United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019-08-16
42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: Appeal from Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; §1981 retaliation dismissed despite availability of §1983 vehicle; equal-protection hostile-environment claim separately revived.; result: claimant-lost; claim:
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
IR court string says Six Circuit; corrected to Sixth Circuit. Footnote at 19840 states §1981 discrimination was not pursued on appeal. This pre-Comcast pleading decision supplies no modern but-for discrimination finding.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 15
| Case | Persons protected by equal contractual rights | Plaintiff has rights in an existing or proposed contract | Formation performance termination or contractual benefits | Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement | Judicial but-for causation of contractual injury | Nongovernmental impairment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 7–12 of 15
| Case | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights | Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation | Judicial material-adversity requirement for retaliation | Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury | Contract and retaliation scope with noncontract clauses identified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–15 of 15
| Case | Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution | Claim-specific limitations and accrual | Compensatory equitable punitive and fee remedies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: O’Grady; count: Section 1981 retaliation; subject: party=O’Grady; count=Section 1981 retaliation The earlier knowledge discussion concerns First Amendment retaliation, but the §1981 section expressly incorporates that factual deficiency. No First Amendment motivating-factor rule is imported into §1981. | knowledge/conclusory-collective-allegation | Boxill alleges that "the Defendants knew" this letter was meant to "memorializ[e] complaints made" by her against O'Grady.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [2655:2777] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.And Boxill has offered no plausible, non-conclusory facts to show that O'Grady was even aware of her complaints against him.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [10664:10788] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [14122:14517] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.Boxill does allege that the "Defendants knew" the letter drafted about O'Grady's behavior was "memorializing complaints made" by her. But again, this vague, conclusory reference to "the Defendants" is not enough to make a plausible showing that O'Grady was aware of her complaints.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [19558:19839] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b. |
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: All individual defendants; count: Section 1981 retaliation; subject: party=All individual defendants; count=Section 1981 retaliation Fails to connect any particular defendant’s materially adverse conduct to protected complaints. The result records §1981 only; the revived hostile-environment branch arises under equal protection, not the appealed §1981 claim. | retaliation/undifferentiated-officials | According to the complaint, Boxill reported her "ongoing harassment" to administrators and judges at FCMC-including Green and Shaw-several times between 2011 and 2013. She alleges that "[n]o administrator or Judge acted on these reports, but each discouraged [her] from action." In April 2013, the "Defendants began removing [her] responsibilities and diminishing [her] abilities to function as coordinator." Sometime thereafter, she "learned that Defendants had given a male subordinate a $14,000.00 per year increase in salary with no commensurate consideration of her contributions."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [1325:1911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.Boxill has nevertheless failed to state a plausible retaliation claim against Brandt, Glaeden, Green, or Shaw. These allegations suffer from the same flaw: Boxill does not state facts specific to those Defendants. Her claims rest on broad, conclusory allegations that the "Defendants" diminished her job responsibilities; but she offers no facts to support a reasonable inference that any of these Defendants individually took such an action, much less that he or she did so in response to Boxill's protected speech.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [9032:9548] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [14122:14517] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.As explained, Boxill's complaint does not plausibly allege that any Defendant took an adverse action against her because of her protected speech.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [14518:14663] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b. |
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Individual judges and court administrator; subject: party=Individual judges and court administrator Satisfied means Boxill pleaded the proper remedial vehicle, not that any official committed a §1981 violation. | state-remedy/section1983-pleaded | Boxill worked at FCMC as its Specialty Dockets Coordinator. Four of the Defendants below-Michael Brandt, Carrie Glaeden, James Green, and James O'Grady-were state court judges at FCMC. The remaining Defendant, Emily Shaw, was FCMC's Court Administrator.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [409:662] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13655:13808] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed)
The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.
interpretation
To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).
Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed)
To survive dismissal, Boxill must allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) her exercise of that activity was known by the Defendant; (3) the Defendant thereafter took an action that was materially adverse to her; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir. 2014).Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [14122:14517] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.Link knowledge to the relevant decisionmaker/defendant, not a conclusory reference to defendants collectively. Boxill dismissed because concrete adverse-action/causal allegations were missing.