AND · 42usc2000e-2:impact
Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
Exact element source
a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national originSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [8572:8754] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impactSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [9124:9372] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _comparator accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is used as a yardstick for another statute or question, not applied to this case's own conduct. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| specific-practice-causation provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the plaintiff tied the disparity to the specific employment practice challenged. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Figueroa v. Pompeo — 923 F.3d 1078 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| statistical-disparity provisional; 3 observed cases | Whether statistics show the practice disproportionately excludes a protected group, and which comparison population is used. | 2 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 2; excluded context 2 | 2 | Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Luceus v. Rhode Island — 923 F.3d 255 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — satisfied · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/superseded · not counted Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · applied/hypothetical · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — not · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(2); party: plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count: second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory: impact is measured in the hiring round at issue (women competed only with women); subject: party=plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count=second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory=impact is measured in the hiring round at issue (women competed only with women) Height rule that would exclude ~80% of women vs ~20% of men has no sex-based impact where the hiring round was restricted to women: she lost to taller women, not to men. Teal's bar on the bottom-line defense presupposes an impact at some step. [law], not [no-evidence]: the statistics and the hiring sequence were undisputed; the reversal turns only on the legal unit of analysis. | neutral-barrier-applied-to-single-sex-applicant-pool | Because the city needed female officers to perform certain duties, related, for example, to female prisoners, and because there were no women high enough on the integrated list to be hired, the city sought and received approval from the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to hire from a list of exclusively female applicants.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [35583:35921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.The most recent integrated list was therefore separated and the city hired the top two women on the women-only list who also met the 5 feet 6 inches height requirement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [35922:36090] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Without the height requirement, the city would still have hired only two women. The only difference is that plaintiff would have been one of them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [37733:37879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [39478:39646] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.On these facts, the height requirement cannot be viewed as having a disparate effect on women. In the absence of a discriminatory effect, Teal simply does not apply.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [37940:38105] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Plaintiff simply failed to make it over the initial hurdle of demonstrating that the challenged barrier had a discriminatory effect on women.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [36814:36955] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1. |
| Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — satisfied · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / superseded basis: law; claim: (a)(2); party: plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count: second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory: impact is measured by the rule in its general operation (national height statistics; one "police officer" job); opinion: panel (Bownes); subject: party=plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count=second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory=impact is measured by the rule in its general operation (national height statistics; one "police officer" job); opinion=panel (Bownes) Panel measured impact by the rule's general operation (national height data, Dothard) rather than by the particular all-female round; treated "we hired only women" as a forbidden bottom-line defense. The women-only round (third fact) is the fact the employer relied on and the en banc court found dispositive. | general-population-statistics/minimum-height-requirement | Plaintiff produced undisputed evidence that eighty percent of the male population is at least five feet six inches tall, while less than twenty percent of the female population reaches this height.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [3943:4140] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Plaintiff’s name correctly appeared first on this list. Plaintiff, however, was again rejected because she failed to meet the height requirement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [3179:3324] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [9397:9590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [12052:12344] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.We hold that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by making an undisputed showing that New Bedford’s use of its height requirement excluded far more women than men from competing for positions as police officers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [13875:14130] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1. |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2); theory: ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick; subject: theory=ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick No Title VII claim. The court reads 2000e-2(a)(2) (which covers "applicants for employment") as the textual home of Griggs impact liability and uses the ADEA's omission of applicants, plus the RFOA clause and Hazen Paper, to refuse to carry Title VII impact theory over to an age claim by an applicant. The held line decides the ADEA claim, not this statute. The fact lines are ADEA facts (age, not a 2000e-2 trait); their polarity is stated relative to the ANALOGOUS impact showing (a neutral salary cap falling more harshly on older applicants), not relative to any Title VII element. | cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii | The EEOC claims that due to the statistically significant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a low maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate percentage of applicants over the age of forty from consideration for the teaching position.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4451:4721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Johnson was sixty-three years old and claimed to have thirty years of experience.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1671:1752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.One of the reasons given for the decision was that Johnson qualified for a salary higher than Parker could afford.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1833:1947] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [10810:10898] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [12504:12622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd. |
| Luceus v. Rhode Island — 923 F.3d 255 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a), (k) | raw-counts-of-temporary-assignments-without-eligible-pool-or-significance-analysis | Except in unusual cases of overwhelming evidence, intuition is not to be trusted, and in order to reach the required prima facie threshold a plaintiff ordinarily must demonstrate that there is "a significant statistical disparity" between the employment outcomes for white and non-white employees.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [2168:2465] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69.The record shows that between 2009 and September 2014 (when she first complained to the Department's human resources office), only one minority employee received a three-day-rule assignment, as compared with seven white employees.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [1695:1925] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69.Indeed, she has not even presented reliable data on which a statistical conclusion would rest, because she has not established the racial composition of the pools of employees eligible for three-day-rule assignments in the instances she cites.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [3566:3809] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69.Using the data she provided, they presented expert analysis demonstrating that there was "no statistically significant evidence of a disparate impact" stemming from the three-day-rule assignments that were the subject of Luceus's complaint.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [4459:4699] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69.Here, Luceus has failed to demonstrate "a significant statistical disparity" on the basis of race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/0255-01; Unicode character offsets [3229:3327] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9b47ea07fd6337340e8a119cd67028f3678010fb54040f2f276021b253028d69. |
| Figueroa v. Pompeo — 923 F.3d 1078 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a), (k) The court expressly does not decide whether the statistical disparity itself was substantial enough ("We need not decide the propriety of the first holding"). | annual-fresh-review-of-promotion-candidates-not-tied-to-disparity | To make a prima facie case, the plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence "demonstrating a causal connection" between the policy and the disparate impact.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/1078-01; Unicode character offsets [13271:13426] (end exclusive); SHA-256 552900284c7a86a658a4d1c9119fc6b3761a6897adb5c1726273a8c52e4ac943.Among them are statistics from 2006 to 2008 showing that no Hispanic or Latino candidate was promoted to the FS-01 pay grade, even though, during those years, Hispanic and Latino candidates made up 4.0% to 5.8% of the applicant pool and the overall promotion rate was 14.1% to 17.6%.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/1078-01; Unicode character offsets [12250:12533] (end exclusive); SHA-256 552900284c7a86a658a4d1c9119fc6b3761a6897adb5c1726273a8c52e4ac943.Both point to non-statistical evidence, but none of the cited materials even refers to-let alone establishes a connection with-the challenged refresh policy.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/1078-01; Unicode character offsets [13688:13845] (end exclusive); SHA-256 552900284c7a86a658a4d1c9119fc6b3761a6897adb5c1726273a8c52e4ac943.Because no genuine issue of material fact exists and Figueroa fails to establish causation as a matter of law, the Secretary is entitled to summary judgment on the disparate impact claim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_923.jsonl#/f3d/923/1078-01; Unicode character offsets [13846:14033] (end exclusive); SHA-256 552900284c7a86a658a4d1c9119fc6b3761a6897adb5c1726273a8c52e4ac943. |
| Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / hypothetical basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) | exam-pass-rate-below-four-fifths | On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49215:49346] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49347:49500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49057:49214] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
Court interpretations
hypothetical
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.
Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [9397:9590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.
Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [12052:12344] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.
Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [39478:39646] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
not-required
Proof of subjective intent to discriminate (Griggs v. Duke Power Co.; EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994))
No source quotation recorded.