AND · 42usc1983:policy
Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).
Exact element source
custom, or usage,Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [115:132] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 9 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 9 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (9). Excluded context examples:Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. — 567 F. Supp. 1159 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of Delaware · 1983 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _comparator accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is used as a yardstick for another statute or question, not applied to this case's own conduct. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:United States v. Town of Colorado City — 935 F.3d 804 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| _derivative accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element stands or falls with another element or claim and receives no independent analysis. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Codrington v. Dolak — 142 F.4th 884 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2025 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| final-policymaker provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the decision was made or ratified by an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur, Praprotnik). | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — satisfied · triable (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. — 567 F. Supp. 1159 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of Delaware · 1983 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Kamenesh v. City of Miami — 772 F. Supp. 583 (1991) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida · 1991 — satisfied · triable (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; party: City of Miami and official-capacity defendants; subject: party=City of Miami and official-capacity defendants Single personnel decisions by the chief, ratified by the city manager, suffice; final ruling reserved for trial. | police-chief-decision-ratified-by-city-manager | Police Chief Dickson elected instead to impose a six month extension of Kamenesh’s probationary period as captain and to eliminate forty hours of Plaintiff’s earned overtime.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [3230:3404] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6.Dickson accepted Oboz’s recommendations to transfer Kamenesh out of SIS and to instigate an Internal Security investigation into Kamenesh’s associations with Anatasia and his alleged insubordination to Oboz.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [2396:2603] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6.the decisions of the two police chiefs involved and the direct and indirect ratification of those decisions by two different city managers concerning the incidents complained of constitute acts by “final policymakers”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_772.jsonl#/f-supp/772/0583-01; Unicode character offsets [23447:23664] (end exclusive); SHA-256 61ce8424e918ef86a19d77a8269d686f5594190217c2ebcc63814df5bb34edd6. |
| Dodson v. Polk County — 628 F.2d 1104 (1980) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 1980 — not · pleaded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: Polk County (entity); subject: party=Polk County (entity) Deficient as pleaded but leave to amend ordered on remand, so the failure is provisional. | policy-or-custom/entity-named-only-as-source-of-authority | . The portion of the complaint which names Polk County reads as follows: “Polk County is enjoined [sic-perhaps “joined” is meant] in this action because it is the political basis, and the source that authorized it’s [sic] political sub-divisions and it’s [sic] quasi-contractants to act in the manner prescribed in this complaint . . .Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [15735:16070] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf.Even though we interpret the allegations expansively, we are unable to say that the complaint alleges the necessary county involvement in the claimed unconstitutional conduct by virtue of the execution of county policy or custom.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_628.jsonl#/f2d/628/1104-01; Unicode character offsets [12870:13099] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d2c865685b00f7d491a6a0a10e31df9c82bf1a5e46d7bc2a6fe79468154f11bf. |
| Calabretta v. Floyd — 189 F.3d 808 (1999) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1999 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Johnson v. Caudill — 475 F.3d 645 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2007 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Henderson v. Glanz — 813 F.3d 938 (2015) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2015 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsSheriff did not appeal in his official capacity. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff — 935 F.3d 633 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed; 42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: City of Pine Bluff; count: race discrimination in termination (42 U.S.C. § 1981 right enforced through § 1983); theory: no municipal damages liability when no municipal official committed the underlying wrong (City of Los Angeles v. Heller); subject: party=City of Pine Bluff; count=race discrimination in termination (42 U.S.C. § 1981 right enforced through § 1983); theory=no municipal damages liability when no municipal official committed the underlying wrong (City of Los Angeles v. Heller) The City's separate argument that no official custom of race discrimination was the moving force behind the termination is not reached: the judgment is reversed because no municipal official was shown to have discriminated at all (see the deprivation blocks). | Unspecified route | Where a plaintiff seeks damages based on alleged illegal actions of a municipal official, there is no authority to award damages against the municipality when the jury concludes that the official committed no wrong.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [5034:5249] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be. |
| United States v. Town of Colorado City — 935 F.3d 804 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits party: Town of Colorado City (appellant; Hildale City withdrew its appeal); count: 34 U.S.C. § 12601 pattern-or-practice claim brought by the United States; theory: Monell policy-or-custom requirement of § 1983 used as the contrast for respondeat superior liability under § 12601; subject: party=Town of Colorado City (appellant; Hildale City withdrew its appeal); count=34 U.S.C. § 12601 pattern-or-practice claim brought by the United States; theory=Monell policy-or-custom requirement of § 1983 used as the contrast for respondeat superior liability under § 12601 No § 1983 claim was before the court. Monell's policy-or-custom requirement is described only as the yardstick against which § 12601 is construed: the text of § 1983 ("custom", "causes to be subjected") is what supports Monell, and § 12601 lacks both phrases. | _comparator | Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local government's "policy or custom" led to the plaintiff's injury.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0804-01; Unicode character offsets [9027:9167] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c8c8a082e238f939ada99fe6c822fed1224a701feedd83954fbc385779bf849a.That difference is important because, by including "custom" in § 1983, Congress expressly contemplated imposing liability on actors who violated constitutional rights under an official policy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0804-01; Unicode character offsets [11190:11382] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c8c8a082e238f939ada99fe6c822fed1224a701feedd83954fbc385779bf849a.We likewise decline to extend Monell 's holding to claims pursuant to § 12601.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0804-01; Unicode character offsets [10774:10852] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c8c8a082e238f939ada99fe6c822fed1224a701feedd83954fbc385779bf849a. |
| Galloway v. County of Nassau — 141 F.4th 417 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2025 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Codrington v. Dolak — 142 F.4th 884 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2025 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government; count: Monell claims (custom of race-based traffic stops; failure to train); subject: party=Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government; count=Monell claims (custom of race-based traffic stops; failure to train) The district court rejected the Monell claims only because no underlying violation survived; with the fabrication claim revived, the judgment on Monell is vacated and the merits are left to the district court. | _derivative | “there can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [29909:29997] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.Given our No. 24-5831 Codrington v. Dolak, et al. Page 14 revival of the fabrication-of-evidence claim, we vacate the district court’s Monell conclusions and remand for the district court to consider the merits in the first instance.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [30454:30687] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a. |
| Hafer v. Melo — 502 U.S. 21 (1991) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1991 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsStated only as a contrast: personal-capacity plaintiffs need not show an entity policy or custom; official-capacity plaintiffs must. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Hudson v. McMillian — 503 U.S. 1 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Municipal policy or custom as moving force (Monell v. Department of Social Services) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: School District of Philadelphia, self-insurer and municipal corporation (own certiorari petition denied); subject: party=School District of Philadelphia, self-insurer and municipal corporation (own certiorari petition denied) School District of Philadelphia (self-insurer, municipal corporation) was a defendant, but its state-actor status and any Monell question were never decided. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local government's "policy or custom" led to the plaintiff's injury. Monell , 436 U.
United States v. Town of Colorado City — 935 F.3d 804 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
Instead, to establish municipal liability, a plaintiff must show that a local government's "policy or custom" led to the plaintiff's injury. Monell , 436 U.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0804-01; Unicode character offsets [9027:9183] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c8c8a082e238f939ada99fe6c822fed1224a701feedd83954fbc385779bf849a.Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).
interpretation
The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights — 503 U.S. 115 (1992) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1992 (42usc1983: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_503.jsonl#/us/503/0115-01; Unicode character offsets [8208:8382] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cdcb0d53dc7d297333c59be23c4699c1e9264a24434e59748ddb5fbaeb69f046.Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).
interpretation
Consequently, we vacate the district court’s derivative judgment in favor of defendants on Codrington’s claims under Monell v.
Codrington v. Dolak — 142 F.4th 884 (2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2025 (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
Consequently, we vacate the district court’s derivative judgment in favor of defendants on Codrington’s claims under Monell v.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/884; Unicode character offsets [2309:2435] (end exclusive); SHA-256 997b387c2c89f1d2c34461257739053b3dcd8941cb6ef00e0ce9f261c8d7c09a.Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).
not-required
Respondeat superior / vicarious liability is rejected; municipality is not liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor (Monell, 436 U.S. at 691)
No source quotation recorded.