United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997-04-15
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil; religious-discrimination discharge (disparate treatment + failure to accommodate) and retaliation against employer and union; defendants' motions for summary judgment granted; result: claimant-lost; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a)
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) | discharge/progressive-discipline-for-absences | Breech received a written warning for his failure to report to work on November 24 and was advised that future failure to report to work would be met with increasingly severe discipline.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [9092:9278] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech failed to report on June 15th; subsequently, he received a reprimand and a three-day suspension.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [12635:12738] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech met with Shelby Walker, Ron Campbell, and Wayne Sheffield (Vice President of Local 345) on July 24, 1991 at which time he was notified that his employment with APC was terminated.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [15294:15480] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: APC; theory: disparate treatment; subject: party=APC; theory=disparate treatment Fourth prima facie prong (differential application of discipline) fails: unnamed comparators in plaintiff's own affidavit, and the only identified absentee employees were all fired too. No direct evidence. | comparator/conclusory-claim-of-unequal-discipline | In his affidavit, Breech states: “There have been many employees over the years who have had many more than four days absent [sic] for personal reasons who were not terminated. Religious reasons are no different than other personal reasons.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32347:32588] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.First, Breech does not state who the other employees are or the circumstances of them absences, i.e., whether the absences were irregular or cyclical.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [32654:32804] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.This evidence does not support Breech’s contention that he was subjected to differential application of work or disciplinary rules: every one of the four employees mentioned was discharged.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33439:33628] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the disparate treatment theory.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [33629:33744] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: Alabama Power Co. (APC); subject: party=Alabama Power Co. (APC) | private-employer/private-utility-long-term-employee | APC employed Breech in various positions from January, 1977 until July, 1991 when he was terminated in response to four unexcused absences.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [1070:1209] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: IBEW System Council U-19 (Union); subject: party=IBEW System Council U-19 (Union) A union can be reached only under (c)(3) (causing the employer to discriminate); that theory was neither argued nor supported, so the discharge claim against the union fails at the threshold. | labor-organization/union-sued-for-employers-discharge | This action was brought by plaintiff Alan Breech (“Breech”) against his former employer, APC, and the union of which he was a member during his employment with APC, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, System Council U-19 (“Union”).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [570:818] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has presented absolutely no evidence on this point; nor has he made specific arguments in his brief that the Union violated § 2000e-2(c)(3).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [21381:21528] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [20836:21002] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: triable; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) Second ground, assuming a prima facie case. Note the "neutral" reason is itself the religiously motivated absence; the court treats that tension under the accommodation theory, not under pretext. | attendance/unexcused-absences-under-progressive-discipline | The stated reason for his discharge was his continued failure to report for work.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [15509:15590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech had also informed APC that he intended to miss each and every shift overlapping with his sabbath if he could not arrange a shift swap or vacation day.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [34130:34287] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actionSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [27358:27555] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.APC has produced ample evidence that it terminated Breech solely because of his four unexcused absences.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [34025:34129] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) (m) is quoted in the standards and pleaded in the complaint, but the court analyses only single-motive McDonnell Douglas; the 1991 Act claims against APC had been dismissed as pre-enactment conduct. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) | no-evidence-of-pretext/plaintiff-offered-none | a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31044:31304] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech never (1) came forth with evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment action was motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent or (2) attempted to show that APC’s proffered explanation was pretextual.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [34288:34500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) | religion/sabbath-observer-converted-during-employment | Breech has been a praetieing member of the Worldwide Church of God since the Fall of 1990; he maintains that he did not attend work on these four occasions because it was contrary to his religious beliefs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [1210:1415] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.One tenant of Breech’s faith is that he cannot work from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [1416:1508] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [25400:25677] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31799:31895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectations | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) | qualified/long-tenure-in-position | he became a Plant Control Operator in May, 1982. He remained a Plant Control Operator, a part of the Operations Department, until he was terminated on July 24,1991.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [4848:5012] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech has satisfied the first three elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31799:31895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: APC only; count: 2000e-3(a) retaliatory discharge; subject: party=APC only; count=2000e-3(a) retaliatory discharge | causal-link/year-long-gap-and-decisionmaker-unaware | In June of 1990, Breech submitted an affidavit with the EEOC on behalf of another employee, Eric Young.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [16892:16995] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Upper management, which was responsible for Breech’s discharge, did not know about Breech’s submission of the affidavit.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [17068:17188] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.In the present case, more than a year passed between the protected activity and the discharge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [40267:40361] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [38762:38968] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [40009:40266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.he has not demonstrated a causal link between his filing of the affidavit and his discharge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [39692:39784] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Failure to reasonably accommodate religious observance or practice (§§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e(j)) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a); party: APC; theory: failure to accommodate under 2000e(j); subject: party=APC; theory=failure to accommodate under 2000e(j) The court skips the accommodation prima facie case and decides on the employer's burden: once any reasonable accommodation is offered the inquiry ends (Philbrook); undue hardship not reached; employee has a duty to cooperate with offered means. | reasonable-accommodation-offered/shift-swaps-vacation-days-and-declined-lower-paid-transfer | Breech met with Shelby Walker on November 26, 1990, at which time Breech informed Walker that he was no longer going to work between sundown Friday and sundown Saturday in observance of his religious beliefs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [7612:7820] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.As a result of the December 7th meeting, APC accommodated Breech by allowing him to make shift swaps which would result in the doubling of shifts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [8379:8525] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.None of the Plant Control Operators who were scheduled with Fridays and Saturdays as their off days were willing to swap schedules with Breech.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [6648:6791] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Finally, APC offered Breech a reasonable accommodation — which Breech declined because he did not want to take a pay cut — when it repeatedly offered to allow him to take a different position, such as Helper or Assistant Control Operator.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [37897:38135] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [35041:35420] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [37277:37384] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.In this case, APC has demonstrated as a matter of law that it reasonably accommodated Breech’s religious beliefs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [37034:37147] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Rejected defense that an adverse CBA arbitration precludes a Title VII action (Alexander v. Gardner-Denver) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) Gardner-Denver controls over Gilmer: union-negotiated CBA arbitration of contract claims is not a waiver of the individual's Title VII forum. | arbitration-preclusion/cba-grievance-award-does-not-bar-statutory-suit | The Board of Arbitration rendered a decision dated June 17,1994; it determined that Breech’s discharge was not in violation of the CBA.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [16702:16837] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [19929:20158] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Thus, defendants’ contention that Beech has waived his right to sue under Title VII is without merit.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [18980:19081] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
Since the Union is not Breech’s employer, it cannot be liable under this specific cause of action; such an action may lie only against the employer, in this case APC.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [20836:21002] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.An employer's discharge decision lies only against the employer under § 2000e-2(a), whereas a union is liable only under § 2000e-2(c) (such as causing or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate under (c)(3)).
interpretation
(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
(1) that he is a member of and/or practices a particular religion, (2) that he was qualified for the job from which he was discharged, (3) that he was discharged, and (4) that his former position was filled by a person of a different religion or a person of no religion at all.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [25400:25677] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Every individual has a race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; in circuits applying a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie prong to majority-group ("reverse discrimination") plaintiffs, background circumstances suggesting inclination to discriminate against the majority group are required.
interpretation
To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
To succeed under the theory of disparate treatment, Breech must show that his employer treated him differently than other employees because of his religious beliefs.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [23883:24048] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
Alternatively, Breech may satisfy the fourth requirement by showing that he was terminated while others having comparable or lesser qualifications and not of his religion were retained, or that he suffered from differential application of work or disciplinary rules.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [26020:26286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
interpretation
the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
the burden of production shifts to the defendant employer who must then come forth with admissible evidence that articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actionSource:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [27358:27555] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.McDonnell Douglas step 2: once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
interpretation
a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31044:31304] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
(1) that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal relation between the protected expression and the adverse action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [38762:38968] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.
interpretation
where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
where a substantial period of time has elapsed between the two events — engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action — the causal connection is less likely to exist absent evidence demonstrating a connection between the two events.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [40009:40266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.
interpretation
To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
To establish a prima facie ease of failure to accommodate, Breech must prove: (1) that he had a bona fide belief that compliance with an employment requirement would be contrary to his religious belief or practice, (2) that he informed his employer about the conflict, and (3) that he was discharged or penalized for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [35041:35420] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Religious accommodation claim combining § 2000e-2(a)(1) with the definition of "religion" in § 2000e(j); once the prima facie case is shown, the employer may show it offered a reasonable accommodation (such as voluntary shift swaps) or that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
interpretation
Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
Employer authorizations of such voluntary shift swaps constitute reasonable accommodations under Title VII.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [37277:37384] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Religious accommodation claim combining § 2000e-2(a)(1) with the definition of "religion" in § 2000e(j); once the prima facie case is shown, the employer may show it offered a reasonable accommodation (such as voluntary shift swaps) or that accommodation would impose an undue hardship.
interpretation
In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
In Alexander and the case sub judice, the CBA provides only for the arbitration of disputes arising under the CBA; it does not provide for the arbitration of an employee’s statutory rights, such as those arising out of Title VII.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [19929:20158] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Under Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (415 U.S. 36 (1974)), an adverse arbitral decision under a collective-bargaining agreement that covers only contractual rights does not preclude a statutory Title VII lawsuit.