American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010

Role: applied; posture: civil; summary judgment for defendants on single-entity defense, affirmed by CA7; certiorari; only the antecedent question whether the league, teams and their licensing corporation are capable of concerted action is decided; result: remanded; claim:

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

The decided issue is CAPACITY to conspire (plurality of actors), not whether an agreement in fact existed — the agreement itself (a vote of the teams) was undisputed. `agreement : satisfied [law]` conflates the two, and it is not a finding of a § 1 violation (reasonableness is remanded); sub-ids like agreement.plurality vs agreement.proof would separate American Needle/Copperweld from Twombly/Monsanto.

The single-entity argument was pleaded as an affirmative defense. It is recorded once, under `agreement` (route capacity-to-conspire); the procedural framing -- who pleads it and who bears the burden -- is not expressible. (Until taxonomy v1.2 it was recorded twice, also as `defense x-single-entity`.)

Holding is stated per ACTOR-RELATION (teams inter se; teams acting through NFLP), not per defendant; `party` carries it, but as free text describing a relation among parties rather than naming one.

§ 2 claim was also pleaded; not addressed by the opinion and not expressible here.

interpretation

The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.

Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita). The Copperweld / American Needle "single entity" argument is this element, route capacity-to-conspire, not a separate defense (it was modelled twice until taxonomy v1.2: also as `defense x-single-entity`). Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).

interpretation

Because the inquiry is one of competitive reality, it is not determinative that two parties to an alleged § 1 violation are legally distinct entities. Nor, however, is it determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Because the inquiry is one of competitive reality, it is not determinative that two parties to an alleged § 1 violation are legally distinct entities. Nor, however, is it determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture.

Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita). The Copperweld / American Needle "single entity" argument is this element, route capacity-to-conspire, not a separate defense (it was modelled twice until taxonomy v1.2: also as `defense x-single-entity`). Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).

interpretation

The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.

Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita). The Copperweld / American Needle "single entity" argument is this element, route capacity-to-conspire, not a separate defense (it was modelled twice until taxonomy v1.2: also as `defense x-single-entity`). Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).

interpretation

When “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

When “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.

Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).

interpretation

The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.

Whether an arrangement joins separate economic decisionmakers capable of concerted action (Copperweld / American Needle) is a threshold inquiry separate from whether cooperation is necessary or procompetitive under the Rule of Reason.

interpretation

The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.

American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.

Whether an arrangement joins separate economic decisionmakers capable of concerted action (Copperweld / American Needle) is a threshold inquiry separate from whether cooperation is necessary or procompetitive under the Rule of Reason.