Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003

Role: rule-announced; posture: civil; jury verdict for employee after mixed-motive instruction, reinstated by CA9 en banc; certiorari by employer on whether direct evidence is required for a (m) instruction; result: claimant-won; claim: (a)(1),(m)

Uncertainty

opinion: the IR appends the Court's two footnotes and the full text of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) directly after "It is so ordered." (@17804..18924), before the concurrence; contiguous, so `maj` is one span. Unanimous; no dissent. No v1 quote lies in the concurrence, so `conc` has no block.

Element motivating-factor: polarity: the first fact is the employer's (rejected) objection that no direct evidence was adduced; v1 tagged it [cuts-against absent]. Since the Court holds direct evidence is not required, the absence is legally irrelevant -> [neutral absent].

Element motivating-factor: decider: one `review` slot, two reviewing courts: the en banc CA9 reviewed SUFFICIENCY (upheld); this Court reviewed only the INSTRUCTION. `instruction-approved` records what this Court did, so the block classifies as finding-below, not instance, although the verdict stands.

Element motivating-factor: other: the fact lines are the Court's summary of trial EVIDENCE presented (largely in CA9's words), not findings; the general verdict does not say which of it the jury credited.

Element adverse-action: decider: inferred from the general verdict under that instruction; the verdict does not itemise this element.

Element because-of: cites: the law file has no relation "motivating-factor is an alternative route to because-of"; mixed-motive-vs-same-decision (type alternative-route, between motivating-factor and x-same-decision) is the nearest declared construct and is cited here and on the defense block for want of a better one.

Element x-same-decision: holding: the jury was instructed on the defense and awarded damages, so it MAY have found the defense failed; a general verdict does not say (it may equally have found sex the sole motive). Not recorded as a jury finding.

Misfit

The holding is about the KIND OF EVIDENCE that may satisfy an element (direct vs circumstantial) and about entitlement to a jury instruction. `decider jury` + `review instruction-approved` now ties the verdict block to the instruction ruling, but "evidence type E is sufficient in kind for element X" still has no construct (no law-side relation or mode to cite); it lives in the variant genus and gloss.

The notation does not distinguish evidence-adduced from facts-found (see the `? other` on the jury block); a general verdict decides several targets at once without saying which.

`review` has one slot per block, but the jury finding passed through two reviewing courts on two different questions (CA9 en banc: sufficiency, upheld; Supreme Court: the instruction only).

The sexual-harassment claim was dismissed in the district court and is outside this opinion (no `count` declared for it).

interpretation

Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only “demonstrate]” that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to “any employment practice.”

(formerly `variant mixed-motive`) Protected trait was a motivating factor among other lawful factors, proved by direct or circumstantial evidence Added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§ 107(a)): establishes an unlawful employment practice whenever a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if lawful factors also motivated the practice.

interpretation

In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In order to obtain an instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.”

(formerly `variant mixed-motive`) Protected trait was a motivating factor among other lawful factors, proved by direct or circumstantial evidence Added by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (§ 107(a)): establishes an unlawful employment practice whenever a protected trait was a motivating factor, even if lawful factors also motivated the practice.

interpretation

In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must “demonstrate] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must “demonstrate] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

(formerly `variant same-action-in-absence`) Employer proves it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor (partial defense limiting remedies) Partial affirmative defense under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to a § 2000e-2(m) mixed-motive violation: restricts remedies to declaratory/injunctive relief and attorney's fees, barring damages and reinstatement.

interpretation

In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must “demonstrate] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa — 539 U.S. 90 (2003) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must “demonstrate] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”

Establishing `motivating-factor` under § 2000e-2(m) establishes liability; `x-same-decision` under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not defeat liability, but restricts the available remedies to declaratory/injunctive relief and attorney's fees.