Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

Role: applied; posture: civil; widow's damages suit against city; Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal affirmed by CA5 on "no abuse of governmental power" theory; certiorari; affirmed on the different ground that no constitutional violation was alleged; result: claimant-lost; claim:

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

The core teaching is a RELATION/ORDERING between elements: for a municipal defendant, deprivation (was there a constitutional violation?) and policy (is the city responsible?) are separate inquiries, and satisfying policy (deliberate indifference) cannot bootstrap deprivation. The law file now declares this as constraint municipal-non-bootstrap, but a case file cannot say "this opinion is the source/an application of that constraint"; it records two independent blocks.

The court rejects a proposed extra element (abuse of governmental power). v1 records it as not-reached / rule-announced so it is no longer a failed instance, but rule-announced does not carry the DIRECTION of the announcement (requirement rejected vs. adopted); only the rule quote and gloss say "this is not an element".

The deprivation block bundles two distinct substantive-due-process theories (affirmative duty vs. shocks-the-conscience) plus a third state-created-liberty-interest theory decided on an arguendo assumption inside a not-satisfied holding; one variant and one basis per block cannot express nested assumptions.

Deprivation sub-ids by constitutional right are open-ended (deprivation.substantive-due-process is ad hoc under the "sub by right" convention); the real doctrinal elements live in the Constitution, not in 1983 -- 1983 instances are mostly instances of another "law".

OCR damage in the first paragraph reads "42 U. S. C. § 1988" for 1983; a citation-keyed loader would misattribute the statute.

interpretation

In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.

Under Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (491 U.S. 58 (1989)), neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for damages, though state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief (or in their personal capacities for damages under Hafer) are "persons".

interpretation

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred (Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); sub-elements branch by the underlying constitutional/statutory provision.

interpretation

Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.

Protects fundamental rights and guards against executive abuse of power that "shocks the conscience" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis), but does not constitutionalize ordinary state tort law or impose an affirmative workplace-safety duty absent custody (DeShaney; Collins).

interpretation

we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law

Protects fundamental rights and guards against executive abuse of power that "shocks the conscience" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis), but does not constitutionalize ordinary state tort law or impose an affirmative workplace-safety duty absent custody (DeShaney; Collins).

interpretation

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).

interpretation

Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.

Under City of Canton v. Harris (489 U.S. 378 (1989)) and Connick v. Thompson (563 U.S. 51 (2011)), failure to train is actionable only where it amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact" and a municipal employee actually committed an underlying constitutional violation.

interpretation

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Non-element rejected by the Supreme Court in Collins: § 1983 does not require proof of an "abuse of governmental power" separate and apart from proof of a constitutional violation.

interpretation

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Municipal responsibility (Monell policy/custom, including Canton deliberate indifference) and the underlying constitutional deprivation are separate inquiries; satisfying policy cannot supply the constitutional violation.