Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)

DEFENSE · 42usc1983:statute-of-limitations

Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).

Exact element source

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [441:516] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.

Routes and case patterns

Curated routes and observed case patterns
RouteDefinitionMerits instance blocksDistinct merits casesExamples (up to 3 cases per count group)
_whole
accepted; provisional (1 case)
The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element.1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1

Bird v. Hawaii — 935 F.3d 738 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: registry listing discovered in 2012, suit threatened in May 2013, complaint filed July 2015 under a two-year borrowed period; ongoing effects of the listing are not a continuing violation

borrowed-state-period
provisional; 2 observed cases
Which state limitations period is borrowed and whether the claim was filed within it.2
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
2

Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: borrowed-state-personal-injury-period/filed-within-two-years

Codrington v. Dolak — 142 F.4th 884 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: Kentucky one-year period; claims accrued at the 2018 search or at the 2019 indictment and suit was filed in November 2021

relation-back
provisional; 2 observed cases
Whether an amendment naming new defendants relates back.1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 1
1

Nobre v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety — 935 F.3d 437 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: proper plaintiffs (decedent's children) substituted sixteen days after the borrowed one-year period; prison's own record listed the children

Excluded context examples:

Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/procedural · not counted
Pattern: john-doe-defendants/no-relation-back-for-unnamed-officers

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopePatternExact source quotations
Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; City of Warren; subject: party=John Mandopoulos, Chief of Police; City of Warren

borrowed-state-personal-injury-period/filed-within-two-years
The incident giving rise to Mr. Dye’s complaint occurred on 11 January 2002 and Mr. Dye filed his complaints against Chief Mando-poulos, the City and John Does 1-5 on 23 December 2003.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [16215:16399] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [15288:15446] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Mr. Dye’s complaint falls within the appropriate time limit with regard to the Chief and the City, but as discussed below, not with regard to John Does 1-5.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [16416:16572] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)satisfied
Excluded from merits counts
applied / procedural

basis: law; party: John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; theory: no Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) relation-back for later-named "John Doe" officers; subject: party=John Does 1-5, unidentified and unserved Warren police officers; theory=no Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) relation-back for later-named "John Doe" officers

john-doe-defendants/no-relation-back-for-unnamed-officers
The John Does 1-5 remain unidentified and unserved by the plaintiff now more than three years from the date of the incident.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [46735:46859] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17838:18064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Any proposed amendment by Mr. Dye, at this late date, to change the John Does 1-5 to identified officers would amount to less than a mistake concerning identity and consequently, could not relate back to his original complaint.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [19143:19370] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Nobre v. Louisiana Department of Public Safety — 935 F.3d 437 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: Louisiana Department of Corrections and the warden (movants asserting limitations); count: limitations defense to the substituted plaintiffs' wrongful-death and § 1983 claims; subject: party=Louisiana Department of Corrections and the warden (movants asserting limitations); count=limitations defense to the substituted plaintiffs' wrongful-death and § 1983 claims

Amended complaint substituting the proper plaintiffs related back under Rule 15(c)(1)(A) and Louisiana's Giroir test, defeating the limitations defense at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
proper plaintiffs (decedent's children) substituted sixteen days after the borrowed one-year period; prison's own record listed the children
Moore's original complaint was filed on September 14, 2016, within the relevant limitation periods; Nobre and Guidry's amended complaint was filed on March 9, 2017, after that period had expired.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [6224:6419] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In fact, the amended complaint differs from Moore's original pleading only with respect to who is bringing the claims.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [9732:9850] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The document unambiguously indicates that the Department-which produced and maintained this document-knew of Cotton's two children.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [11204:11335] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But the defendants present no indication that allowing the amendment to relate back would prejudice their capacity to defend the suit, for example, that they would be deprived of relevant proof.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [14778:14972] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To determine whether the amended complaint relates back to Moore's original complaint, the court applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [6420:6566] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It would be allowed to relate back under Louisiana law, and is also allowed to relate back under Rule 15(c)(1).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [15253:15364] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We REVERSE the district court's dismissal of Nobre and Guidry's wrongful death and Section 1983 claims as time barred and remand for further proceedings.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0437-01; Unicode character offsets [15370:15523] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c42f026aa15bf95c29605ff54082b4171e737a7e3d26b8b2dcf033e38e1f73e6.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Bird v. Hawaii — 935 F.3d 738 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: State of Hawai'i, its Department of Human Services and state officials; count: procedural due process challenge to listing on the Central Child Abuse Registry without notice or hearing; theory: federal discovery rule of accrual; no exception for facial challenges to an ongoing scheme; continuing-violations doctrine inapplicable to an individualized claim; subject: party=State of Hawai'i, its Department of Human Services and state officials; count=procedural due process challenge to listing on the Central Child Abuse Registry without notice or hearing; theory=federal discovery rule of accrual; no exception for facial challenges to an ongoing scheme; continuing-violations doctrine inapplicable to an individualized claim

Section 1983 borrows Hawai'i's two-year personal-injury period; accrual is governed by the federal discovery rule; the panel declines to exempt facial challenges to an ongoing statutory scheme and holds the continuing-violations doctrine inapplicable to an individualized due process claim.
registry listing discovered in 2012, suit threatened in May 2013, complaint filed July 2015 under a two-year borrowed period; ongoing effects of the listing are not a continuing violation
In a letter dated May 14, 2013, Bird's attorney indicated to DHS that Bird would "proceed with litigation" if she was not removed from the registry.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [11588:11736] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Bird did not file suit, however, until July 20, 2015-more than two years after her extensive communications with DHS and previous threat to sue.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [999:1143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The only instance Bird has identified where she sought and was denied a post-deprivation hearing occurred prior to May 2013.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [33690:33814] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Nevertheless, because DHS did not conclude that its initial assessment was "frivolous or in bad faith," DHS took no action and Bird remained on the CCAR as a "confirmed" child abuser.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [8453:8636] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Although Bird's injuries resulting from the 2007 act of placing her on the CCAR continue to the present day, continuing effect is insufficient to constitute a continuing violation.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [32523:32703] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [1290:1518] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Accordingly, her suit, filed in July 2015, was outside the two-year statute of limitations.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [34122:34213] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Codrington v. Dolak — 142 F.4th 884 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Borrowed state personal-injury statute of limitations (42 U.S.C. § 1988; Wilson v. Garcia; Owens v. Okure)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: Officers Dolak, Blissett and Kirk (Louisville Metro Police Department); count: unlawful search and seizure, selective enforcement and false arrest / imprisonment claims; subject: party=Officers Dolak, Blissett and Kirk (Louisville Metro Police Department); count=unlawful search and seizure, selective enforcement and false arrest / imprisonment claims

Search-and-seizure claim accrued at the search; selective-enforcement and false-arrest claims accrued when legal process began (grand jury charge). The fabrication and malicious-prosecution claims were timely because they accrue on favorable termination (n. 2) and are not part of this block. A new "continuing trespass" accrual argument was forfeited.
Kentucky one-year period; claims accrued at the 2018 search or at the 2019 indictment and suit was filed in November 2021
Codrington’s complaint challenges the unlawful search and seizure of his person, which occurred on August 10, 2018.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [10294:10409] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But he did not file his complaint until November 3, 2021, more than two years after the search.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [10542:10637] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As explained above, Kentucky initiated legal process against Codrington, at the latest, on February 12, 2019, when a grand jury charged him with his alleged crimes.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [17429:17593] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Indeed, Codrington conceded at oral argument that, with respect to the search and seizure of his person, this claim is time-barred.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [10785:10916] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Therefore, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 413.140(1)(a), Codrington’s § 1983 claims are governed by a one-year statute of limitations.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [9358:9490] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Because Codrington filed suit more than a year after these claims accrued, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on these three claims.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [9610:9787] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.

Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

As § 1983 contains no statute of limitations, federal courts apply the most analogous state statute of limitations, which is that for personal injury actions.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [15288:15446] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).

interpretation

This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.

Dye v. City of Warren — 367 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio · 2005 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

This requirement is not satisfied where the caption of an original complaint refers to “John Doe” officers and, after the expiration of the applicable limitations period, an amended complaint specifically names those officers.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_367.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/367/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17838:18064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a691ce28535a7c307a739684761f22ce436f22e5bc46c2a6c0235a33bf67199f.

Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).

interpretation

Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.

Bird v. Hawaii — 935 F.3d 738 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))

Because Bird's complaint is not subject to any exception from the normal discovery rule of accrual, we agree that Bird's claim accrued no later than May 2013, when Bird threatened to sue DHS if she was not removed from the CCAR.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0738-01; Unicode character offsets [1290:1518] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a1b6fa995dfd9828c40aad68ff423848239a7e998a4107824207d521b499713a.

Length of limitations period and tolling are borrowed from state residual personal-injury law (Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (1989)), while accrual date is governed by federal law (Wallace v. Kato; Reed v. Goertz).