United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994-10-21
42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: comparator; posture: civil; ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623) refusal-to-hire suit by EEOC; summary judgment for employer on disparate impact affirmed by CA7; Title VII cited only by analogy/contrast; result: not-decided; claim: (a)(2)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
`role comparator` now keeps this file out of the 2000e-2 instances, but the valuable datum is still unexpressed: a cross-statute link (this case is an INSTANCE of 29usc623; for 2000e-2 it is interpretive gloss on (a)(2) -- "same words, different result" because the ADEA mirror provision omits applicants). The comparator block therefore still carries fact/held quotes that belong to the sibling statute; v1 has no pointer to the law they are really facts of.
Dissent (Cudahy, J.) argues Title VII impact doctrine carries over wholesale and that business necessity already plays the role of the RFOA clause. v1 has `scope dissent`, but no quote from the dissent was captured and a dissent block would be about the ADEA, not this statute; left unrecorded.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 33
| Case | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | adverse-action-a2 statutory route or exception | employment-agency-route statutory route or exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: comparator/merits | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: comparator/merits | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: comparator/merits | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 7–12 of 33
| Case | labor-organization-route statutory route or exception | training-program statutory route or exception | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | Bona fide occupational qualification (§ 2000e-2(e)(1)) | Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: comparator/merits |
Elements 13–18 of 33
| Case | Bona fide seniority/merit system or professionally developed ability test (§ 2000e-2(h)) | Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) | Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) | communist-organization statutory route or exception | Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) | indian-preference statutory route or exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 19–24 of 33
| Case | Subsection (n) limits challenges to covered litigated or consent judgments or orders | judgment-order-scope statutory route or exception | k2-intentional-limit statutory route or exception | k3-controlled-substance statutory route or exception | labor-organization-causation statutory route or exception | national-security statutory route or exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 25–30 of 33
| Case | no-preference-imbalance statutory route or exception | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations | religious-institution statutory route or exception | test-score-discrimination statutory route or exception | Rejected "bottom-line" racial or gender balance defense to a discriminatory pass/fail barrier (Connecticut v. Teal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 31–33 of 33
| Case | Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) | Rejected defense that an adverse CBA arbitration precludes a Title VII action (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver) | Mixed-motive same-decision partial affirmative defense (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2); theory: ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick; subject: theory=ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick No Title VII claim. The court reads 2000e-2(a)(2) (which covers "applicants for employment") as the textual home of Griggs impact liability and uses the ADEA's omission of applicants, plus the RFOA clause and Hazen Paper, to refuse to carry Title VII impact theory over to an age claim by an applicant. The held line decides the ADEA claim, not this statute. The fact lines are ADEA facts (age, not a 2000e-2 trait); their polarity is stated relative to the ANALOGOUS impact showing (a neutral salary cap falling more harshly on older applicants), not relative to any Title VII element. | cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii | The EEOC claims that due to the statistically significant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a low maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate percentage of applicants over the age of forty from consideration for the teaching position.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4451:4721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Johnson was sixty-three years old and claimed to have thirty years of experience.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1671:1752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.One of the reasons given for the decision was that Johnson qualified for a salary higher than Parker could afford.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1833:1947] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [10810:10898] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [12504:12622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd. |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) The trait is age, which is not a 2000e-2 trait. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
hypothetical
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.