AND · 15usc1:restraint
Because every commercial contract restrains trade in some literal sense, § 1 outlaws only *unreasonable* restraints of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)), evaluated via one of three analytical modes (`restraint.per-se`, `restraint.quick-look`, or `restraint.rule-of-reason`).
Exact element source
in restraint of trade or commerceSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [135:168] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; 5 observed cases | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 5 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (5). Excluded context examples:In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig. — 351 F. Supp. 3d 698 (2018) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2018 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. — 589 F.2d 451 (1979) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp. — 117 F.3d 1137 (1997) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 1997 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig. — 351 F. Supp. 3d 698 (2018) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2018 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsMode of analysis and anticompetitive effect of the alleged boycott are not discussed here (the court relies on its earlier decision, 261 F.Supp.3d 430). | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; party: City of Rockford, Illinois (self-insured health-plan payor that paid ESI for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory: manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market; subject: party=City of Rockford, Illinois (self-insured health-plan payor that paid ESI for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory=manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market The court declined to choose between per se and rule of reason at the pleading stage ("the court need not make this determination at this time", @35681); recorded on the parent element, no mode decided. | exclusive distribution plus acquisition and shelving of the only rival product; mode of analysis expressly deferred to after discovery | At this stage, it is sufficient for plaintiffs to plausibly allege that defendants engaged in conduct that resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [37935:38089] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.The "new strategy" reduced the number of wholesale distributors of Acthar from three to one, thereby restricting patient's access to Acthar, and employed Express Scripts' market power not to push for lower-cost alternatives.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [38221:38445] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.Upon purchasing the rights to Synacthen, Mallinckrodt chose not to bring it to market.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [7619:7705] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.As soon as defendants implemented the ASAP, Mallinckrodt increased the price of Acthar from approximately $ 1,980 to $ 27,922.80-a 1,310% increase in the span of a month, and a 69,707% increase from 2001.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [4062:4266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.Consequently, the court finds that Rockford's assertions of anticompetitive conduct are sufficient to adequately plead the "unreasonable restraint of trade" prong of Rockford's § 1 claim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [39447:39634] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54. |
| Harvey v. Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. — 589 F.2d 451 (1979) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsCourt notes plaintiffs would ultimately have to prove an unreasonable restraint (refusal to supply during the 1973 gasoline shortage) but disposes of the claim at the conspiracy threshold. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp. — 117 F.3d 1137 (1997) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 1997 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / meritsWang's market-power and no-conditioning arguments were raised below but not decided by the district court, panel, or en banc court; left for remand. | Unspecified route | A tying arrangement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade if “the seller has ‘appreciable economic power’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_117.jsonl#/f3d/117/1137-01; Unicode character offsets [5624:5851] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a36344b321af95e0282badf90b0d6556447e8cb9d2f401ed27f3a27a49607f8d. |
| IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. — 924 F.3d 57 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not reached (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits party: IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors); subject: party=IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors) Only antitrust standing was before the court; at Gatt step one it says only that a group boycott is conduct of a kind the antitrust laws forbid. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly — 550 U.S. 544 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsMarket allocation among competitors would be a classic per se restraint if an agreement were adequately alleged; nobody disputed the substantive law. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
A tying arrangement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade if “the seller has ‘appreciable economic power’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.”
Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp. — 117 F.3d 1137 (1997) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 1997 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
A tying arrangement constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade if “the seller has ‘appreciable economic power’ in the tying product market and if the arrangement affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_117.jsonl#/f3d/117/1137-01; Unicode character offsets [5624:5851] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a36344b321af95e0282badf90b0d6556447e8cb9d2f401ed27f3a27a49607f8d.Because every commercial contract restrains trade in some literal sense, § 1 outlaws only *unreasonable* restraints of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)), evaluated via one of three analytical modes (`restraint.per-se`, `restraint.quick-look`, or `restraint.rule-of-reason`).
interpretation
2d 168 (1993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws"); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP , ANTITRUST LAW supra, P651d, at 80 ("In the presence of substantial market power, some kinds of tortious behavior could anticompetitively create or sustain a monopoly, [but] it is wrong categorically to condemn such practices .
Premier Comp Solutions LLC v. UPMC — 377 F. Supp. 3d 506 (2019) · United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania · 2019 (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
2d 168 (1993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws"); 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP , ANTITRUST LAW supra, P651d, at 80 ("In the presence of substantial market power, some kinds of tortious behavior could anticompetitively create or sustain a monopoly, [but] it is wrong categorically to condemn such practices .Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_377.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/377/0506-01; Unicode character offsets [28564:28973] (end exclusive); SHA-256 8fee9334f8a023bc551820e848c61bbe5abc1278d90533adce759ca603a26796.Because every commercial contract restrains trade in some literal sense, § 1 outlaws only *unreasonable* restraints of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)), evaluated via one of three analytical modes (`restraint.per-se`, `restraint.quick-look`, or `restraint.rule-of-reason`).
interpretation
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue,
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue,Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [10049:10185] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.A plaintiff who disclaims every other mode loses on the merits when its mode is rejected (Texaco v. Dagher); otherwise rejection of per se treatment only moves the case to another mode.
interpretation
is now overruled. Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. — 551 U.S. 877 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
is now overruled. Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [52662:52755] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.A plaintiff who disclaims every other mode loses on the merits when its mode is rejected (Texaco v. Dagher); otherwise rejection of per se treatment only moves the case to another mode.