DEFENSE · 42usc1983:qualified-immunity
Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
Exact element source
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at lawSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [404:460] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; provisional (1 case) | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (2). Excluded context examples:Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/procedural · not counted Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/procedural · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| clearly-established-law provisional; 5 observed cases | Whether the right was clearly established at the time at the relevant level of specificity. | 8 Satisfied 2; not satisfied 6; excluded context 0 | 5 | Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — not · no-evidence (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| objective-reasonableness provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether, the law being clear, a reasonable official could have believed the conduct lawful on the facts known. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 1 | Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/alternative · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: law; party: John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; count: Count II, excessive force at the second traffic stop (Chief and John Does 1-5); subject: party=John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; count=Count II, excessive force at the second traffic stop (Chief and John Does 1-5) Second Saucier step, reached only arguendo ("even if the officer unreasonably used force") after the court had already found no violation. | reasonable-mistake/force-on-erratic-arrestee-perceived-as-danger | The volatility of Mr. Dye’s behavior was witnessed during the second traffic stop by an independent observer who substantiated Mr. Dye’s seeming instability and loss of control.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [36750:36927] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Finally, as the hospital records indicate, the sole physical consequence to Mr. Dye was an abrasion and contusion of the right wrist caused by Mr. Dye’s admitted struggle against the handcuffs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [37217:37410] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Thus, even if the officer unreasonably used force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should be granted if the officer had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief about the legality of the officer’s actions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [35495:35721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Under those circumstances, it cannot be said there was a clearly established rule that would prohibit using the force the officers exercised to secure Mr. Dye and his vehicle.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [36574:36749] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f. |
| Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — not · no-evidence (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; party: individual-capacity defendants (argued and decided jointly); subject: party=individual-capacity defendants (argued and decided jointly) Provisional denial of defendants' summary-judgment motion: plaintiff's evidence suffices with all inferences in his favour; the court may yet find immunity after trial. "Clearly established" is anchored in state statutes and the CBA rather than federal constitutional precedent. | clearly-established/adverse-employment-action-without-cause-contrary-to-state-statute | A reasonable police officer would know, at a minimum, that such conduct violated clearly established statutory rights prohibiting adverse treatment of public employees without cause.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [21608:21790] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6.If Plaintiff proves his allegations that he was defamed and demoted and kept from promotion, all without cause, it is likely that no qualified immunity will attach to the Defendants’ conduct.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [21416:21607] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6.Upon resolving the factual disputes underlying the legal conclusion of qualified immunity at trial, the court may well yet find that some or all Defendants possess such immunity in their individual capacities.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [22755:22964] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Shepard; extended to Offender Advocate and Board members; subject: party=Shepard; extended to Offender Advocate and Board members Only AVAILABILITY of the defense to public defenders is decided (as a matter of law), with the test stated; whether it protects these defendants on these facts is for remand. Hence not-reached / rule-announced rather than "satisfied". | good-faith-immunity/public-defender-professional-judgment | The defender oversteps the immunity boundary, however, if he acts in a manner which he knows or reasonably should know will violate the constitutional rights of his client, or if he acts with the malicious intention to injure his client.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [9216:9453] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.We hold, therefore, that in § 1983 suits attorneys employed by public defender offices enjoy the qualified immunity we have described for actions taken while representing indigent clients.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [10682:10870] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: social worker Floyd and Officer Schwall; count: coerced entry into the home; subject: party=social worker Floyd and Officer Schwall; count=coerced entry into the home Precedent about police (White v. Pierce County) clearly establishes the rule for social workers too; no child-welfare or administrative-search exception to the warrant requirement absent exigency; state regulations did not authorize forced entry. | clearly-established/warrantless-home-entry-child-welfare-check-no-exigency | On November 10, fourteen days after the call and ten days after the first visit, the social worker returned to the Calabretta house with a policeman.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [2083:2232] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.Mrs. Calabretta did not open the door, and said she was uncomfortable letting them in without her husband at home.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [2847:2961] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The police officer had the opinion that in any check on the welfare of children “there is an exigent circumstance” so no search warrant is needed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [2962:3108] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The social worker and her department delayed entry into the home for fourteen days after the report, because they perceived no immediate danger of serious harm to the children.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [9191:9367] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The only reason the social worker and police officer did not seek a search warrant was that their subjective opinion was that they did not need one.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [14591:14739] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.Anderson requires more particularized analysis, to determine whether, in these particular circumstances, notably the absence of emergency, a reasonable official would understand that they could not enter the home without consent or a search warrant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [10962:11211] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would know it.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [11696:11951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.In our circuit, a reasonable official would have known that the law barred this entry.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [11212:11298] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.We conclude that on appellants’ first issue, whether they were protected by qualified immunity regarding their coerced entry into the Calabrettas’ home, the district court was right. They were not.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [25634:25831] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591. |
| Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: social worker Floyd; count: strip search of the three-year-old; subject: party=social worker Floyd; count=strip search of the three-year-old No in-circuit case on point; out-of-circuit authority (3d and 10th Cir.) plus the taint of the unlawful entry defeat immunity. The injured interest is framed chiefly as the mother's dignity and authority in her home, not the toddler's bodily privacy. | clearly-established/strip-search-of-child-during-unlawful-home-entry | While the mother was still with the policeman in the other room, the social worker told the twelve year old to pull down the three year old girl’s pants.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [4548:4701] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The three year old was screaming and fighting to get loose, the mother looked at the social worker to see whether she would relent, but she did not, and the mother pulled down the three year old’s pants in obedience to the social worker’s order.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [5768:6013] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The twelve year old had already explained away the screaming and told the social worker that the children were not abusively disciplined.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [29757:29894] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.By the time the social worker forced the mother to pull down the child’s pants, the investigation had contracted to the social worker’s personal opinion that any discipline of a child with an object must be against the law, and her puzzling mention of the family’s religiosity.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [35407:35684] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.The strip search cannot be separated from the context in which it took place, the coerced entry into the home.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [33829:33939] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.An unlawful entry or search of a home does not end when the government officials walk across the threshold.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [33940:34047] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591.This case is like Good, not Darryl H.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_189.jsonl#/f3d/189/0808-01; Unicode character offsets [33791:33828] (end exclusive); SHA-256 edec3b518ed061bd5b1694c2c9bca444a659a0f2506551d6bce3f3f43f0a5591. |
| Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; count: "not afraid of lawsuits" statement; "make do" equipment response; subject: count="not afraid of lawsuits" statement; "make do" equipment response Plaintiff's failure to cite authority for the specific conduct is dispositive; the court does not decide whether the threat was a constitutional violation. | not-clearly-established/no-authority-for-specific-conduct | When Sheriff Caudill learned of Johnson’s intentions, he called a meeting with her at which time he allegedly told her that he was “not afraid of lawsuits” and would “no longer need” Johnson if she filed suit.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [5854:6063] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.An official’s actions violate a “clearly established” constitutional right only if “in the light of pre-existing law [,] the unlawfulness” of the actions is apparent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [11809:11975] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.Johnson cites no authority indicating that such a statement violates clearly established law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [15081:15174] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.Even were this action discriminatory, frugality with the distribution of equipment is simply not "specific conduct ... proscribed by ... clearly established law.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [17311:17473] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717. |
| Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; count: termination; subject: count=termination The right (public employee free from gender discrimination) is clearly established in the abstract; immunity granted on the second step because the firing had an undisputed neutral trigger. Whether the task-force exclusion was itself justified is treated as irrelevant. | objectively-reasonable-conduct/termination-after-third-party-ended-core-job-function | After conferring with his supervisor, Sergeant Ruffin decided that the Virginia State Police would no longer fund Johnson’s drug purchases, effectively ending her ability to work with the drug task force.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [3087:3291] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.When Sheriff Caudill learned in February 2004 that Johnson could no longer perform her central job function, he met with Johnson requesting an explanation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [3494:3649] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.Because Johnson was unable to offer an explanation of the incident sufficient to reverse the decision of the Virginia State Police, Sheriff Caudill terminated Johnson’s employment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [3650:3830] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.the question of Sheriff Caudill’s entitlement to qualified immunity condenses to whether a “reasonable officer in [his] position would have appreciated that he was violating [Johnson’s constitutional] right[ ]” to be free from gender discriminationSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [12792:13040] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.the inquiry focuses on whether Sheriff Caudill, when faced with the knowledge that Johnson could no longer participate in the work for which she was hired, acted reasonably in terminating herSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [13470:13661] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.We find Sheriff Caudill’s actions reasonable based on Johnson’s dismissal from the drug task force.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [13663:13762] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717. |
| Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Detention Officer Thomas; subject: party=Detention Officer Thomas Decided on the clearly-established prong only, but the court first overrides the district court's fact finding (risk awareness "blatantly contradicted by the record"), which effectively negates deliberate indifference. Violation of jail double-staffing policy is not a constitutional violation. | not-clearly-established/officer-left-post-without-subjective-knowledge-of-risk | When a gurney was requested from the medical unit, DO Thomas left to deliver it, though having an inmate deliver it would have been permissible under Jail policy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [3750:3912] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.The record indicates that, when DO Thomas left to deliver the gurney for the medical emergency, he knew only that Ms. Henderson was in the tub room and that DO Johnson was in the medical unit outside the tub room.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [27843:28056] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.DO Thomas testified that he believed the door to the tub room was locked when he left. Ms. Henderson presented no evidence to the contrary.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [28057:28196] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [31902:32154] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.the Supreme Court has admonished “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [34744:34847] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.Ms. Henderson has provided no authority clearly establishing that an officer violates the Eighth Amendment when that officer, as here with DO Thomas, has no subjective knowledge of risk of assault to an inmate, leaves to attend to a medical emergency, and does so believing the inmate is in a locked room under the guard of another officer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [35138:35478] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.Moreover, although DO Thomas may have violated Jail policy by leaving the medical unit in the care of only DO Johnson, Ms. Henderson offers no authority to show this was a clearly established constitutional violation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [35479:35696] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40. |
| Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural party: Detention Officer Johnson; subject: party=Detention Officer Johnson Appeal dismissed for lack of interlocutory jurisdiction (challenge to evidence sufficiency); district court's denial of immunity stands unreviewed. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural party: Sheriff Glanz (individual capacity); subject: party=Sheriff Glanz (individual capacity) Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; district court's denial of immunity stands unreviewed. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Detectives Ross and Dluginski; opinion: majority; subject: party=Detectives Ross and Dluginski; opinion=majority No factually similar precedent; the officers' knowledge of the witness's description counts as "information possessed", not subjective intent. Dissent: sheets/hats/seated lineups had been upheld, so the right was defined at too high a level of generality, and reliability of the identifications was ignored. | clearly-established/general-rule-applied-to-novel-suggestive-lineup | Ross’s then-fiancée, Lori Magliaro, submitted an affidavit 31 attesting that Ross had since admitted that he had “contrived a lineup 32 where [Galloway] wore a baseball cap to conceal the difference in 33 hair” and “made adjustments” “to make [him] look taller”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [9312:9573] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.It 22 was clearly established that police could not use identification 23 procedures that are unduly suggestive as to a particular investigation, 24 even if those same procedures would be textbook in another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [21207:21415] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.“[t]he salient question is whether the state of the law gave the 15 defendant fair warning that his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was 16 unconstitutional.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [29074:29234] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.Qualified immunity does not shield Ross and Dluginski.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [21152:21206] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.Ross and Dluginski had such warning: every reasonable 18 officer would have understood that their lineup was unduly likely to 19 result in a misidentificationSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [29301:29459] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f. |
| Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Detective Lipson; opinion: majority; subject: party=Detective Lipson; opinion=majority Majority treats the fair-trial claim as unitary: one clearly established theory defeats immunity for the whole claim. Dissent would grant immunity on the suggestive-photo-array theory. | clearly-established/police-withholding-exculpatory-evidence-from-prosecutor | It was clearly established by 2008 22 that police officers violate Brady when they withhold exculpatory 23 evidence from prosecutors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [19185:19318] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.we need not decide whether they violated clearly 30 established law; Lipson’s qualified immunity defense fails in any 31 event because he misled prosecutors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [19735:19892] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f. |
| Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Qualified immunity for government officials sued in individual capacity (Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Pearson v. Callahan) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Detectives DeCaro and Darienzo; subject: party=Detectives DeCaro and Darienzo Unanimous on this point. | clearly-established/fabrication-of-evidence-by-coercing-witness | By 2008, it was clearly established 18 that police officers violate the due process right to a fair trial if they 19 rig witness identifications, coerce a witness to sign a fabricated 20 inculpatory statement, or ensure that the state withholds evidence of 21 the same from the defense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [14531:14817] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.we find no error of law in the district court’s determination 32 that a rational jury could find all five individual defendants liable for 33 violating Galloway’s clearly established right to a fair trial.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [15454:15659] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Evaluating the qualified immunity defense is thus a two-step process. The first is to determine whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated by conduct that, viewed from the officer's perspective and information at the time, is objectively unreasonable.
Cole v. Carson — 935 F.3d 444 · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1983: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)
Evaluating the qualified immunity defense is thus a two-step process. The first is to determine whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated by conduct that, viewed from the officer's perspective and information at the time, is objectively unreasonable.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0444-01; Unicode character offsets [0:255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 573ddb6e2744440a7e6222022cf21f9806077383c1923706cdb627b4adef74d4.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
interpretation
Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.
Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
Thus, at summary judgment, we must grant qualified immunity unless the plaintiff can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s conduct.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [31902:32154] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
interpretation
the Supreme Court has admonished “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”
Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
the Supreme Court has admonished “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_813.jsonl#/f3d/813/0938-01; Unicode character offsets [34744:34847] (end exclusive); SHA-256 716c6c7b3cb2dd26448ea815f36cfccade2304aa36f8155043a90af21345fb40.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
interpretation
An official’s actions violate a “clearly established” constitutional right only if “in the light of pre-existing law [,] the unlawfulness” of the actions is apparent.
Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
An official’s actions violate a “clearly established” constitutional right only if “in the light of pre-existing law [,] the unlawfulness” of the actions is apparent.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_475.jsonl#/f3d/475/0645-01; Unicode character offsets [11809:11975] (end exclusive); SHA-256 30727309c1ebc11dd668c942b1108b6857a301484b72823436c570f211451717.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
interpretation
“[t]he salient question is whether the state of the law gave the 15 defendant fair warning that his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was 16 unconstitutional.”
Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
“[t]he salient question is whether the state of the law gave the 15 defendant fair warning that his alleged treatment of the plaintiff was 16 unconstitutional.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/417; Unicode character offsets [29074:29234] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ffd06c7c495fbf996a4a6d1e4a3336db8e40aa112435c30b895506a5be4e900f.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).
interpretation
Thus, even if the officer unreasonably used force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should be granted if the officer had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief about the legality of the officer’s actions.
Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Thus, even if the officer unreasonably used force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity should be granted if the officer had a reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief about the legality of the officer’s actions.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [35495:35721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.Two-prong test (which courts may address in either order under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): (1) whether the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether the unlawfulness of the conduct was "clearly established" at the time so as to give fair warning (Hope v. Pelzer; Mullenix v. Luna).