AND · 42usc2000e-2:because-of
(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
Exact element source
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national originSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [320:395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 4 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 4 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (4). Excluded context examples:Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary — 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _procedural accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is only the occasion for a procedural ruling. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P'ship — 931 F.3d 799 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · waived (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/procedural · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P'ship — 931 F.3d 799 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/alternative · not counted |
| comparator provisional; 5 observed cases | Whether similarly situated persons outside the class were treated better, or the same rule was applied to everyone. | 6 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 5; excluded context 0 | 5 | Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| decision-maker-remark provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether a statement by the decision-maker shows the protected trait motivated the action. | 2 Satisfied 2; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 2 | Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted Mayorga v. Merdon — 928 F.3d 84 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| express-classification provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the decision was taken expressly on the basis of the protected trait. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
| harassment-because-of-sex provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether harassing conduct was directed at the plaintiff because of sex. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. — 510 U.S. 17 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — satisfied · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/lower-court · not counted |
| non-protected-motive provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether the real motive, though perhaps unfair or personal, was something other than the protected trait (Hicks). | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 2 | 1 | Turner v. Barber-Scotia College — 604 F. Supp. 1450 (1985) · United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 — not · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/lower-court · not counted St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| temporal-proximity provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether the timing of the action relative to disclosure of the trait or condition supports causation. | 2 Satisfied 2; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 2 | Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) Racial motive for the decision (evidence that officials considered squad racial make-up) is held irrelevant absent a racially differential EFFECT on individuals: "discriminate" is read to require disparate treatment, not just a race-based reason. | differential-treatment/unit-wide-change-applied-to-all-races | On March 6, 2003, Cathy Lanier, Commander of the Special Operations Division, issued a memorandum announcing that the MPD was going to reorganize the Canine Unit so that all canine officers would work five eight-hour shifts per week instead of four ten-hour shifts and would rotate through different shifts instead of being assigned to a permanent day or night shift.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [1653:2020] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.In this case, all officers in the Canine Unit were equally affected by the reorganization in that all officers were required to work rotating shifts regardless of race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [5887:6055] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.They point to evidence that higher level police officials were concerned about the racial make up of the squads when they decided to undertake the reorganization and that those officials took race into account when realigning the squads.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [16300:16537] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15389:15579] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15830:16037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.Given that some sort of different treatment is at the heart of a discrimination claim, plaintiffs’ arguments fail.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [16746:16860] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1. |
| Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: comparators Adams and Copperthwaite (white employees, alleged fight, no discipline); subject: theory=comparators Adams and Copperthwaite (white employees, alleged fight, no discipline) | not-similarly-situated-different-decision-maker-and-unconfirmed-misconduct | He did not see any punches thrown, but observed from a distance some individuals “separating the two of them,” with Adams trying to “pursue” Copperthwaite and saying “if you ever do that again, I’ll snap your F’ing [sic] neck.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [12178:12405] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Regarding the same supervisor argument, Adams and Copperthwaite were employed in the Delivery Department, while Glenn worked in the Operations Department.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [26916:27070] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Critically, the underlying misconduct in Glenn’s case was reported to Glenn’s direct supervisors, confirmed by more than one witness, and admitted to by Glenn himself.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [28600:28767] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Dye’s allegations notwithstanding, Adams’ alleged misconduct was not witnessed by Adams’ direct supervisors, was not reported to those supervisors, and was not admitted to by Adams or Copperthwaite.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [29810:30008] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Therefore, the record is without sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Adams or Copperthwaite are “similarly situated” to Glenn for purposes of establishing the fourth element of his prima facie case.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [30009:30211] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f. |
| Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: comparator Faust (white coworker in the same altercation, given written warning); subject: theory=comparator Faust (white coworker in the same altercation, given written warning) Same supervisor, same incident, but a threat to fight is treated as more serious than name-calling, even assuming the white coworker used a racial epithet ("boy"); the comparator also reported to management while plaintiff did not. | not-similarly-situated-other-party-to-same-altercation-less-serious-conduct | In the March 20 altercation, Glenn admitted that he repeatedly told Faust to “step outside.” Faust did not make a similar threat to Glenn.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [23483:23621] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Furthermore, Faust retreated from the altercation to report it to management.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [23874:23951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.According to Glenn, while he and Faust were pushing the trash box back and forth from their respective work areas, Faust said to him, “Boy, don’t put your box back on this line.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [8799:8977] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Yet at no point during that discussion did Glenn alert Mirth to Faust allegedly calling him a “boy” or goading him to “go ahead, do it.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [24357:24493] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [21739:21858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.In sum, Raymours’ treatment of Faust cannot raise an inference of unlawful discrimination regarding Glenn’s termination because there are differentiating and mitigating circumstances that significantly distinguish both their conduct and Raymours’ treatment of them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [26202:26467] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f. |
| Evans v. Staples, Inc. — 375 F. Supp. 3d 117 (2019) · United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; claim: (a) | segregated-workspace-and-ostracism-once-supervisor-learned-race-then-early-termination | Finally, Plaintiff alleges that after Ms. Dagg learned her race, she was ostracized in the office.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [14077:14175] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.Her emails were ignored, she was never trained to do her job, and she was made to work in a separate and smaller workspace.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [14176:14299] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.At this stage, a "plaintiff must allege a series of facts which at the very least gives rise to an inference of discriminatory animus."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [14511:14646] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090.Taking these allegations as true, it is plausible that Plaintiff was treated differently, and ultimately fired, because of her race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_375.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/375/0117-01; Unicode character offsets [14378:14510] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6049c9626d71ce89b276768b61451e839fe24594dfab66b83a74acb956c07090. |
| Turner v. Barber-Scotia College — 604 F. Supp. 1450 (1985) · United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 — not · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; claim: (a) Replacement by cheaper, less-qualified black and Asian hires and departures from AAUP/SACS procedure did not support an inference of race: the hostility traced to the 1978-79 contract/union dispute. | animus/professional-and-philosophical-conflict-with-administration | Buggs is less qualified than Turner, having only an M.S. degree, but she worked for only $11,800.00; Turner had earned $17,000.00 his last year at BSC, and claims that with salary increments he would have earned $19,000.00 had he been rehired. Buggs is black.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [7710:7969] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Although the percentage of white faculty members was smaller, it should be noted that two new whites were hired after Turner and Goetzman were fired.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [14757:14906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.The administration saw the efforts of Turner and Goetzman as disruptive and counterproductive; they were making waves in already troubled waters.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [22449:22594] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.If certain other faculty members were treated differently, if some received extra assignments and as a corollary slightly more pay, it was due to their being more philosophically aligned with the administration.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [25354:25565] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.It is for the Court to determine whether the wedge driven between the two white professors and the predominantly black school was one of racial animus. The Court concludes that it was not.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [24596:24784] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Therefore, it is concluded that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [25971:26083] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8. |
| Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: APC; theory: disparate treatment; subject: party=APC; theory=disparate treatment Fourth prima facie prong (differential application of discipline) fails: unnamed comparators in plaintiff's own affidavit, and the only identified absentee employees were all fired too. No direct evidence. | conclusory-claim-of-unequal-discipline | In his affidavit, Breech states: “There have been many employees over the years who have had many more than four days absent [sic] for personal reasons who were not terminated. Religious reasons are no different than other personal reasons.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32347:32588] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.First, Breech does not state who the other employees are or the circumstances of them absences, i.e., whether the absences were irregular or cyclical.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32654:32804] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.This evidence does not support Breech’s contention that he was subjected to differential application of work or disciplinary rules: every one of the four employees mentioned was discharged.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33439:33628] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33629:33744] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| Costa v. Markey — 706 F.2d 1 (1982) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(2) Pure disparate-impact theory; no discriminatory purpose alleged ("Absent any discriminatory purpose"). | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Francis W. Parker School — 41 F.3d 1073 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: temporal proximity; subject: theory=temporal proximity | fired-within-days-of-disclosing-condition | Here, Doe was fired on the day her baby was buried, just three working days after she notified Kohl that she would have to undergo an abortion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25674:25817] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The temporal proximity, however, is sufficient here to meet Doe’s minimal prima facie case burden as to the causal connection element.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [26037:26171] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees); subject: theory=comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees) Comparators need not share the plaintiff's immediate supervisor where one decision-maker (Kohl) alone controlled sick-leave permission for everyone. | call-in-rule-enforced-only-against-plaintiff | Mike King, for example, suffered a heart attack while he was employed by CARS and testified that, although he or his wife did call to tell Kohl he was still in the hospital, they did not do so daily, and that he was paid during his absence.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [16343:16583] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Babich testified that for every employee, CARS had a “separate set of rules” and that there was no uniformly enforced rule concerning the use of vacation or sick time.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [17268:17435] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Babich did report directly to Kohl and did not call every day or give a precise return date when she was out.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [19458:19567] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Comparing Doe to other non-pregnant workers who were temporarily disabled, we conclude that Doe has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie ease and has thus raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to defeat summary judgment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14905:15177] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: decision-maker remark; subject: theory=decision-maker remark | ambiguous-comment-about-the-protected-condition | A: On a daily basis, I go into Mr. Kohl’s office to check the warranties, and I was there as he and Alivia were working on whatever, I was checking through the warranties and Alivia said, “I don’t know what all this secrecy behind [the plaintiff] losing her baby was.” And Mr. Kohl said “she didn’t want to take responsibility.” Which upset me.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [22396:22740] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.What is clear is that this particular remark may raise a reasonable inference that the abortion was a factor in terminating Doe’s employment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [24518:24659] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary — 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a) Prima facie case assumed without deciding; the district court had held it failed for lack of comparators, and the panel affirms on the alternative pretext ground instead. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Spencer v. VIRGINIA STATE UNIVERSITY — 919 F.3d 199 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a) The comparator facts are found in the Equal Pay Act section; the Title VII section adopts them by reference ("for the same reasons we discussed above"). | professors-in-other-departments-who-were-former-administrators | Where, as here, the prima facie case of wage discrimination is based on comparators, the plaintiff must show that she is paid less than men in similar jobs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [15432:15588] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c.First, Shackleford and Dial taught in different departments than Spencer did.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [7374:7451] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c.Spencer taught mainly undergraduate courses, while Shackleford and Dial taught more graduate courses.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [8543:8644] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c.Nor did the professors work equal hours, as the record shows that Shackleford and Dial worked more than Spencer did week to week.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [8970:9099] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c.While a plaintiff may use statistics to suggest a discriminatory motive, Spencer's expert found no statistical evidence that the University paid women less than men.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [22978:23143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c.For the same reasons we discussed above, Spencer's broad generalizations cannot even show sufficient similarity to meet her burden under Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_919.jsonl#/f3d/919/0199-01; Unicode character offsets [16926:17073] (end exclusive); SHA-256 74e2ea300edf9e56045848c314f121d888bb4136961d68cc526a9841e8ad680c. |
| Mayorga v. Merdon — 928 F.3d 84 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a) Single-motive claim only: any mixed-motive (§ 2000e-2(m)) theory was forfeited at oral argument, so on remand the plaintiff must prove but-for causation. | mockery-of-hispanic-name-and-accent-by-selection-panelists | disparaging comments of the sort Mayorga describes are "nonetheless probative evidence of a supervisor's discriminatory attitude, at least when it is targeted directly at the plaintiff or is one of a pattern of similar remarks."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [27473:27701] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.Mayorga claims that Bieber and Wallace made fun of his Hispanic first name, regularly calling him "Caviar" instead of Javier, and that Bieber mocks Mayorga's accent and interrupts him in meetings.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [4556:4752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.Furthermore, Mayorga clearly testified that Wallace has previously called him "Caviar" - a particularly significant accusation because Wallace was on the selection panel.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [26624:26794] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.Bieber and Wallace dispute this account of their behavior; Bieber denies ever having worked with Mayorga.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [4753:4858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.To be sure, Mayorga's argument would be stronger if he had drawn a direct connection between the discriminatory name-calling and the selection decisionSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [27292:27443] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.Finally, we reject the AOC's argument that mockery about Mayorga's name and accent does not permit a jury to infer discrimination because Mayorga has not explained how the remarks relate to the decision at issue.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [26795:27007] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b.We conclude Mayorga has proffered evidence from which a jury could infer the AOC discriminated against him.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_928.jsonl#/f3d/928/0084-01; Unicode character offsets [29427:29534] (end exclusive); SHA-256 73316afd8aed8c6e7189982c076c75d00eba558f236e5a018c04b7d74b87504b. |
| Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P'ship — 931 F.3d 799 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; claim: (a) One-sentence alternative ground; the opinion states no facts for it. | no-showing-of-causal-connection-between-termination-and-sex | Even if she did not waive it, summary judgment is proper because Mahler did not show a causal connection between her termination and sex.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/0799-01; Unicode character offsets [17146:17283] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8dacc83ce7e502f47d50a01ce4f274c8e9529a0841652cd8d421c35b43d57a. |
| Mahler v. First Dakota Title Ltd. P'ship — 931 F.3d 799 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · waived (42usc2000e-2: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: waived; claim: (a) The sex-discrimination (termination) claim as a whole is held waived on appeal; the element is only the occasion. | _procedural | Because Mahler's brief does not include this claim in the statement of issues and mentioned it only briefly, she has waived this issue.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_931.jsonl#/f3d/931/0799-01; Unicode character offsets [16574:16709] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8dacc83ce7e502f47d50a01ce4f274c8e9529a0841652cd8d421c35b43d57a. |
| St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / lower-court basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent); subject: party=plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent) The District Court's reasons for finding no racial motive, as recited by the Supreme Court (majority footnote); same finding as the trial-judge pretext block, seen from the ultimate-burden side. | ultimate-burden/personal-animus-not-racial | Various considerations led it to this conclusion, including the fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that recommended disciplining respondent, that respondent’s black subordinates who actually committed the violations were not disciplined, and that “the number of black employees at St. Mary’s remained constant.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [38389:38723] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3. |
| St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1) The Supreme Court does not itself decide causation; it holds that the trier of fact's no-race-motive finding is not foreclosed by its disbelief of the employer, and remands (CA8 to review that finding on the ordinary standard). | ultimate-burden/personal-animus-not-racial | Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [35543:35806] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3. |
| Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. — 510 U.S. 17 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — satisfied · proved (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / lower-court basis: proved; claim: (a)(1) Magistrate's finding, recited and not disturbed; the sex-based character of the conduct was not in dispute before the Court. | sex-based-harassment/gender-insults-and-sexual-innuendo-by-company-president | Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift’s president.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [315:480] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef.Magistrate found that, throughout Harris’ time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [486:652] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef.He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [1126:1231] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef. |
| Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1),(m) Case tried and decided under the (m) motivating-factor route; but-for "because of" under (a)(1) and Price Waterhouse burden-shifting are discussed only as background. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; subject: party=plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results Benign objective (avoiding disparate-impact liability) does not negate intent: acting on the racial distribution of outcomes is itself "because of race". No McDonnell Douglas inference needed; the motive is undisputed on the record. | express-race-based-decision/results-discarded-because-of-racial-distribution | When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [993:1172] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [8394:8537] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.With one member recused, the CSB deadlocked 2 to 2, resulting in a decision not to certify the results.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [24569:24672] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— i. e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [33723:33943] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Whatever the City’s ultimate aim — however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed — the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [35257:35500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
Ricci v. DeStefano — 557 U.S. 557 (2009) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))
Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [35543:35806] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.
Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15389:15579] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”
Ginger v. District of Columbia — 477 F. Supp. 2d 41 (2007) · United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15830:16037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”
Glenn v. Raymour — 832 F. Supp. 2d 539 (2011) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [21739:21858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.
Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary — 858 F.3d 1307 (2017) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25042:25291] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
In the nature of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of production (and has thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination) can involve no credibility assessment.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
In the nature of things, the determination that a defendant has met its burden of production (and has thus rebutted any legal presumption of intentional discrimination) can involve no credibility assessment.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [8673:8880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.interpretation
It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks — 509 U.S. 502 (1993) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [27222:27370] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.