AND · 42usc1981:state-remedial-route
Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.
Exact element source
The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1981; Unicode character offsets [823:967] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5e5aa212ab2f30dd84c80b0b228057e2c583768ee608c391e0ac73d92e609577.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; provisional (1 case) | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Hu v. City of New York — 927 F.3d 81 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2-crosscheck.md)) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _derivative accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element stands or falls with another element or claim and receives no independent analysis. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff — 935 F.3d 633 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| _whole accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 2 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 2 | Gonzalez v. City of N.Y. — 377 F. Supp. 3d 273 (2019) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2019 — not · law (42usc1981: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| policy-or-custom provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether the violation was caused by a municipal policy or custom, as Monell requires when the claim runs through § 1983. | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. — 927 F.3d 961 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc1981: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gonzalez v. City of N.Y. — 377 F. Supp. 3d 273 (2019) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2019 — not · law (42usc1981: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law What fails is the direct Section 1981 cause of action against state actors (Jett / Duplan); the court did not decide any Section 1981 element on the facts. The Section 1983 claims are analysed afterwards on equal-protection and First Amendment grounds, not as carriers of Section 1981 rights. | claims-pleaded-directly-under-section-1981-against-city-and-municipal-employees-in-both-capacities | In Duplan v. City of New York , however, the Second Circuit held that " § 1981 does not provide a separate private right of action against state actors."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0273-01; Unicode character offsets [14422:14575] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1597bf0a1c182a7427ca838920a992bc7e17f3d55c12a25d887d169a24ab1f0d.Therefore, Duplan 's holding applies to the Individual Defendants and bars Mr. Gonzalez from asserting claims under § 1981 against them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0273-01; Unicode character offsets [15952:16088] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1597bf0a1c182a7427ca838920a992bc7e17f3d55c12a25d887d169a24ab1f0d.Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the claims that Mr. Gonzalez asserts under § 1981 in counts one through seven is GRANTED.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0273-01; Unicode character offsets [17220:17350] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1597bf0a1c182a7427ca838920a992bc7e17f3d55c12a25d887d169a24ab1f0d. |
| Hu v. City of New York — 927 F.3d 81 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not reached (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2-crosscheck.md)) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsState officials and the City are defendants, but the captured §1981 holding addresses only comparator pleading. Availability of a direct remedy versus §1983 is not decided here; Jett and the law file remain applicable. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. — 927 F.3d 961 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (42usc1981: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded | alleged-disproportionate-firing-of-black-probationers-without-saying-disparate-treatment-or-impact | Freeman alleges that the District disproportionately fires probationary employees who are African-American.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0961-01; Unicode character offsets [9698:9805] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b8b5a3388cf320254eba34947ffe968fff6293d517feb963080c1db21c85f439.But Freeman does not allege whether the policy is to treat African-Americans disparately or that the District's probation powers have a disparate impact on them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0961-01; Unicode character offsets [9806:9967] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b8b5a3388cf320254eba34947ffe968fff6293d517feb963080c1db21c85f439.that law does not create a private right of action against public bodies unless the plaintiff has raised Monell allegations.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0961-01; Unicode character offsets [9479:9603] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b8b5a3388cf320254eba34947ffe968fff6293d517feb963080c1db21c85f439.We affirm with respect to Freeman's contention that the District fired him pursuant to a policy that is unlawful under Monell v. Department of Social Services. , 436 U.S. 658, 694-95, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0961-01; Unicode character offsets [496:717] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b8b5a3388cf320254eba34947ffe968fff6293d517feb963080c1db21c85f439.Because the district court recruited four attorneys to assist Freeman with pleading this claim adequately, and he had four opportunities to amend his complaint to do so and yet never did, we see no abuse of discretion in the dismissal of this claim without additional leave to amend.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_927.jsonl#/f3d/927/0961-01; Unicode character offsets [10206:10489] (end exclusive); SHA-256 b8b5a3388cf320254eba34947ffe968fff6293d517feb963080c1db21c85f439. |
| Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Individual judges and court administrator; subject: party=Individual judges and court administrator Satisfied means Boxill pleaded the proper remedial vehicle, not that any official committed a §1981 violation. | state-remedy/section1983-pleaded | Boxill worked at FCMC as its Specialty Dockets Coordinator. Four of the Defendants below-Michael Brandt, Carrie Glaeden, James Green, and James O'Grady-were state court judges at FCMC. The remaining Defendant, Emily Shaw, was FCMC's Court Administrator.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [409:662] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13655:13808] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b. |
| Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff — 935 F.3d 633 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed; 42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: City of Pine Bluff; theory: Liability premised on Mayor Hollingsworth’s actions; subject: party=City of Pine Bluff; theory=Liability premised on Mayor Hollingsworth’s actions Record-specific rejection of liability through the sole alleged discriminator. It does not establish a universal rule insulating municipalities whenever any individual defendant wins. | municipal-liability/sole-discriminator-exonerated | The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hollingsworth but against the City on Ridgell's claims of race discrimination and awarded damages of $24,080.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [3573:3722] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.The only municipal official or employee whom Ridgell cited to the jury as a wrongdoer was Hollingsworth.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [9312:9416] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [4620:5033] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.Insofar as the case rests entirely on alleged wrongdoing by Hollingsworth, the City is entitled to judgment. The jury's finding that Hollingsworth did not racially discriminate against Ridgell means that the City cannot be held liable based on discrimination by Hollingsworth.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [9417:9693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
Boxill v. O’Grady — 935 F.3d 510 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed)
The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.
interpretation
A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).
Ridgell v. City of Pine Bluff — 935 F.3d 633 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed)
A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [4620:5033] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.