OR · 42usc2000e-2:employer
An employer's discharge decision lies only against the employer under § 2000e-2(a), whereas a union is liable only under § 2000e-2(c) (such as causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate under (c)(3)).
Exact element source
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [63:123] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agencySource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [739:807] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [1122:1191] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; provisional (1 case) | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. — 510 U.S. 17 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| _procedural accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is only the occasion for a procedural ruling. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Garcia v. Salvation Army — 918 F.3d 997 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/procedural · not counted |
| employee-status provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the plaintiff is an employee of the defendant at all (remuneration, control). | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Sacchi v. Ihc Health Servs., Inc. — 918 F.3d 1155 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| individual-liability provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether an individual supervisor or co-worker can be liable as an employer. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| labor-organization provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether a union is answerable for the challenged action. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| private-employer provisional; 8 observed cases | Whether a private entity is a covered employer. | 8 Satisfied 8; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 8 | Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Beck v. Figeac Aero N. Am., Inc. — 382 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Kansas · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| public-employer provisional; 7 observed cases | Whether a government body is a covered employer. | 7 Satisfied 7; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 7 | Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Henderson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. — 384 F. Supp. 3d 199 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Luceus v. Rhode Island — 923 F.3d 255 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| religious-organization provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether a religious organization is a covered employer for the claim, or exempt. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Garcia v. Salvation Army — 918 F.3d 997 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) | municipal-police-department | Plaintiffs are eight District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department officers employed in the Canine Unit of the Special Operations Division.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [517:662] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1. |
| Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1) | private-retailer | On July 24, 2007, Raymour and Flanigan, a furniture company, hired Glenn, an African-American male, as a Facility Technician in its Frazer, Pennsylvania service center (“Frazer Service Center”).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [685:879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f. |
| Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a); party: Jessica Dagg, individual supervisor; subject: party=Jessica Dagg, individual supervisor | supervisor-who-hired-and-fired-plaintiff-sued-personally | Ms. Dagg was an employee of Staples and not Plaintiff's employer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [10372:10437] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.Title VII does not provide for individual employee liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [10175:10236] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claims against Ms. Dagg are dismissed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [10438:10511] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090. |
| Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (a); party: Staples Contract & Commercial LLC; subject: party=Staples Contract & Commercial LLC Not contested: the court treats Staples as "her employer" without discussing the staffing-agency placement. | temp-agency-worker-placed-with-client-company | On April 13, 2015, Kforce Professional Staffing ("Kforce") placed Plaintiff in a temporary assignment with Staples to assist Ms. Dagg's project team with clean-up of procurement databases.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [799:987] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.Her employer took an adverse action against her by terminating her employment earlier than expected.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [13766:13866] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090. |
| Beck v. Figeac Aero N. Am., Inc. — 382 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Kansas · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (a) Not contested. | aerospace-parts-company-with-french-manager | Beck worked as a buyer for Figeac from January to April, 2017.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_382.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/382/1170-01; Unicode character offsets [803:865] (end exclusive); SHA-256 bf0e94769a9c76f63453f558a56b227b214ef9156a48d4a1c1aac4c3a3426919. |
| Henderson v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. — 384 F. Supp. 3d 199 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1) Not contested. | regional-transit-authority | He has continued as a laborer foreman at the MBTA to this day.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_384.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/384/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [9158:9220] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f2ca6c3947bf244a4721dd31600d039f6edeee5495b8fbf1162bb88bd7df3405. |
| Turner v. Barber-Scotia College — 604 F. Supp. 1450 (1985) · United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 — satisfied · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; claim: (a); party: Barber-Scotia College; subject: party=Barber-Scotia College | church-owned-college | Defendant Barber-Scotia College (BSC) is an institution of higher learning and is an employer within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [1156:1314] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8. |
| Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: Alabama Power Co. (APC); subject: party=Alabama Power Co. (APC) | private-utility-long-term-employee | APC employed Breech in various positions from January, 1977 until July, 1991 when he was terminated in response to four unexcused absences.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [1070:1209] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: IBEW System Council U-19 (Union); subject: party=IBEW System Council U-19 (Union) A union can be reached only under (c)(3) (causing the employer to discriminate); that theory was neither argued nor supported, so the discharge claim against the union fails at the threshold. | union-sued-for-employers-discharge | This action was brought by plaintiff Alan Breech (“Breech”) against his former employer, APC, and the union of which he was a member during his employment with APC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19 (“Union”).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [570:818] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has presented absolutely no evidence on this point; nor has he made specific arguments in his brief that the Union violated § 2000e-2(c)(3).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [21381:21528] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [20836:21002] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a); 2000e(k) | small-private-company-owner-supervisor | CARS hired Jane Doe as a graphic artist in June 1999.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [1537:1590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Fred Kohl, Vice-President and part-owner of the company, was Doe’s supervisor.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [1656:1734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary — 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) | private-university | Colorado Seminary owns and operates the University of Denver (“DU”), including DU’s Health and Counseling Center (“HCC”), which provides wellness services such as counseling to DU’s student body.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [571:766] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.In November 2011, DU hired Dr. Hiatt to be a Staff Psychologist and the Training Director at the HCC.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [767:868] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f. |
| Garcia v. Salvation Army — 918 F.3d 997 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-1(a); theory: the religious organization exemption (2000e-1(a)) applies to this employer and reaches these claims; subject: theory=the religious organization exemption (2000e-1(a)) applies to this employer and reaches these claims The exemption applied is 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a) (Title VII "shall not apply to an employer with respect to ... a religious corporation ..."), NOT the 2000e-2(e)(2) educational-institution exception that the law file declares as `religious-institution`. It is recorded on `employer` because the route `religious-organization` is defined as "covered employer for the claim, or exempt". Polarity is relative to the Salvation Army being a COVERED employer for these claims: religious character and the religion-based nature of the claims cut against. Two rulings: (A) the Salvation Army, a church, is a religious organization (15% sales revenue does not defeat that); (B) the exemption is not limited to hiring and firing: it reaches religion-based hostile-environment and retaliation claims. | church-employer-exempt-from-religion-based-harassment-and-retaliation-claims | In 2002, the Corps hired Garcia to work as an assistant to the pastor, a position she held until July 2010, when Arlene and Dionisio Torres became the new pastors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [1505:1668] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.The Salvation Army holds regular religious services.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [6533:6585] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Here in the United States, the Salvation Army operates through 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporations.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [1093:1189] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Three days later, Garcia filed an internal grievance of her own against Torres, claiming that she "fe[lt] discriminated against and excluded and isolated" at work ever since leaving the church.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [2445:2638] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.In applying the ROE, we determine whether an institution's "purpose and character are primarily religious" by weighing "[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [5609:5786] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Because the ROE permits religious organizations to discriminate based on religion, retaliation claims based on religious discrimination fail against protected organizations because the practice "opposed" is not "unlawful."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [12775:12997] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.The record establishes that, as a church, the Salvation Army is "clearly" religious.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [7015:7099] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Absent prejudice resulting from the Salvation Army's failure to timely raise the defense, however, the ROE forecloses Garcia's Title VII claims for retaliation and hostile work environment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [30952:31141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213. |
| Garcia v. Salvation Army — 918 F.3d 997 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: law; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-1(a); theory: whether the exemption is jurisdictional or was forfeited by not being pleaded; subject: theory=whether the exemption is jurisdictional or was forfeited by not being pleaded Procedural ruling: the district court erred in treating the exemption as jurisdictional (Arbaugh); it is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and can be forfeited, but here the late assertion caused no prejudice, so the exemption still applies. Polarity is relative to the exemption being unavailable (i.e. the Salvation Army remaining a covered employer). | exemption-not-pleaded-in-answer-but-raised-at-summary-judgment-without-prejudice | The Salvation Army did not raise the ROE in its answer but insists that it pleaded enough to put Garcia on notice.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [21331:21445] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.But as a former member of the Salvation Army's congregation, Garcia was intimately familiar with its religious focus and mission.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [23433:23562] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Even so, "[i]n the absence of a showing of prejudice ... an affirmative defense may be raised for the first time at summary judgment."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [22763:22897] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.We hold that the ROE is nonjurisdictional and subject to procedural forfeiture.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [30872:30951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213.Absent prejudice, the Salvation Army permissibly invoked the ROE at summary judgment, and it applies to foreclose Garcia's Title VII claims.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/0997-01; Unicode character offsets [23981:24121] (end exclusive); SHA-256 4482ee745ce02a4e1c2f69943f5c6ce8899574c95ee0886292f463dd63e1e213. |
| Sacchi v. Ihc Health Servs., Inc. — 918 F.3d 1155 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (a), (d) Threshold-remuneration test: an unpaid worker must first show direct pay or substantial, non-incidental indirect benefits before the common-law agency test is reached. Benefits not provided by the hospital itself and contingent on later events (passing the exam, being hired) are too attenuated. | unpaid-intern-claiming-certification-eligibility-and-path-to-employment-as-remuneration | Relevant to this appeal, Ms. Sacchi received no direct payment or other benefits for her work as an intern.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [2748:2855] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.The Hospital's internship program is designed to satisfy the clinical experience requirement, and the program is accredited and recognized by the Child Life Council.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [3559:3724] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.Although an internship was required for Ms. Sacchi to sit for a professional exam, she still had to pass the exam to receive her child life certification.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [8667:8821] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.For her to have obtained a position thereafter, she still had to find an open position, apply for that position, and then be selected over all other applicants in what Ms. Sacchi noted is a competitive field.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [8843:9051] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.In general, to satisfy the test, the plaintiff must receive direct remuneration or indirect benefits that are substantial or significant and not incidentally related to advancing the purpose of the putative employer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [7260:7476] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.We conclude that Ms. Sacchi's intern relationship with the Hospital fails to satisfy the threshold-remuneration test as a matter of law for two reasons.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [8146:8298] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390.We also decline the invitation to conclude that all interns are protected by Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_918.jsonl#/f3d/918/1155-01; Unicode character offsets [10169:10279] (end exclusive); SHA-256 07fc3d350d4e048520c297e487140d60fc390217113f71eb61fd2be9d3c62390. |
| Luceus v. Rhode Island — 923 F.3d 255 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a), (k) | state-department-of-labor | Erika Luceus, an employee of the call center of the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, sued the Department and the State of Rhode Island for discrimination in violation of Title VIISource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [27:220] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69. |
| Figueroa v. Pompeo — 923 F.3d 1078 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a), (k) | federal-department-of-state | Until 2009, Richard Figueroa worked as a foreign service officer in the United States Department of State (Department).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/1078-01; Unicode character offsets [730:849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 552900284c7a86a658a4d1c9119fc6b3761a6897adb5c1726273a8c52e4ac943. |
| Mawakana v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia — 926 F.3d 859 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a), (m) | public-university | Law professor Kemit Mawakana was denied tenure and terminated by his employer, the University of the District of Columbia.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_926.jsonl#/f3d/926/0859-01; Unicode character offsets [40:162] (end exclusive); SHA-256 e41e6ee99ed9737bf3b92347c97331ec6c047d8f8abe3135d002e8a6017d03cf. |
| Mayorga v. Merdon — 928 F.3d 84 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a) Title VII reaches the legislative-branch employer through the Congressional Accountability Act (2 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1317), which the opinion cites without discussion. | federal-legislative-branch-architect-of-capitol | Since 2007 Mayorga has been employed at the AOC, a federal agency that operates and maintains certain buildings and historic monuments in the District of Columbia, such as the Capitol, the Capitol Visitor Center, and the Supreme Court.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [1495:1730] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b. |
| Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P'ship — 931 F.3d 799 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a) | title-insurance-company | Community Title hired Mahler in 2012 as vice president of one of the TRN umbrella companies.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/0799-01; Unicode character offsets [806:898] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8dacc83ce7e502f47d50a01ce4f274c8e9529a0841652cd8d421c35b43d57a. |
| Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. — 510 U.S. 17 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); subject: party=defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents) | municipal-fire-department | When the City of New Haven undertook to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department (Department), the promotion and hiring process was governed by the City charter, in addition to federal and state law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [3526:3752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.
Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [20836:21002] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.An employer's discharge decision lies only against the employer under § 2000e-2(a), whereas a union is liable only under § 2000e-2(c) (such as causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate under (c)(3)).