Supreme Court of the United States · 2004-05-03
42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: Interlocutory review of which limitations period governs postformation employment claims made possible by the 1991 Act; Seventh Circuit reversed.; result: remanded; claim:
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
The employee-status claims were left for party sorting by the district court (23123..23506); they are not included in the resolved three-claim timing block. Procedural classification is excluded from instance counts.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 15
| Case | Persons protected by equal contractual rights | Plaintiff has rights in an existing or proposed contract | Formation performance termination or contractual benefits | Judicial intentional-race-discrimination requirement | Judicial but-for causation of contractual injury | Nongovernmental impairment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — 541 U.S. 369 (2004) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: applied/procedural | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 7–12 of 15
| Case | Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment | Opposition to racial impairment of contract rights | Judicial defendant-knowledge requirement for retaliation | Judicial material-adversity requirement for retaliation | Judicial causation requirement for retaliatory injury | Contract and retaliation scope with noncontract clauses identified |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — 541 U.S. 369 (2004) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–15 of 15
| Case | Judicial hostile-environment threshold and attribution | Claim-specific limitations and accrual | Compensatory equitable punitive and fee remedies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — 541 U.S. 369 (2004) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | ✗ not · lawNot counted: applied/procedural | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — 541 U.S. 369 (2004) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 — not reached (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Formation performance termination or contractual benefits | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural count: Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; subject: count=Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer Classification of the alleged conduct as newly actionable after 1991 selects the limitations period. The undisputed allegation of an amended-statute violation is not a merits finding that discriminatory impairment occurred. | temporal-scope/postformation-employment | Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chicago plant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_541.jsonl#/us/541/0369-01; Unicode character offsets [1054:1307] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d97f70cecae17686f7c93330009de0ceb4c140f8b8a03db4fdcddb1549f8eb41.The original version of the statute now codified at Rev. Stat. § 1977, 42 U. S. C. § 1981, was enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. It was amended in minor respects in 1870 and recodified in 1874, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160, 168-169, n. 8 (1976), but its basic coverage did not change prior to 1991. As first enacted, § 1981 provided in relevant part that “all persons [within the jurisdiction of the United States] shall have the same right, in every State and Territory ... to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 14 Stat. 27. We held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 (1989), that the statutory right “to make and enforce contracts” did not protect against harassing conduct that occurred after the formation of the contract. Under that holding, it is clear that petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, and refusal to transfer claims do not state violations of the original version of §1981. In 1991, however, Congress responded to Patterson by adding a new subsection to § 1981 that defines the term “ ‘make and enforce contracts’ ” to include the “termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U. S. C. § 1981(b). It is undisputed that petitioners have alleged violations of the amended statute. The critical question, then, is whether petitioners’ causes of action “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act or under § 1981 as originally enacted.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_541.jsonl#/us/541/0369-01; Unicode character offsets [1997:3521] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d97f70cecae17686f7c93330009de0ceb4c140f8b8a03db4fdcddb1549f8eb41. |
| Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — 541 U.S. 369 (2004) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2004 — not · law (42usc1981: author: Astra2 · not independently reviewed) | Claim-specific limitations and accrual | not Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: law; count: Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; theory: Employer’s borrowed two-year Illinois period; subject: count=Hostile work environment, wrongful discharge, failure to transfer; theory=Employer’s borrowed two-year Illinois period Rejects employer’s asserted two-year period; §1658 four-year period governs these claims. Does not adjudicate liability or every possible accrual/tolling defense. | limitations/post1990-created-rights | Petitioners are African-American former employees of respondent’s Chicago manufacturing division. On November 25,1996, petitioners filed this class action alleging violations of their rights under § 1981, as amended by the 1991 Act. Specifically, the three classes of plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, given an inferior employee status, and wrongfully terminated or denied a transfer in connection with the closing of the Chicago plant. Respondent sought summary judgment on the ground that petitioners’ claims are barred by the applicable Illinois statute of limitations because they arose more than two years before the complaint was filed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_541.jsonl#/us/541/0369-01; Unicode character offsets [821:1513] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d97f70cecae17686f7c93330009de0ceb4c140f8b8a03db4fdcddb1549f8eb41.We conclude that a cause of action “aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted” after December 1,1990 — and therefore is governed by § 1658’s 4-year statute of limitations — if the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment. That construction best serves Congress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations while at the same time protecting settled interests. It spares federal judges and litigants the need to identify the appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to new claims but leaves in place the “borrowed” limitations periods for pre-existing causes of action, with respect to which the difficult work already has been done.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_541.jsonl#/us/541/0369-01; Unicode character offsets [17523:18269] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d97f70cecae17686f7c93330009de0ceb4c140f8b8a03db4fdcddb1549f8eb41.In this case, petitioners’ hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims “ar[ose] under” the 1991 Act in the sense that petitioners’ causes of action were made possible by that Act.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_541.jsonl#/us/541/0369-01; Unicode character offsets [19008:19222] (end exclusive); SHA-256 d97f70cecae17686f7c93330009de0ceb4c140f8b8a03db4fdcddb1549f8eb41. |