Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997

Role: applied; posture: civil; religious-discrimination discharge (disparate treatment + failure to accommodate) and retaliation against employer and union; defendants' motions for summary judgment granted; result: claimant-lost; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a)

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

Religious failure-to-accommodate (2000e(j)) is a distinct liability theory with its own prima facie case and an employer burden (reasonable accommodation OR undue hardship). Recorded as x-failure-to-accommodate, but it is really a 3-part claim plus a 2-branch defense, and the court decided only the defense branch. Its basis [no-evidence] follows the rule "summary judgment against the claimant" yet misdescribes the ruling: the claimant did not lack evidence; the EMPLOYER established its accommodation showing "as a matter of law" on undisputed facts. No basis says "defeated at summary judgment by the opponent's affirmative showing".

because-of is decided via the fourth prima facie prong (comparators); `scope alternative` marks employer-reason/pretext as the "even assuming" ground, but the notation cannot express that these blocks are sequential steps of one burden-shifting proof of a single statutory element. employer-reason [triable] means only "burden of production met on the summary-judgment record".

The employer's "legitimate" reason (Sabbath absences) is causally identical to the protected trait; disparate-treatment framing calls it nondiscriminatory while the accommodation framing treats it as the conflict. Same facts, opposite roles under two theories; `theory` separates the blocks but cannot relate them.

Subsection (c)(3) (union causing employer to discriminate) has no element id and was found unpleaded; it shows only as an [absent] fact under the union's `employer` block.

protected-class/qualified/adverse-action are disposed of in one sentence ("satisfied the first three elements"); the same held quote is reused across blocks.

interpretation

Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.

An employer's discharge decision lies only against the employer under § 2000e-2(a), whereas a union is liable only under § 2000e-2(c) (such as causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate under (c)(3)).

interpretation

(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.

Every individual has a race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; in circuits applying a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie prong to majority-group ("reverse discrimination") plaintiffs, background circumstances suggesting inclination to discriminate against the majority group are required.

interpretation

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.

(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.

(formerly `variant circumstantial-nexus`) Circumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class) Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action

(formerly `variant legitimate-nondiscriminatory-reason`) Articulation of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason through admissible evidence McDonnell Douglas step 2: once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.

interpretation

a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.

McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.

interpretation

(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.

Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.

interpretation

where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.

Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.

interpretation

To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.

(formerly `variant religious-accommodation`) Bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, notice to employer, and discharge/penalty without reasonable accommodation Religious accommodation claim combining § 2000e-2(a)(1) with the definition of "religion" in § 2000e(j); once the prima facie case is shown, the employer may show it offered a reasonable accommodation (such as voluntary shift swaps) or that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

interpretation

Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.

(formerly `variant religious-accommodation`) Bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, notice to employer, and discharge/penalty without reasonable accommodation Religious accommodation claim combining § 2000e-2(a)(1) with the definition of "religion" in § 2000e(j); once the prima facie case is shown, the employer may show it offered a reasonable accommodation (such as voluntary shift swaps) or that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.

interpretation

In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.

Breech v. Alabama Power Co. — 962 F. Supp. 1447 (1997) · United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 (42usc2000e-2: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.

(formerly `variant cba-arbitration-no-preclusion`) Prior adverse arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement does not bar an employee's statutory Title VII action Under Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (415 U.S. 36 (1974)), an adverse arbitral decision under a collective-bargaining agreement that covers only contractual rights does not preclude a statutory Title VII lawsuit.