Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc. — 922 F.3d 219 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2019

basis: triable; party: Haynes and WCI; theory: White employee with comparable or more serious infractions; subject: party=Haynes and WCI; theory=White employee with comparable or more serious infractions

James Fountain, a white man, hired Haynes to work for WCI in 2006 and supervised Haynes for the duration of his employment. During his employment, Haynes drove a large, multi-ton "front-end loader" truck in Duncan, South Carolina, to pick up trash from WCI's customers.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Haynes has produced evidence that Joe Hicks, a white employee also supervised by Fountain, had several workplace infractions, including twice using a cellphone while driving, driving while distracted, and responding to a traffic situation late. Haynes also pointed to evidence, which appears undisputed, that Hicks became angry and yelled at Fountain before quitting his job. Yet, Hicks was permitted to return to his job, and Haynes, who had fewer infractions and did not yell at his supervisor, was not permitted to return to his job and instead had his employment terminated. Considering this evidence, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Hicks and Haynes were appropriate comparators, because they dealt with the same supervisor, were subject to the same standards, and engaged in similar conduct. See Cook , 988 F.2d at 511. Indeed, it appears that Hicks, who had more infractions and was less respectful to his superiors, may have engaged in more egregious conduct, yet received more favorable treatment.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Contrary to WCI's argument, the nature of Haynes's previous infractions does not render Hicks an inappropriate comparator. WCI argues in particular that Haynes and Hicks are not proper comparators, because Haynes's infractions caused damage and Hicks's did not. As an initial matter, disputes of fact in the record call into question WCI's assertion that Haynes's infractions caused damage to property. For example, Haynes points to evidence that the police officer did not issue any citation as a result of his undershooting a driveway because there was no damage and that Fountain himself said the incident was not that bad.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Turning first to the issue of an appropriate comparator, this Court has emphasized that a comparison between similar employees "will never involve precisely the same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of circumstances." Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp. , 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993). Rather, to establish a valid comparator, the plaintiff must produce evidence that the plaintiff and comparator "dealt with the same supervisor, [were] subject to the same standards and ... engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it." Haywood v. Locke , 387 F. App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp ., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992) ) (alterations in original).

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Taken as a whole, the evidence in the record could permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Haynes and Hicks are proper comparators. Because Haynes is similar to Hicks in all relevant respects but was treated differently from Hicks, a white employee, the district court erred in holding that Haynes had failed to establish a proper comparator.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: triable; party: Haynes and WCI; theory: Pretext; subject: party=Haynes and WCI; theory=Pretext

Before receiving Haynes's call, Fountain spoke with the company mechanics. According to WCI, the mechanics said that Haynes seemed frustrated with the delay to repair his normal truck and said, "Forget this" or "F*** this." After speaking with the mechanics, Fountain met with the district manager and human resources manager and decided that Haynes's employment should be terminated. On October 8, 2015, Fountain and the district manager informed Haynes that his employment was being terminated for job abandonment.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Here, because Haynes has produced evidence that WCI's reason for his termination has changed substantially over time, he has presented sufficient evidence of pretext. Perhaps most importantly, WCI now asserts for the first time during this litigation an entirely different reason for the termination than was offered initially: Haynes's poor attitude. Additionally, when Haynes's employment was terminated, Fountain told him that he had met with the human resources department and that the reason for the termination was "job abandonment." J.A. 201. As Haynes points out, WCI's own policy defines job abandonment as "three days, no call and no show," which is inconsistent with Haynes's behavior on October 7. Haynes had in fact texted and called before returning to work after only one day.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The district court likewise erred in determining that Haynes had not shown any evidence of pretext. In order to show pretext, a plaintiff may show that an employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination are inconsistent over time, false, or based on mistakes of fact. E.E.O.C. v. Sears Roebuck & Co. , 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2001). Once the plaintiff offers such circumstantial evidence, the case must be decided by a trier of fact and cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Id. This Court has allowed an inference of pretext in cases where an employer has made substantial changes to its proffered reason for discharge over time. Id. ; Wesley v. Arlington Cnty. , 354 F. App'x 775, 782 (4th Cir. 2009).

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

While an employer is certainly permitted to expand on its original reason for a termination, such evidence of substantial changes to WCI's proffered reason for the termination permits an inference of pretext. See Sears Roebuck & Co. , 243 F.3d at 852-53. Thus, because Haynes has pointed to sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether WCI's proffered reason for the termination is pretext, summary judgment on this basis would be in error.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)