DEFENSE · 15usc1:state-action-immunity
Under Parker v. Brown (317 U.S. 341 (1943)) and California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (445 U.S. 97 (1980)), state-action immunity shields non-sovereign/private actors only when (1) the challenged restraint is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and (2) the policy is actively supervised by the State itself (and hybrid state-mandated pricing rules that compel private per se conduct without active supervision are preempted, 324 Liquor / Schwegmann / Connecticut Fine Wine).
Exact element source
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracySource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [57:133] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _whole accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 2 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 2 | Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass'n — 496 F.3d 403 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — not · law (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · applied/merits · counted Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Vill. of Bellwood — 929 F.3d 914 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass'n — 496 F.3d 403 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — not · law (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Parker v. Brown state-action immunity (Midcal two-prong test: clearly articulated state policy + active state supervision) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: the casino defendants; subject: party=the casino defendants One-sentence affirmance by reference; three distinct immunities (Local Government Antitrust Act, Parker, Noerr-Pennington) are lumped together with no reasoning in this opinion. | private-parties/trade-association-members-claiming-parker-lgaa-noerr | The court rejected the other defendants’ claims that they were entitled to immunity from plaintiffs’ antitrust claims under the LGAA, the Parker doctrine, and the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [5963:6152] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.Finally, we reject the casinos’ immunity claims for essentially the reasons stated in the district court's November 24, 2004 order.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [32809:32940] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201. |
| Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Vill. of Bellwood — 929 F.3d 914 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · law (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Parker v. Brown state-action immunity (Midcal two-prong test: clearly articulated state policy + active state supervision) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Paramount Media Group (billboard company, plaintiff) v. Village of Bellwood and Image Media Advertising (competitor that won the Village's lease); theory: Count V: the Village's lease of village-owned land to Image Media, under the village-property exception to its billboard-permit ban, as a conspiracy in restraint of trade; subject: party=Paramount Media Group (billboard company, plaintiff) v. Village of Bellwood and Image Media Advertising (competitor that won the Village's lease); theory=Count V: the Village's lease of village-owned land to Image Media, under the village-property exception to its billboard-permit ban, as a conspiracy in restraint of trade Image Media is covered derivatively: a private party cannot be held liable for conspiring with a Parker-protected entity (City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising). | home-rule municipality regulating billboards and leasing its own land; private lessee shares the municipality's immunity | Municipalities receive immunity from federal antitrust laws if they "demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities were authorized by the State pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [11784:12025] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.In 2009 the Village passed Ordinance 9-4, which mandated that "no new off-site advertising sign permit will be issued by the village."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [2074:2208] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.In October 2012 the Village accepted Image Media's offer without responding to Paramount.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [2872:2961] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.As luck would have it, the Village owned property at 1156 Bellwood Avenue, across the street from the Sodhi property.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [2522:2639] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.Illinois has thus immunized the Village from Paramount's antitrust claims.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [12747:12821] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Then, the court inquired whether the challenged provision brought about facially, or per se , unlawful restraints on trade, in which case they are preempted, or restraints that are subject to rule of reason scrutiny, in which case they are not.
Connecticut Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC v. Seagull — 916 F.3d 160 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
Then, the court inquired whether the challenged provision brought about facially, or per se , unlawful restraints on trade, in which case they are preempted, or restraints that are subject to rule of reason scrutiny, in which case they are not.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_916.jsonl#/f3d/916/0160-01; Unicode character offsets [11677:11921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cd0e367f5845bbda844f06ccfcc8c7200ee4c47266959fc0c10dd9bf088d2fd2.Under Parker v. Brown (317 U.S. 341 (1943)) and California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. (445 U.S. 97 (1980)), state-action immunity shields non-sovereign/private actors only when (1) the challenged restraint is clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and (2) the policy is actively supervised by the State itself (and hybrid state-mandated pricing rules that compel private per se conduct without active supervision are preempted, 324 Liquor / Schwegmann / Connecticut Fine Wine).