AND · 42usc1983:color-of-law
Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Exact element source
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of ColumbiaSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [64:186] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 8 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 8 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (8). Excluded context examples:Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| private-party provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether a private party's conduct is fairly attributable to the State. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| public-official provisional; 5 observed cases | Whether a government officer or employee acted in an official capacity. | 4 Satisfied 4; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 3 | Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — satisfied · conceded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Lindke v. Freed — 601 U.S. 187 (2024) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2024 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · rule-announced/merits · not counted O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier — 601 U.S. 205 (2024) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2024 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/superseded · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Polk County Board of Supervisors members; subject: party=Polk County Board of Supervisors members | county-governing-board-members | There can be no question that the members of the Polk County Board of Supervisors, in carrying out the responsibilities of that office, act under color of state law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [15569:15734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Shepard (assistant public defender) and the Offender Advocate; subject: party=Shepard (assistant public defender) and the Offender Advocate Employment relationship is dispositive; county's lack of control over individual professional decisions and the defender's duty of undivided loyalty to the client are assumed and held "beside the point". Private court-appointed counsel still not under color of law. Dissent: wrong was not "made possible only because" of public office. | county-employed-public-defender-representing-indigent | The complaint alleged that Martha Shepard, an attorney in the Polk County, Iowa, Offender Advocate’s office, failed to represent appellant adequately in his appeal of a robbery conviction to the Supreme Court of Iowa.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [376:593] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Subsequently, she moved for permission to withdraw as counsel and to have the appeal dismissed as frivolous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [1097:1205] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.All these lawyers are selected, paid, hired, and fired by the County.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3484:3553] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3729:3980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.We hold that an attorney in a county or state funded public defender’s office acts under color of state law in representing indigent defendants.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [4234:4378] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded Acts within lawful authority and "necessary to governmental functions" are still under color of law; no carve-out for authorized official acts. | exercise-of-official-authority | While Hafer’s power to hire and fire derived from her position as auditor general, it said, a suit for damages based on the exercise of this authority could be brought against Hafer in her personal capacity.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [2760:2967] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.Because of that intent, we have held that in § 1983 actions the statutory requirement of action “under color of” state law is just as broad as the Fourteenth Amendment’s “state action” requirement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [10623:10820] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07.The requirement of action under color of state law means that Hafer may be liable for discharging respondents precisely because of her authority as auditor general.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_502.jsonl#/us/502/0021-01; Unicode character offsets [9307:9471] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b981c1cb2a9bf4bab619f49a26674002633c907c86f39bd53f955befb5605c07. |
| Hudson v. McMillian — 503 U.S. 1 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsUndisputed (on-duty state corrections officers); respondents' "unauthorized personal dispute" argument was framed as an Eighth Amendment "punishment" point, and the Court took no position. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — satisfied · conceded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; party: state officials administering the Act and the director of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (own certiorari petitions denied); subject: party=state officials administering the Act and the director of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (own certiorari petitions denied) | administering-statutory-scheme | All agree that the public officials responsible for administering the workers’ compensation system and the director of SWIF are state actors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [12211:12352] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97. |
| American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: private workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers (petitioners); theory: state coercion or significant encouragement (Blum / Jackson close-nexus test); delegation of a traditionally exclusive public function; joint participation / symbiotic entanglement (Burton; Lugar); subject: party=private workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers (petitioners); theory=state coercion or significant encouragement (Blum / Jackson close-nexus test); delegation of a traditionally exclusive public function; joint participation / symbiotic entanglement (Burton; Lugar) All three private-party routes rejected: nexus/coercion-encouragement (State merely permits the choice), public function (State has no obligation to provide benefits; withholding was historically a private prerogative), joint participation (heavy regulation is not Burton; no ex parte seizure by officials as in Lugar). First Lugar prong (acting pursuant to state statute) was met; second (state actor) failed. | private-insurer-using-state-authorized-withholding-procedure | Upon the proper filing of a request, an insurer may withhold payment to health care providers for the particular services being challenged.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [3433:3572] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.It authorizes, but does not require, insurers to withhold payments for disputed medical treatment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [14382:14480] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.the Bureau’s participation is limited to requiring insurers to file “a form prescribed by the Bureau,” 84 Pa. Code § 127.452, processing the request for technical compliance, and then forwarding the matter to a URO and informing the parties that utilization review has been requested.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [18931:19215] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.nothing in Pennsylvania’s Constitution or statutory scheme obligates the State to provide either medical treatment or workers’ compensation benefits to injured workers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [20896:21064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [9774:9977] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [13972:14077] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state officials,” Tulsa, supra, at 486, cannot.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [18073:18238] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.We conclude that an insurer’s decision to withhold payment and seek utilization review of the reasonableness and necessity of particular medical treatment is not fairly attributable to the State.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [25713:25908] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97. |
| Lindke v. Freed — 601 U.S. 187 (2024) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2024 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: James Freed, city manager of Port Huron, sued in his individual capacity; count: First Amendment claim for deleting comments and blocking on Facebook; theory: whether an official's posts on a mixed personal / job-related social-media page are state action; subject: party=James Freed, city manager of Port Huron, sued in his individual capacity; count=First Amendment claim for deleting comments and blocking on Facebook; theory=whether an official's posts on a mixed personal / job-related social-media page are state action The Court announces a two-part test for when a public official's social-media activity is state action under § 1983 (actual authority to speak for the State on the matter; purporting to exercise it in the relevant posts) and does not apply it to Freed's page. | city manager's public Facebook page mixing personal and job-related posts, neither labelled personal nor official; critic's comments deleted and critic blocked | He described himself as “Daddy to Lucy, Husband to Jessie and City Manager, Chief Administrative Offcer for the citizens of Port Huron, MI.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [13399:13539] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101.And, as before his appointment, Freed posted prolifically (and primarily) about his personal life.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [13609:13707] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101.We hold that such speech is attribut- able to the State only if the offcial (1) possessed actual au- thority to speak on the State's behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social media.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [11927:12143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101.In sum, a defendant like Freed must have actual authority rooted in written law or longstanding custom to speak for the State.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [33251:33377] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101.The state-action doctrine requires Lindke to show that Freed (1) had actual authority to speak on behalf of the State on a particular matter, and (2) purported to exercise that authority in the relevant posts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [40199:40408] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101.To the extent that this test differs from the one applied by the Sixth Circuit, we vacate its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/187; Unicode character offsets [40409:40585] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52e95c6050e67173cc6ac2d8b57671fc706ef84b7358ea5b127323e1c6ac8101. |
| O'Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier — 601 U.S. 205 (2024) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2024 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Action taken "under color of" state, territorial, or D.C. law | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / superseded basis: law; party: O'Connor-Ratcliff and Zane, Poway Unified School District trustees; count: First Amendment claim for deleting comments and blocking on Facebook and Twitter; theory: Ninth Circuit "close nexus" / appearance-and-content approach to state action by an official on social media; subject: party=O'Connor-Ratcliff and Zane, Poway Unified School District trustees; count=First Amendment claim for deleting comments and blocking on Facebook and Twitter; theory=Ninth Circuit "close nexus" / appearance-and-content approach to state action by an official on social media This Court decides nothing on the element itself: it records the Ninth Circuit's finding of state action, made under an appearance-and-content approach, and vacates it because that approach differs from the Lindke test. The first `held` is the Ninth Circuit's ruling as reported; the second is this Court's disposition. | school-board trustees' campaign pages kept after election for district business and labelled "Government Official"; critics' repetitive comments deleted and critics blocked | After they won election, the Trustees continued to use their public pages to post PUSD-related content, including board- meeting recaps, application solicitations for board positions, local budget plans and surveys, and public safety updates.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/205; Unicode character offsets [5540:5782] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0744a4e48523e9a82bcf20a8e1fa63496d3c6010c089ecd19c6263673e33b75c.Their Facebook pages described them as “Government Offcial[s]” and noted their offcial posi- tions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/205; Unicode character offsets [5867:5966] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0744a4e48523e9a82bcf20a8e1fa63496d3c6010c089ecd19c6263673e33b75c.It held that § 1983's state- action requirement was satisfed because there was a “close nexus between the Trustees' use of their social media pages and their offcial positions.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/205; Unicode character offsets [7039:7216] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0744a4e48523e9a82bcf20a8e1fa63496d3c6010c089ecd19c6263673e33b75c.Because the approach that the Ninth Circuit applied is different from the one we have elaborated in Lindke, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the Ninth Circuit for further pro- ceedings consistent with our opinion in that case.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_601.jsonl#/us/601/205; Unicode character offsets [8241:8486] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0744a4e48523e9a82bcf20a8e1fa63496d3c6010c089ecd19c6263673e33b75c. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, the under-color-of-state-law element of §1983 excludes from its reach “‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful,’ ”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [9774:9977] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
interpretation
Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the State is not state action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [13972:14077] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
interpretation
a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state officials,” Tulsa, supra, at 486, cannot.
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
a private party’s mere use of the State’s dispute resolution machinery, without the “overt, significant assistance of state officials,” Tulsa, supra, at 486, cannot.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [18073:18238] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
interpretation
Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.
Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Public defenders receive their power not because they are selected by their clients, but because they are employed by the County to represent a certain class of clients, who likely have little or no choice in selecting the lawyer who will defend them.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [3729:3980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Under West v. Atkins (487 U.S. 42 (1988)), traditional definition requires that the defendant exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law". Note Polk County v. Dodson (454 U.S. 312 (1981)) later reversed the Eighth Circuit's Dodson holding on public defenders, holding a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.