OR · 15usc1:restraint.rule-of-reason
Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
Exact element source
in restraint of trade or commerceSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [135:168] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 7 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 7 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (7). Excluded context examples:North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc. — 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · rule-announced/merits · not counted Jain Irrigation, Inc. v. Netafim Irrigation, Inc. — 386 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (2019) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of California · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · not counted Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc. — 361 F.2d 874 (1966) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| anticompetitive-effect provisional; 3 observed cases | Whether the plaintiff carried the initial burden of showing harm to competition in a relevant market. | 2 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 1; excluded context 1 | 2 | Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Vill. of Bellwood — 929 F.3d 914 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Mucky Duck v. Directv, LLC (In re Nat'l Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.) — 933 F.3d 1136 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/alternative · not counted |
| market-definition provisional; 2 observed cases | Whether the plaintiff pleaded or proved a plausible relevant market. | 2 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 2; excluded context 0 | 2 | Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC — 377 F. Supp. 3d 506 (2019) · United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · 2019 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Maui Jim, Inc. v. Smartbuy Guru Enters. — 386 F. Supp. 3d 926 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc. — 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits count: Claim I; subject: count=Claim I Selected as the governing standard for Claim I (the selection itself is recorded in the restraint.per-se Claim I block); the court expressly withholds any view on ultimate lawfulness. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC — 377 F. Supp. 3d 506 (2019) · United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · 2019 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; party: Premier Comp Solutions, LLC (workers' compensation cost-containment vendor; plaintiff); UPMC, UPMC Benefit Management Services and UPMC Health Benefits (d/b/a WorkPartners), and MCMC, LLC (repricing vendor) (defendants); theory: § 1 counts II (group boycott), IV (exclusive dealing) and V (restraint of trade): WorkPartners consolidated repricing with MCMC and moved panel generation to Align, cutting Premier out; subject: party=Premier Comp Solutions, LLC (workers' compensation cost-containment vendor; plaintiff); UPMC, UPMC Benefit Management Services and UPMC Health Benefits (d/b/a WorkPartners), and MCMC, LLC (repricing vendor) (defendants); theory=§ 1 counts II (group boycott), IV (exclusive dealing) and V (restraint of trade): WorkPartners consolidated repricing with MCMC and moved panel generation to Align, cutting Premier out Summary judgment after "years of discovery": both the proposed cluster product market and the western-Pennsylvania geographic market are rejected for want of evidence (the court's own label is "legally insufficient"). The same failure is held fatal to antitrust standing and to the § 2 counts. | expert-asserted "cluster" product market and regional geographic market with no quantitative or practical-indicia support | In order to succeed in showing antitrust standing, a Section 1 violation or a Section 2 violation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a properly-defined relevant product and geographic market.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [56198:56395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.In defining the relevant product market, however, Premier fails to direct this Court to any evidence with regard to the Brown Shoe factors, any "practical indicia" that defines the boundaries of the relevant market, or the "business realities" of the market.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [45864:46122] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.In this instance, none of the competitors identified by Premier offer the same set of services as those Premier included in the "cluster."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [49188:49326] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.Steve Wagner, the Senior Claims Manager for WP, agreed that panel development by and for [WorkPartners] would generally have been confined to Western PA.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [51789:51942] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.Premier's expert, Dr. Fuhr, testified that the markets for repricing, physical therapy networks, and MRI networks are national in scope.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [54107:54243] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.Premier's failure to define the relevant markets in this instance dooms its antitrust claims, and will result in summary judgment in favor of Defendants.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [56924:57077] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796. |
| Maui Jim, Inc. v. Smartbuy Guru Enters. — 386 F. Supp. 3d 926 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: SmartBuy Guru Enterprises and affiliates (unauthorized online discount reseller; defendants and counterclaimants - the § 1 claimant); Maui Jim, Inc. (sunglasses manufacturer; plaintiff and counterclaim defendant); theory: Count III counterclaim: Maui Jim's contracts with authorized distributors set minimum retail prices, restrict resale, and cut off retailers that supply SBG; subject: party=SmartBuy Guru Enterprises and affiliates (unauthorized online discount reseller; defendants and counterclaimants - the § 1 claimant); Maui Jim, Inc. (sunglasses manufacturer; plaintiff and counterclaim defendant); theory=Count III counterclaim: Maui Jim's contracts with authorized distributors set minimum retail prices, restrict resale, and cut off retailers that supply SBG The opinion does not name the mode of analysis; it requires a relevant market as part of the second § 1 element for these vertical resale restraints. | single-brand market (one manufacturer's sunglasses) pleaded by a retailer that itself sells 180 competing brands | "When a complaint limits the relevant market to a 'single brand, franchise, institution, or comparable entity that competes with potential substitutes,' a court should dismiss the complaint unless the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations that make it plausible there is no substitute."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [34130:34428] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536.SBG identifies the alleged relevant antitrust market as the "Maui Jim sunglasses market, specifically Maui Jim sunglasses that are marketed and sold throughout the United States either online or through retail stores."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [33101:33319] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536.SBG's only other allegation that Maui Jim sunglasses constitute a market unto themselves states, "Maui Jim's products are differentiated by virtue of their labeling and design."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [38976:39153] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536.SBG's minimal allegations say nothing regarding cross-elasticities of supply or demand.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [36028:36115] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536.The asserted single-brand market in Maui Jim sunglasses is all the more implausible in light of SBG's allegation that it sells "products from more than 180 of the world's best-selling designer brands at attractive prices."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [38000:38222] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536.SBG's failure to plead a plausible relevant market renders dismissal appropriate.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_386.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/386/0926-01; Unicode character offsets [38472:38553] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a632803aa5361679adfc6a9af0138464dd4fdb0508bedabc55ff7554e2ed4536. |
| Jain Irrigation, Inc. v. Netafim Irrigation, Inc. — 386 F. Supp. 3d 1308 (2019) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of California · 2019 — not reached (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: Jain Irrigation, Inc. (manufacturer) and its part-owned distributors Agri-Valley Irrigation (AVI) and Irrigation Design & Construction (IDC) (plaintiffs); Netafim Irrigation, Inc. (competing manufacturer, alleged instigator; sole defendant); subject: party=Jain Irrigation, Inc. (manufacturer) and its part-owned distributors Agri-Valley Irrigation (AVI) and Irrigation Design & Construction (IDC) (plaintiffs); Netafim Irrigation, Inc. (competing manufacturer, alleged instigator; sole defendant) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; count: Count III; subject: count=Count III Alternative merits holding ("Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff has standing"): privilege suspension is not a per se group boycott; with no actual detrimental effects shown, market definition and market power were required and wholly absent. The mode-of-analysis choice (first held line) and the failure of proof under it (second held line) are one block because the claim fails under the selected mode. | single-competitor-excluded-no-market-proof | Plaintiff has suggested that this ease involves a group boycott, which traditionally has been categorized as a per se violation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18005:18133] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.As Defendants note, Plaintiff has not attempted to define the relevant market or provide evidence of market power.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18816:18930] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.After his suspension, he went on to compete effectively in Orlando.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [20199:20266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17680:17911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Upon review of relevant caselaw, the Court concludes that the proper analysis in this case is the rule of reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18247:18360] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Unlike the plaintiff in Boczar, Plaintiff must establish market power in order to maintain a claim under Section 1. This he has not done.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [20267:20404] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3. |
| Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc. — 361 F.2d 874 (1966) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass'n — 496 F.3d 403 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Med. Ctr. At Elizabeth Place, LLC v. Atrium Health Sys. — 922 F.3d 713 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: Medical Center at Elizabeth Place (MCEP; physician-owned hospital, plaintiff) v. the Premier Health Partners hospitals ("Hospital Defendants", a joint operating company and its four member hospitals); theory: per se group boycott by the Hospital Defendants (the "hub" claim): payer panel limitations, physician non-competes and lease terminations, the "Dear Physician" letter; subject: party=Medical Center at Elizabeth Place (MCEP; physician-owned hospital, plaintiff) v. the Premier Health Partners hospitals ("Hospital Defendants", a joint operating company and its four member hospitals); theory=per se group boycott by the Hospital Defendants (the "hub" claim): payer panel limitations, physician non-competes and lease terminations, the "Dear Physician" letter | Unspecified route | This opinion likewise reaches no decision on the ultimate economic merits of Premier's actions because to do so would go beyond our charge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_922.jsonl#/f3d/922/0713-01; Unicode character offsets [2325:2464] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52b18aaeeab3bbac5a98f6f0309c8611637b1f238b1c1a5bcb726b6c3994b6b0. |
| Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Vill. of Bellwood — 929 F.3d 914 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; party: Paramount Media Group (billboard company, plaintiff) v. Village of Bellwood and Image Media Advertising (competitor that won the Village's lease); theory: Count V: the Village's lease of village-owned land to Image Media, under the village-property exception to its billboard-permit ban, as a conspiracy in restraint of trade; subject: party=Paramount Media Group (billboard company, plaintiff) v. Village of Bellwood and Image Media Advertising (competitor that won the Village's lease); theory=Count V: the Village's lease of village-owned land to Image Media, under the village-property exception to its billboard-permit ban, as a conspiracy in restraint of trade The court relies on NYNEX Corp. v. Discon: a § 1 plaintiff must prove harm to the competitive process, not just to a single competitor. The relevant-market discussion that follows (municipal boundaries as the market) is addressed to the § 2 claim. | losing bidder for a municipal billboard lease shows harm to itself, not to competition | To prevail under the rule of reason in a § 1 case, Paramount must establish "(1) a contract, combination or conspiracy; (2) a resultant unreasonable restraint of trade in a relevant market; and (3) an accompanying injury."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [13819:14041] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.In March 2012 the Village amended the ban to exempt "village owned or controlled property."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [2405:2496] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.It instead complains that the Village and Image Media's conduct harmed it individually.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [14270:14357] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.Paramount doesn't offer proof of either anticompetitive effects or a conspiracy to restrain trade between Image Media and the Village.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [14135:14269] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396.This allegation is insufficient to support a § 1 claim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_929.jsonl#/f3d/929/0914-01; Unicode character offsets [14358:14413] (end exclusive); SHA-256 14a0297e822ab7d379d9643d32f8b1f8631a6d7e363d457a2b40a76db1da3396. |
| Mucky Duck v. Directv, LLC (In re Nat'l Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.) — 933 F.3d 1136 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: putative class of residential and commercial Sunday Ticket subscribers (plaintiffs) v. the NFL, its 32 teams and DirecTV; theory: interlocking agreements: the Teams-NFL Agreement pooling the teams' telecast rights and the NFL-DirecTV Agreement giving DirecTV exclusive distribution of out-of-market games; subject: party=putative class of residential and commercial Sunday Ticket subscribers (plaintiffs) v. the NFL, its 32 teams and DirecTV; theory=interlocking agreements: the Teams-NFL Agreement pooling the teams' telecast rights and the NFL-DirecTV Agreement giving DirecTV exclusive distribution of out-of-market games The court applies the rule of reason to both the horizontal and the vertical agreement (league sports, NCAA), views them together rather than separately, and rejects the arguments that cooperation is needed to produce telecasts at all, that output is not reduced because every game airs somewhere, and that no relevant market or market power is pleaded. | league-wide pooling of telecast rights limiting output to one telecast per game; naked output restriction as in NCAA v. Board of Regents, so no market definition needed | Alternatively, plaintiffs can show that a restraint injures competition if they plausibly allege "a naked restriction on price or output," such as "an agreement not to compete in terms of price or output."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [23710:23915] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.Under the terms of the Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements, no individual NFL team is permitted to sell its telecasting rights independently.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [26142:26284] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.The complaint alleges that defendants have limited output by restricting the quantity of telecasts available for sale, and that the NFL has set a uniform quantity of telecasts of football games-one per game-with no regard to the actual consumer demand for the telecasts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [39090:39360] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.And in another form of media, radio broadcasting, plaintiffs allege that the NFL Teams already negotiate individual radio broadcasting contracts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [37687:37832] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.Thus, Sunday Ticket subscribers have access to both local and out-of-market games.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [15530:15612] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.We conclude that the complaint adequately alleges the element of injury to competition by alleging that the interlocking Teams-NFL and NFL-DirecTV Agreements injure competition.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [42090:42267] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9. |
| Texaco Inc. v. Dagher — 547 U.S. 1 (2006) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsPlaintiffs disclaimed a rule of reason claim, which is why losing the per se question ends the case. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits theory: vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers; subject: theory=vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers Court supplies guidance factors for remand (breadth of use in the industry, source of the restraint, market power) but does not apply them to Leegin. | rule-of-reason/vertical-minimum-resale-price-maintenance | Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32031:32164] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32676:32880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37. |
| American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League — 560 U.S. 183 (2010) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsReasonableness of the exclusive headwear license left for remand; competitive balance flagged as a possible justification. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”
United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [9969:10143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32031:32164] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32676:32880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.
Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17680:17911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.