeas-exclusivity bar | Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure) | Issue preclusion / collateral estoppel from prior state criminal or civil judgment (Allen v. McCurry) | Judicial standing prerequisite, separate from damages remedy |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–18 of 20
| Case | Statutory bar on injunctive relief against a judicial officer acting in a judicial capacity (1996 amendment) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | District of Columbia exclusive Act of Congress inclusion clause (1979 amendment) | Rejected extra element: separate proof of "abuse of governmental power" (Collins v. City of Harker Heights) | Federal action / Fifth Amendment claim (outside § 1983 state-law scope) | Collateral-order appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory qualified-immunity denials (Mitchell v. Forsyth; Johnson v. Jones) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 19–20 of 20
| Case | Appellate preservation / forfeiture of issue not raised in district court | Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim (Fourth Amendment / procedural due process) |
|---|---|---|
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Personal involvement / causal connection ("subjects, or causes to be subjected") | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Offender Advocate and Board of Supervisors members; subject: party=Offender Advocate and Board of Supervisors members Pro se complaint read expansively; court flags that summary judgment on no-personal-involvement may follow if the rules had nothing to do with the defender's conduct. | supervisory/established-rules-and-procedures-subordinate-followed | The Polk County Offender Advocate and the Polk County Board of Supervisors, also named as defendants, were alleged to be responsible for Ms. Shepard’s actions because they established rules and procedures for her to follow in handling criminal appeals.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [1762:2014] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Whether the requisite personal involvement by the Offender Advocate in the claimed unconstitutional conduct was sufficiently alleged, however, is a separate issue which the District Court did not reach.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [11175:11377] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.These allegations are sufficient, as a matter of pleading, to state a § 1983 claim against the Offender Advocate.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [11817:11930] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Similar allegations were made as to the involvement of the Polk County Board of Supervisors, and we hold that the complaint is sufficient to state a claim against the Board members for the same reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [12056:12257] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Polk County Board of Supervisors members; subject: party=Polk County Board of Supervisors members | county-governing-board-members | There can be no question that the members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors, in carrying out the responsibilities of that office, act under color of state law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [15569:15734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Shepard (assistant public defender) and the Offender Advocate; subject: party=Shepard (assistant public defender) and the Offender Advocate Employment relationship is dispositive; county's lack of control over individual professional decisions and the defender's duty of undivided loyalty to the client are assumed and held "beside the point". Private court-appointed counsel still not under color of law. Dissent: wrong was not "made possible only because" of public office. | county-employed-public-defender-representing-indigent | The complaint alleged that Martha Shepard, an attorney in the Polk County, Iowa, Offender Advocate’s office, failed to represent appellant adequately in his appeal of a robbery conviction to the Supreme Court of Iowa.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [376:593] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Subsequently, she moved for permission to withdraw as counsel and to have the appeal dismissed as frivolous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [1097:1205] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.All these lawyers are selected, paid, hired, and fired by the County.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3484:3553] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3729:3980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.We hold that an attorney in a county or state funded public defender’s office acts under color of state law in representing indigent defendants.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [4234:4378] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Damages remedy (legacy CASE id; not a prerequisite for prospective relief) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution and laws | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsAlleged deprivations (right to counsel, Eighth Amendment, due-process denial of state-created appeal right) from counsel's motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal as frivolous; merits never examined. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Suable "person" (natural person in individual capacity, official in official capacity for prospective relief, or municipality; excludes States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Polk County (entity); subject: party=Polk County (entity) Deficient as pleaded but leave to amend ordered on remand, so the failure is provisional. | policy-or-custom/entity-named-only-as-source-of-authority | . The portion of the complaint which names Polk County reads as follows: “Polk County is enjoined [sic-perhaps “joined” is meant] in this action because it is the political basis, and the source that authorized it’s [sic] political sub-divisions and it’s [sic] quasi-contractants to act in the manner prescribed in this complaint . . .Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [15735:16070] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Even though we interpret the allegations expansively, we are unable to say that the complaint alleges the necessary county involvement in the claimed unconstitutional conduct by virtue of the execution of county policy or custom.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [12870:13099] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Shepard; extended to Offender Advocate and Board members; subject: party=Shepard; extended to Offender Advocate and Board members Only AVAILABILITY of the defense to public defenders is decided (as a matter of law), with the test stated; whether it protects these defendants on these facts is for remand. Hence not-reached / rule-announced rather than "satisfied". | good-faith-immunity/public-defender-professional-judgment | The defender oversteps the immunity boundary, however, if he acts in a manner which he knows or reasonably should know will violate the constitutional rights of his client, or if he acts with the malicious intention to injure his client.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [9216:9453] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.We hold, therefore, that in § 1983 suits attorneys employed by public defender offices enjoy the qualified immunity we have described for actions taken while representing indigent clients.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [10682:10870] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Common-law absolute immunity (judicial, prosecutorial, legislative, witness functions) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Shepard (public defender); subject: party=Shepard (public defender) | absolute-immunity/public-defender-akin-to-private-counsel | We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7155:7366] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.For these reasons, we are compelled to deny the invitation to extend absolute immunity to public defenders.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7844:7951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · conceded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Preiser / Heck v. Humphrey favorable-termination and habeas-exclusivity bar | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; count: claim for injunction commanding release; subject: count=claim for injunction commanding release | relief-in-nature-of-habeas/state-remedies-unexhausted | This claim is in the nature of habeas corpus, and it is conceded that state remedies have not been exhausted.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [13672:13781] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.
Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3729:3980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
interpretation
Whether the requisite personal involvement by the Offender Advocate in the claimed unconstitutional conduct was sufficiently alleged, however, is a separate issue which the District Court did not reach.
Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Whether the requisite personal involvement by the Offender Advocate in the claimed unconstitutional conduct was sufficiently alleged, however, is a separate issue which the District Court did not reach.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [11175:11377] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Because there is no respondeat superior in § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution (Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
interpretation
We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.
Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
We perceive no distinction of substance, for immunity purposes, between appointed counsel and a public defender. Both owe primary allegiance to the client and represent the public interest only in a general way.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [7155:7366] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Functional approach: absolute immunity attaches to judicial acts (Pierson v. Ray), prosecutorial advocacy intimately associated with the judicial phase (Imbler v. Pachtman), and legislative acts (Bogan v. Scott-Harris), but not administrative/investigative executive functions.