United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008-05-30
42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil; sex (pregnancy/abortion) discriminatory-discharge claim; summary judgment for employer reversed on plaintiff's appeal by CA3; result: remanded; claim: (a); 2000e(k)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
The key holding is statutory construction of the DEFINITION section 2000e(k) ("related medical conditions" includes abortion), which feeds 2000e-2(a)'s "because of sex". Recorded as protected-class [law], which is both a rule announced for the circuit and an application to this plaintiff in one block; the law line can only gesture at a sibling section, and a definition-level node (trait := sex > pregnancy > related medical condition > abortion) is what is being built.
Pregnancy cases modify the prima facie case: prong 1 becomes "pregnant AND employer knew" (a knowledge sub-element inside protected-class) and prong 4 becomes "nexus". The element vocabulary is fixed, so circuit- and claim-type-specific prima facie formulations are flattened into protected-class/because-of.
because-of is satisfied by three evidentiary routes (comparators, remark, timing), now three blocks distinguished by `theory`; but they are CUMULATIVE routes to one holding, not three independent holdings, and the instance count triples. The same evidence is then reused for pretext (the court expressly says the stages overlap).
[triable] with "satisfied" at each McDonnell Douglas stage means "enough to reach a jury"; employer-reason "satisfied" is only a burden of production, a different epistemic kind from the others.
Cross-appeal on sealing the record and use of a pseudonym (procedural, non-statutory) is not representable and is omitted.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 33
Elements 7–12 of 33
| Case | labor-organization-route statutory route or exception | training-program statutory route or exception | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | Bona fide occupational qualification (§ 2000e-2(e)(1)) | Severe or pervasive hostile or abusive working environment | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: applied/merits | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–18 of 33
| Case | Bona fide seniority/merit system or professionally developed ability test (§ 2000e-2(h)) | Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) | Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) | communist-organization statutory route or exception | Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) | indian-preference statutory route or exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 19–24 of 33
| Case | Subsection (n) limits challenges to covered litigated or consent judgments or orders | judgment-order-scope statutory route or exception | k2-intentional-limit statutory route or exception | k3-controlled-substance statutory route or exception | labor-organization-causation statutory route or exception | national-security statutory route or exception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 25–30 of 33
| Case | no-preference-imbalance statutory route or exception | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations | religious-institution statutory route or exception | test-score-discrimination statutory route or exception | Rejected "bottom-line" racial or gender balance defense to a discriminatory pass/fail barrier (Connecticut v. Teal) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 31–33 of 33
| Case | Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) | Rejected defense that an adverse CBA arbitration precludes a Title VII action (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver) | Mixed-motive same-decision partial affirmative defense (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a); 2000e(k) | fired-during-medical-absence | As she was leaving for the funeral, Leona noticed Babich packing up Doe’s personal belongings from her desk.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [3816:3924] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Doe called Kohl who told her that she had been discharged.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [3978:4036] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: temporal proximity; subject: theory=temporal proximity | fired-within-days-of-disclosing-condition | Here, Doe was fired on the day her baby was buried, just three working days after she notified Kohl that she would have to undergo an abortion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25674:25817] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The temporal proximity, however, is sufficient here to meet Doe’s minimal prima facie case burden as to the causal connection element.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [26037:26171] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees); subject: theory=comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees) Comparators need not share the plaintiff's immediate supervisor where one decision-maker (Kohl) alone controlled sick-leave permission for everyone. | call-in-rule-enforced-only-against-plaintiff | Mike King, for example, suffered a heart attack while he was employed by CARS and testified that, although he or his wife did call to tell Kohl he was still in the hospital, they did not do so daily, and that he was paid during his absence.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [16343:16583] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Babich testified that for every employee, CARS had a “separate set of rules” and that there was no uniformly enforced rule concerning the use of vacation or sick time.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [17268:17435] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Babich did report directly to Kohl and did not call every day or give a precise return date when she was out.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [19458:19567] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Comparing Doe to other non-pregnant workers who were temporarily disabled, we conclude that Doe has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie ease and has thus raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to defeat summary judgment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14905:15177] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: decision-maker remark; subject: theory=decision-maker remark | ambiguous-comment-about-the-protected-condition | A: On a daily basis, I go into Mr. Kohl’s office to check the warranties, and I was there as he and Alivia were working on whatever, I was checking through the warranties and Alivia said, “I don’t know what all this secrecy behind [the plaintiff] losing her baby was.” And Mr. Kohl said “she didn’t want to take responsibility.” Which upset me.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [22396:22740] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.What is clear is that this particular remark may raise a reasonable inference that the abortion was a factor in terminating Doe’s employment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [24518:24659] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a); 2000e(k) | small-private-company-owner-supervisor | CARS hired Jane Doe as a graphic artist in June 1999.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [1537:1590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Fred Kohl, Vice-President and part-owner of the company, was Doe’s supervisor.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [1656:1734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k) | job-abandonment-no-call-absence | Specifically, CARS asserts that Doe was fired because neither she nor her husband called to request Friday, August 11th or the week of August 14th off from work.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [29709:29870] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Unexcused absence from work is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [29871:29968] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — not reached (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a); 2000e(k) The court quotes a "motivating factor" formulation for pregnancy discrimination but analyses the case entirely under McDonnell Douglas pretext, not 2000e-2(m). | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · triable (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k) The employer's reason (no call, no approved leave) rests on a fact the plaintiff's witnesses contradict; the district court erred by weighing phone records against testimony at summary judgment. | disputed-factual-premise/leave-was-approved-by-decision-maker | Doe’s husband further testified that he talked to Kohl on Thursday, August 10th and got Kohl’s permission for his wife to take a vacation the following week.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [20485:20642] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.She further testified that, after that call, Kohl asked her to make sure she had the receptionist station covered by other employees during the lunch hour for the week in question (a task for which Doe was usually responsible).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [31368:31595] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.This statement contradicted Kohl’s statements to the EEOC wherein he testified to the EEOC investigator that employees “needed to call off every day.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [16119:16269] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The conversation between Kohl and Babich, in which Kohl remarked that Doe had not taken responsibility for her abortion indicates that Kohl may have had other reasons for terminating Doe’s employment than her “abandonment” of her job.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [32278:32512] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [27758:28132] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.This testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CARS’ proffered reasons for terminating Doe’s employment were a pretext.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [31965:32107] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · law (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a); 2000e(k) First-impression statutory construction of 2000e(k): "because of sex" reaches discharge for having an abortion. The class element also carries an employer-knowledge requirement in pregnancy cases (conceded here). | sex-pregnancy-related-condition/abortion | On Wednesday, August 9th, Doe learned that her baby had severe deformities and her physician recommended that her pregnancy be terminated.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [2735:2873] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Then, he spoke with Kohl and told him that the pregnancy would be terminated the following day.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [3237:3332] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Instead, she argues that she was discharged because she underwent a surgical abortion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [4676:4762] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Clearly, the plain language of the statute, together with the legislative history and the EEOC guidelines, support a conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman employee because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [8078:8325] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Therefore, in a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, to raise an inference of any unlawful discharge a plaintiff must adduce evidence that she was pregnant, and, that the employer knew it.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [12960:13151] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.We now hold that the term “related medical conditions” includes an abortion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [8326:8402] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied · conceded (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a); 2000e(k) | qualified/undisputed | Neither party disputes that Doe has met her burden on the first three elements of a prima facie pregnancy discrimination case: 1) she is or was pregnant and that her employer knew she was pregnant; 2) she was qualified for her job; and, 3) she suffered an adverse employment decision.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13825:14109] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
Clearly, the plain language of the statute, together with the legislative history and the EEOC guidelines, support a conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman employee because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
Clearly, the plain language of the statute, together with the legislative history and the EEOC guidelines, support a conclusion that an employer may not discriminate against a woman employee because she has exercised her right to have an abortion.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [8078:8325] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Every individual has a race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; in circuits applying a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie prong to majority-group ("reverse discrimination") plaintiffs, background circumstances suggesting inclination to discriminate against the majority group are required.
interpretation
Therefore, in a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, to raise an inference of any unlawful discharge a plaintiff must adduce evidence that she was pregnant, and, that the employer knew it.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
Therefore, in a case alleging pregnancy discrimination, to raise an inference of any unlawful discharge a plaintiff must adduce evidence that she was pregnant, and, that the employer knew it.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [12960:13151] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.Every individual has a race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; in circuits applying a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie prong to majority-group ("reverse discrimination") plaintiffs, background circumstances suggesting inclination to discriminate against the majority group are required.
interpretation
The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.
Doe v. C.A.R.S Protection Plus, Inc. — 527 F.3d 358 (2008) · United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [27758:28132] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.