AND · 42usc2000e-2:motivating-factor
(formerly `variant mixed-motive`) Protected trait was a motivating factor among other lawful factors, proved by direct or circumstantial evidence Added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§ 107(a)): establishes an unlawful employment practice whenever a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if lawful factors also motivated the practice.
Exact element source
an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [11488:11734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 5 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 5 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (5). Excluded context examples:Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 1 | Mawakana v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia — 926 F.3d 859 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — satisfied · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/lower-court · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) (m) is quoted in the standards and pleaded in the complaint, but the court analyses only single-motive McDonnell Douglas; the 1991 Act claims against APC had been dismissed as pre-enactment conduct. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a); 2000e(k) The court quotes a "motivating factor" formulation for pregnancy discrimination but analyses the case entirely under McDonnell Douglas pretext, not 2000e-2(m). | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary — 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Mawakana v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia — 926 F.3d 859 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a), (m) The court skips the prima facie and pretext steps (the employer having proffered a reason) and goes to "the ultimate question of discrimination vel non", which it frames under § 2000e-2(m). | dean-influence-differential-scholarship-criteria-and-racial-pattern-in-tenure-outcomes | Consistent with Penn 's suggestion, we believe that Ewing and the concept of academic freedom do not entitle a university to special deference in Title VII tenure cases.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [8901:9070] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.Specifically, we ask whether a reasonable jury could find that Mawakana's race was a "motivating factor" in the University's decision to deny him tenure.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [13082:13235] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.But the University treated a co-authored work as inferior in assessing the application of a black candidate, Joint Appendix (JA) 1205, even though it did not do so in assessing the application of a white candidate, JA 1235-78.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [14406:14632] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.She originally recommended Mawakana for promotion because the article was "of high quality, it reflects originality, creativity, and intellectual inquiry, and it contributes to the growth and understanding of the law," JA 1156, but she later agreed with the faculty committee's concern about Mawakana's scholarship, which resulted in its finding that the same article did not meet tenure standards, JA 397.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [16552:16958] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.Indeed, the chairman of the faculty review committee wrote in an email to another faculty member: "After losing 4 colleagues these past months, all faculty of color, ... I am not inclined to be pressured by more of [Broderick's] efforts to clean her house."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [18777:19034] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.Fourth , two members of the University faculty who were privy to the internal workings of the tenure review process testified that they believed the University had disfavored black professors within that process.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [19044:19256] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.Fifth , of the eight white applicants who applied for tenure between the time Broderick became the Dean in 1999 and the time Mawakana filed suit in 2014, each one received tenure.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [19278:19457] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.By contrast, of the seven black professors who applied for tenure within that time period, only five received tenure.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [19467:19584] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf.These five factors, taken together and viewed in the light most favorable to Mawakana , raise a plausible inference that race was a motivating factor in the University's decision to deny Mawakana tenure.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [20043:20246] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf. |
| Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1),(m); party: plaintiff Catharina Costa, warehouse worker (respondent); count: Title VII sex-discrimination claim tried to the jury (discipline and termination); subject: party=plaintiff Catharina Costa, warehouse worker (respondent); count=Title VII sex-discrimination claim tried to the jury (discipline and termination) Pure construction of (m): "demonstrates" carries no heightened/direct-evidence requirement, so a mixed-motive instruction may rest on circumstantial evidence. The Court approves the instruction and affirms; it does not itself review whether the evidence was sufficient (the en banc CA9 had so held). | circumstantial-evidence/harsher-discipline-than-male-coworker | Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [11483:11655] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df.In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [17217:17497] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df.Because direct evidence of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving a mixed-motive instruction to the jury.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [17498:17722] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df. |
| Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — satisfied · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / lower-court basis: proved; claim: (a)(1),(m); party: plaintiff Catharina Costa, warehouse worker (respondent); count: Title VII sex-discrimination claim tried to the jury (discipline and termination); subject: party=plaintiff Catharina Costa, warehouse worker (respondent); count=Title VII sex-discrimination claim tried to the jury (discipline and termination) Jury verdict for the employee on comparative-discipline and slur evidence, reinstated by the en banc Court of Appeals; left standing, not re-weighed, by the Supreme Court. | circumstantial-evidence/harsher-discipline-than-male-coworker | Petitioner disciplined both employees because the facts surrounding the incident were in dispute, but Gerber, who had a clean disciplinary record, received only a 5-day suspension.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [5703:5883] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df.At trial, respondent presented evidence that (1) she was singled out for “intense ‘stalking’ ” by one- of her supervisors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men for the same conduct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly “stack[ed]” her disciplinary record and “frequently used or tolerated” sex-based slurs against her.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [6212:6607] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df. |
| Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [11483:11655] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df.(formerly `variant mixed-motive`) Protected trait was a motivating factor among other lawful factors, proved by direct or circumstantial evidence Added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§ 107(a)): establishes an unlawful employment practice whenever a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if lawful factors also motivated the practice.
interpretation
In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_539.jsonl#/us/539/0090-01; Unicode character offsets [17217:17497] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a7e4d9846d799473649658702ae2649d2f44f3694664d7d3e7eb291f31597df.(formerly `variant mixed-motive`) Protected trait was a motivating factor among other lawful factors, proved by direct or circumstantial evidence Added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§ 107(a)): establishes an unlawful employment practice whenever a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if lawful factors also motivated the practice.
not-required
Direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under § 2000e-2(m); circumstantial evidence suffices (Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003))
No source quotation recorded.