Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)

AND · 42usc2000e-2:because-of

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

Exact element source

because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [320:395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
animus/professional-and-philosophical-conflict-with-administration1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f-supp/604/1450-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 — not
circumstantial-nexusCircumstantial inference of discriminatory animus (remarks, timing, replacement outside class)0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
0No annotation uses in this snapshot
comparator-disparityLess favorable treatment than similarly situated comparators outside the protected class0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
0No annotation uses in this snapshot
comparator/call-in-rule-enforced-only-against-plaintiff1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied
comparator/conclusory-claim-of-unequal-discipline1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — not
comparator/not-similarly-situated-different-decision-maker-and-unconfirmed-misconduct1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not
comparator/not-similarly-situated-other-party-to-same-altercation-less-serious-conduct1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — not
decision-maker-remark/ambiguous-comment-about-the-protected-condition1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied
differential-treatment/unit-wide-change-applied-to-all-races1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — not
express-classificationExpress race- or sex-based decision-making (facial or direct disparate treatment)0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
0No annotation uses in this snapshot
express-race-based-decision/results-discarded-because-of-racial-distribution1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — satisfied
sex-based-harassment/gender-insults-and-sexual-innuendo-by-company-president0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /us/510/0017-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — applied/lower-court

temporal-proximity/fired-within-days-of-disclosing-condition1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied
ultimate-burden/personal-animus-not-racial0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — applied/lower-court, rule-announced/merits

Unspecified variantNo variant assigned in the database.0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 4
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — applied/merits; /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — comparator/merits; /f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — applied/merits

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Racial motive for the decision (evidence that officials considered squad racial make-up) is held irrelevant absent a racially differential EFFECT on individuals: "discriminate" is read to require disparate treatment, not just a race-based reason.
differential-treatment/unit-wide-change-applied-to-all-races
On March 6, 2003, Cathy Lanier, Commander of the Special Operations Division, issued a memorandum announcing that the MPD was going to reorganize the Canine Unit so that all canine officers would work five eight-hour shifts per week instead of four ten-hour shifts and would rotate through different shifts instead of being assigned to a permanent day or night shift.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [1653:2020] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In this case, all officers in the Canine Unit were equally affected by the reorganization in that all officers were required to work rotating shifts regardless of race.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [5887:6055] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

They point to evidence that higher level police officials were concerned about the racial make up of the squads when they decided to undertake the reorganization and that those officials took race into account when realigning the squads.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [16300:16537] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15389:15579] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15830:16037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Given that some sort of different treatment is at the heart of a discrimination claim, plaintiffs’ arguments fail.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [16746:16860] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: comparator Faust (white coworker in the same altercation, given written warning); subject: theory=comparator Faust (white coworker in the same altercation, given written warning)

Same supervisor, same incident, but a threat to fight is treated as more serious than name-calling, even assuming the white coworker used a racial epithet ("boy"); the comparator also reported to management while plaintiff did not.
comparator/not-similarly-situated-other-party-to-same-altercation-less-serious-conduct
In the March 20 altercation, Glenn admitted that he repeatedly told Faust to “step outside.” Faust did not make a similar threat to Glenn.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [23483:23621] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Furthermore, Faust retreated from the altercation to report it to management.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [23874:23951] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

According to Glenn, while he and Faust were pushing the trash box back and forth from their respective work areas, Faust said to him, “Boy, don’t put your box back on this line.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [8799:8977] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Yet at no point during that discussion did Glenn alert Mirth to Faust allegedly calling him a “boy” or goading him to “go ahead, do it.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [24357:24493] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [21739:21858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In sum, Raymours’ treatment of Faust cannot raise an inference of unlawful discrimination regarding Glenn’s termination because there are differentiating and mitigating circumstances that significantly distinguish both their conduct and Raymours’ treatment of them.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [26202:26467] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: comparators Adams and Copperthwaite (white employees, alleged fight, no discipline); subject: theory=comparators Adams and Copperthwaite (white employees, alleged fight, no discipline)

comparator/not-similarly-situated-different-decision-maker-and-unconfirmed-misconduct
He did not see any punches thrown, but observed from a distance some individuals “separating the two of them,” with Adams trying to “pursue” Copperthwaite and saying “if you ever do that again, I’ll snap your F’ing [sic] neck.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [12178:12405] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Regarding the same supervisor argument, Adams and Copperthwaite were employed in the Delivery Department, while Glenn worked in the Operations Department.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [26916:27070] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Critically, the underlying misconduct in Glenn’s case was reported to Glenn’s direct supervisors, confirmed by more than one witness, and admitted to by Glenn himself.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [28600:28767] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dye’s allegations notwithstanding, Adams’ alleged misconduct was not witnessed by Adams’ direct supervisors, was not reported to those supervisors, and was not admitted to by Adams or Copperthwaite.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [29810:30008] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Therefore, the record is without sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Adams or Copperthwaite are “similarly situated” to Glenn for purposes of establishing the fourth element of his prima facie case.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [30009:30211] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp/604/1450-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: proved; claim: (a)

Replacement by cheaper, less-qualified black and Asian hires and departures from AAUP/SACS procedure did not support an inference of race: the hostility traced to the 1978-79 contract/union dispute.
animus/professional-and-philosophical-conflict-with-administration
Buggs is less qualified than Turner, having only an M.S. degree, but she worked for only $11,800.00; Turner had earned $17,000.00 his last year at BSC, and claims that with salary increments he would have earned $19,000.00 had he been rehired. Buggs is black.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [7710:7969] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Although the percentage of white faculty members was smaller, it should be noted that two new whites were hired after Turner and Goetzman were fired.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [14757:14906] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The administration saw the efforts of Turner and Goetzman as disruptive and counterproductive; they were making waves in already troubled waters.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [22449:22594] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

If certain other faculty members were treated differently, if some received extra assignments and as a corollary slightly more pay, it was due to their being more philosophically aligned with the administration.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [25354:25565] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It is for the Court to determine whether the wedge driven between the two white professors and the predominantly black school was one of racial animus. The Court concludes that it was not.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [24596:24784] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Therefore, it is concluded that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [25971:26083] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: APC; theory: disparate treatment; subject: party=APC; theory=disparate treatment

Fourth prima facie prong (differential application of discipline) fails: unnamed comparators in plaintiff's own affidavit, and the only identified absentee employees were all fired too. No direct evidence.
comparator/conclusory-claim-of-unequal-discipline
In his affidavit, Breech states: “There have been many employees over the years who have had many more than four days absent [sic] for personal reasons who were not terminated. Religious reasons are no different than other personal reasons.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32347:32588] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

First, Breech does not state who the other employees are or the circumstances of them absences, i.e., whether the absences were irregular or cyclical.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32654:32804] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

This evidence does not support Breech’s contention that he was subjected to differential application of work or disciplinary rules: every one of the four employees mentioned was discharged.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33439:33628] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33629:33744] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

claim: (a)(2)

Pure disparate-impact theory; no discriminatory purpose alleged ("Absent any discriminatory purpose").
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
comparator / merits

claim: (a)(2)

Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees); subject: theory=comparators (non-pregnant temporarily disabled employees)

Comparators need not share the plaintiff's immediate supervisor where one decision-maker (Kohl) alone controlled sick-leave permission for everyone.
comparator/call-in-rule-enforced-only-against-plaintiff
Mike King, for example, suffered a heart attack while he was employed by CARS and testified that, although he or his wife did call to tell Kohl he was still in the hospital, they did not do so daily, and that he was paid during his absence.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [16343:16583] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Babich testified that for every employee, CARS had a “separate set of rules” and that there was no uniformly enforced rule concerning the use of vacation or sick time.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [17268:17435] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Babich did report directly to Kohl and did not call every day or give a precise return date when she was out.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [19458:19567] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Comparing Doe to other non-pregnant workers who were temporarily disabled, we conclude that Doe has provided sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie ease and has thus raised an inference of discrimination sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14905:15177] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: decision-maker remark; subject: theory=decision-maker remark

decision-maker-remark/ambiguous-comment-about-the-protected-condition
A: On a daily basis, I go into Mr. Kohl’s office to check the warranties, and I was there as he and Alivia were working on whatever, I was checking through the warranties and Alivia said, “I don’t know what all this secrecy behind [the plaintiff] losing her baby was.” And Mr. Kohl said “she didn’t want to take responsibility.” Which upset me.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [22396:22740] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

What is clear is that this particular remark may raise a reasonable inference that the abortion was a factor in terminating Doe’s employment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [24518:24659] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k); theory: temporal proximity; subject: theory=temporal proximity

temporal-proximity/fired-within-days-of-disclosing-condition
Here, Doe was fired on the day her baby was buried, just three working days after she notified Kohl that she would have to undergo an abortion.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25674:25817] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The temporal proximity, however, is sufficient here to meet Doe’s minimal prima facie case burden as to the causal connection element.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [26037:26171] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Prima facie case assumed without deciding; the district court had held it failed for lack of comparators, and the panel affirms on the alternative pretext ground instead.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
rule-announced / merits

claim: (a)(1)

The Supreme Court does not itself decide causation; it holds that the trier of fact's no-race-motive finding is not foreclosed by its disbelief of the employer, and remands (CA8 to review that finding on the ordinary standard).
ultimate-burden/personal-animus-not-racial
Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [35543:35806] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not
Excluded from merits counts
applied / lower-court

basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent); subject: party=plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent)

The District Court's reasons for finding no racial motive, as recited by the Supreme Court (majority footnote); same finding as the trial-judge pretext block, seen from the ultimate-burden side.
ultimate-burden/personal-animus-not-racial
Various considerations led it to this conclusion, including the fact that two blacks sat on the disciplinary review board that recommended disciplining respondent, that respondent’s black subordinates who actually committed the violations were not disciplined, and that “the number of black employees at St. Mary’s remained constant.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [38389:38723] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/510/0017-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)satisfied
Excluded from merits counts
applied / lower-court

basis: proved; claim: (a)(1)

Magistrate's finding, recited and not disturbed; the sex-based character of the conduct was not in dispute before the Court.
sex-based-harassment/gender-insults-and-sexual-innuendo-by-company-president
Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was Forklift’s president.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [315:480] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Magistrate found that, throughout Harris’ time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [486:652] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

He threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to pick the objects up.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_510.jsonl#/us/510/0017-01; Unicode character offsets [1126:1231] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d1ea22ac767a8da9f8196f8e0b5a1a9926fdbf322dd6be788952d6040b67ddef.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/539/0090-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2003Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
rule-announced / merits

claim: (a)(1),(m)

Case tried and decided under the (m) motivating-factor route; but-for "because of" under (a)(1) and Price Waterhouse burden-shifting are discussed only as background.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; subject: party=plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results

Benign objective (avoiding disparate-impact liability) does not negate intent: acting on the racial distribution of outcomes is itself "because of race". No McDonnell Douglas inference needed; the motive is undisputed on the record.
express-race-based-decision/results-discarded-because-of-racial-distribution
When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [993:1172] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [8394:8537] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

With one member recused, the CSB deadlocked 2 to 2, resulting in a decision not to certify the results.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [24569:24672] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— i. e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [33723:33943] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Whatever the City’s ultimate aim — however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed — the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [35257:35500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.

/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009

Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.

/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993

Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse employment action by reason of (in the context of the present case) race.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [35543:35806] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.

/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007

an employee alleging discrimination based on changed conditions or terms of employment must make some sort of showing that the change affected him in some way different from other employees.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15389:15579] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”

/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007

If every single employee in a racially diverse Canine Unit faces the same change in the terms and conditions of his employment after a reorganization, there are no “distinctions or differences in treatment.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_477.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/477/0041-01; Unicode character offsets [15830:16037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 98f9fdfbd29e7eaa93261d6440fe0ed8e4821a6a9a6334e41f0be98ebbbe49e1.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”

/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011

To be “similarly situated,” the plaintiff must show that “the other employee’s acts were of ‘comparable seriousness.’ ”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [21739:21858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25042:25291] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.

/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997

To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.

/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997

Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008

The fourth element requires that a plaintiff show some nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment action.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [13591:13708] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008

The evidence most often used to establish this nexus is that of disparate treatment, whereby a plaintiff shows that she was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who are not in plaintiffs protected class.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [14309:14532] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008

However, we later explained that such remarks could provide background evidence that may be critical to a jury’s determination of whether the decision-maker was more likely than not acting out of a discriminatory motive.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [23142:23362] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.

/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008

We have held temporal proximity sufficient to create an inference of causality to defeat summary judgment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [25180:25286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.