Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)

AND · 15usc1:standing

Under Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters (459 U.S. 519 (1983)), courts balance: (1) causal connection and antitrust injury, (2) directness of the injury (and the Illinois Brick bar on indirect-purchaser damages suits), (3) speculative nature of damages, (4) risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and (5) existence of more direct victims ("efficient enforcer" factors).

Exact element source

is declared to be illegal
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [220:245] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.

Routes and case patterns

Curated routes and observed case patterns
RouteDefinitionMerits instance blocksDistinct merits casesExamples (up to 3 cases per count group)
Unclassified route
provisional; 5 observed cases
no definition yet0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 5
0

Used only in non-merits blocks (5).

Excluded context examples:

North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc. — 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · rule-announced/merits · not counted
Pattern: not recorded

In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig. — 351 F. Supp. 3d 698 (2018) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2018 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted
Pattern: not recorded

Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc. — 361 F.2d 874 (1966) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — not reached · basis not recorded (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted
Pattern: not recorded

efficient-enforcer
provisional; 3 observed cases
Whether the plaintiff is a proper party under the Associated General Contractors factors (directness, speculativeness, more direct victims).3
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 2; excluded context 1
2

Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: speculative-damages-from-hypothetical-open-market

IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. — 924 F.3d 57 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: competitor that was itself the target of the boycott: suppliers pressured to cut it off

IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. — 924 F.3d 57 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: distributor harmed derivatively by a boycott aimed at the online portal it sold through; the portal itself has already sued

Excluded context examples:

Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass'n — 496 F.3d 403 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — not · law (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md)) · applied/lower-court · not counted
Pattern: improper-plaintiff/shareholder-of-injured-corporation

indirect-purchaser-rule
provisional; 2 observed cases
Whether the plaintiff bought directly from the alleged violator and so may claim damages (Illinois Brick).3
Satisfied 2; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
2

City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: payor that paid a non-conspirator PBM (CVS Caremark), not the alleged co-conspirator distributor

City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: payor that paid the conspiring exclusive distributor sues distributor and manufacturer: co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick

Mucky Duck v. Directv, LLC (In re Nat'l Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.) — 933 F.3d 1136 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: direct purchasers from a distributor alleged to be a co-conspirator of the upstream rights holders in an output restriction

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopePatternExact source quotations
North Jackson Pharmacy, Inc. v. Caremark Rx, Inc. — 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (2005) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
rule-announced / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
In re Interest Rate Swaps Antitrust Litig. — 351 F. Supp. 3d 698 (2018) · United States District Court for the Southern District of New York · 2018 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; party: Acument Global Technologies Inc. (self-insured payor that paid CVS Caremark for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory: manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market; subject: party=Acument Global Technologies Inc. (self-insured payor that paid CVS Caremark for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory=manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market

Dismissed without prejudice with leave to replead; the court could not complete the AGC analysis for Acument either (@32295).
payor that paid a non-conspirator PBM (CVS Caremark), not the alleged co-conspirator distributor
First, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977), the Supreme Court held that only direct purchasers from alleged antitrust violators may bring federal antitrust actions.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [15462:15676] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

CVS charged Acument $ 894,617.75 for thirteen administrations of Acthar in a thirteen-month period between December 2015 and December 2016.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [10241:10380] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Plaintiffs allege that CVS stepped into the place of ESI in the Acthar distribution chain, but was still coordinated by UBC.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [10116:10240] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Otherwise, the SAC contains scant mentions of CVS and its role as part of the dealing arrangement alleged in all other respects to be exclusive.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [31830:31974] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As currently formulated, plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that Acument was a direct purchaser from a member of the alleged conspiracy, nor does Acument plausibly allege any other theory which would furnish antitrust standing to it.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [31975:32208] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc. — 360 F. Supp. 3d 730 (2019) · United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; party: City of Rockford, Illinois (self-insured health-plan payor that paid ESI for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory: manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market; subject: party=City of Rockford, Illinois (self-insured health-plan payor that paid ESI for Acthar; plaintiff); Mallinckrodt plc and Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., formerly Questcor (manufacturer of Acthar; defendants); Express Scripts Holding Co. and subsidiaries ESI, CuraScript, Accredo, UBC (exclusive distributor of Acthar; defendants); theory=manufacturer and its exclusive distributor conspired to fix and inflate Acthar's price (exclusive dealing arrangement "ASAP") and to keep the only rival drug, Synacthen, off the market

Added in triage: the Illinois Brick question for Rockford is the most heavily contested federal antitrust issue in the opinion and had no block. The court also found the AGC "proper party" factors met for Rockford (@29127..30482), not recorded separately.
payor that paid the conspiring exclusive distributor sues distributor and manufacturer: co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick
One such exception is the "co-conspirator" exception, which allows indirect purchasers to sue middlemen-conspirators if the plaintiffs can establish a conspiracy and overcharges:
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [16816:16994] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

ESI then charged Rockford $ 100,457.64 for the 30-day supply of Acthar, pursuant to the terms of the PBM Agreement.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [9784:9899] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But here, plaintiffs do not allege that defendants' agreement in fact included a "pass-on" payment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [27003:27102] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Accordingly, on April 1, 2015, Mallinckrodt had Acthar shipped directly to the children of two Rockford employees.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [9669:9783] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But at the Rule 12 stage, the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs, and finds that Illinois Brick is not a bar to plaintiffs' claims.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_360.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/360/0730-01; Unicode character offsets [28349:28506] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1f8910a323ccf3d6ebebad02d768209fa54f8d2dede5be52740a926291937b54.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — not · no-evidence (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; party: CFMA, Healthchoice; count: Count I (exclusion from closed-panel PPO); theory: plaintiff wants the panel opened to all physicians (affidavit version); subject: party=CFMA, Healthchoice; count=Count I (exclusion from closed-panel PPO); theory=plaintiff wants the panel opened to all physicians (affidavit version)

speculative-damages-from-hypothetical-open-market
There are currently 2,200 licensed physicians in the Orlando area. Healthchoice presently has 863 physicians on its provider panel in Orange, Seminole and Osceola Counties.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [29137:29309] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It is impossible to predict how many of the doctors not currently on the panel would choose to participate in Healthchoice.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [29310:29433] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

There is no way to know how many patients would choose Plaintiff as their internist or what services those patients would require.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [30172:30302] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

A second factor is the nature of the plaintiffs damages claims. Id. If the claims are highly speculative,' the plaintiff may not have standing.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [23502:23645] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It appears that any damages Plaintiff may be able to claim are highly speculative. Therefore, Plaintiff is not an efficient enforcer of this alleged antitrust violation.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [30615:30784] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc. — 361 F.2d 874 (1966) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp. — 117 F.3d 1137 (1997) · United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 1997 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
rule-announced / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
Tunica Web Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass'n — 496 F.3d 403 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — not · law (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not
Excluded from merits counts
applied / lower-court

basis: law; party: Graziosi individually (sole shareholder and CEO of TWA); subject: party=Graziosi individually (sole shareholder and CEO of TWA)

The DISTRICT COURT's ruling, reported in a footnote and not reviewed: Graziosi does not challenge it on appeal, so this panel decides nothing about standing. The opinion does not give the district court's reasoning; [law] is inferred from the variant (shareholder of the injured corporation).
improper-plaintiff/shareholder-of-injured-corporation
The district court held that Graziosi did not individually have standing to pursue the antitrust claims. Although Graziosi is listed as an appellant, she does not appear to challenge the district court’s standing ruling on appeal.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [28425:28655] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. — 924 F.3d 57 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; party: IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors); theory: the "direct boycott allegations": pressure on manufacturers to stop supplying IQ and disparagement of IQ to its customers; subject: party=IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors); theory=the "direct boycott allegations": pressure on manufacturers to stop supplying IQ and disparagement of IQ to its customers

competitor that was itself the target of the boycott: suppliers pressured to cut it off
A four-factor test is employed to determine whether an antitrust plaintiff is an efficient enforcer; thus we must evaluate: (1) "the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury," (2) "the existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement," (3) "the speculativeness of the alleged injury," and (4) "the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [15297:15837] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

IQ claims that the Defendants directly pressured manufacturers to stop selling their products to IQ, and that the Defendants sought to damage IQ's business reputation with its customers.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [25028:25214] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The value of each lost opportunity might be calculated based on IQ's historical sales data without undue speculation.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [26045:26162] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Unlike the indirect claims, any damages in connection with the Defendants' direct boycott of IQ could not also be claimed by Arnold and DDS.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [26302:26442] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We find, with respect to these particular allegations, that IQ is an efficient enforcer and thus has antitrust standing to proceed with its direct boycott claim against the Defendants.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [24744:24928] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

IQ Dental Supply, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. — 924 F.3d 57 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — not · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; party: IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors); theory: the "indirect boycott allegations": boycotts of SourceOne-affiliated websites and of the state dental associations, which harmed IQ derivatively; subject: party=IQ Dental Supply (small distributor selling through SourceOne's online portals, plaintiff) v. Henry Schein, Patterson and Benco (the three dominant dental-supply distributors); theory=the "indirect boycott allegations": boycotts of SourceOne-affiliated websites and of the state dental associations, which harmed IQ derivatively

distributor harmed derivatively by a boycott aimed at the online portal it sold through; the portal itself has already sued
The first efficient-enforcer factor requires a direct injury: "Directness in the antitrust context means close in the chain of causation."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [16698:16836] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

By contrast, the Defendants here sought to put SourceOne-not IQ-out of business by undermining SourceOne's new and disruptive online sales model.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [17973:18118] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

And SourceOne has in fact sued the Defendants seeking to enforce the antitrust laws.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [19445:19529] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

This is IQ's most promising claim that it is a properly motivated plaintiff: while SourceOne and the SDAs earn a commission on the sales, neither earns a profit.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [19686:19847] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The damages to which IQ lays claim-lost profits from sales it would have made through SourceOne-affiliated websites absent the Defendants' anticompetitive conduct-are exactly the same damages SourceOne's initial suppliers, DDS and Arnold, could have claimed.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [22625:22883] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In sum, we agree with the district court that because IQ is not positioned to efficiently enforce the claims that the Defendants harmed it by conspiring to boycott SourceOne-affiliated websites and the SDAs, IQ does not have antitrust standing to bring these claims.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_924.jsonl#/f3d/924/0057-01; Unicode character offsets [24137:24403] (end exclusive); SHA-256 da542b913aaaaecc4dee585005c4c043a7ad5068aafddc4154b5213f1e68de8f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Mucky Duck v. Directv, LLC (In re Nat'l Football League's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig.) — 933 F.3d 1136 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied · pleaded (15usc1: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: pleaded; party: putative class of residential and commercial Sunday Ticket subscribers (plaintiffs) v. the NFL, its 32 teams and DirecTV; theory: interlocking agreements: the Teams-NFL Agreement pooling the teams' telecast rights and the NFL-DirecTV Agreement giving DirecTV exclusive distribution of out-of-market games; subject: party=putative class of residential and commercial Sunday Ticket subscribers (plaintiffs) v. the NFL, its 32 teams and DirecTV; theory=interlocking agreements: the Teams-NFL Agreement pooling the teams' telecast rights and the NFL-DirecTV Agreement giving DirecTV exclusive distribution of out-of-market games

Extends the Ninth Circuit's co-conspirator reading of Illinois Brick (Shamrock Foods, ATM Fee) from price-fixing to output-restriction conspiracies. Judge Smith dissents on exactly this point.
direct purchasers from a distributor alleged to be a co-conspirator of the upstream rights holders in an output restriction
In other words, when co-conspirators have jointly committed the antitrust violation, a plaintiff who is the immediate purchaser from any of the conspirators is directly injured by the violation.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [45453:45647] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Additionally, in order to subscribe to the Sunday Ticket, consumers must also purchase a basic television package from DirecTV.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [16364:16491] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

According to the complaint, the conspiracy involves both the Teams-NFL agreement and the NFL-DirecTV agreement, which work together as a single conspiracy to limit the output of NFL telecasts.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [45768:45960] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Even though DirecTV is the immediate seller to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' allegation that they were directly injured by the conspiracy among the NFL teams, the NFL, and DirecTV is sufficient to allege antitrust standing for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/1136-01; Unicode character offsets [46394:46665] (end exclusive); SHA-256 42db1f4be612dc14ab467043a16aad8f736e97a31b6f073cfa1f940151d3b1e9.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly — 550 U.S. 544 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — not reached (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.

Court interpretations

interpretation

This language has been interpreted in this Circuit to mean that a plaintiff alleging antitrust claims must establish antitrust standing in addition to constitutional standing under Article III.

Sonterra Capital Master Fund v. Barclays Bank Plc — 366 F. Supp. 3d 516 · United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois · 2018 (15usc1: author: unavailable · not independently reviewed)

This language has been interpreted in this Circuit to mean that a plaintiff alleging antitrust claims must establish antitrust standing in addition to constitutional standing under Article III.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_366.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/366/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [21172:21365] (end exclusive); SHA-256 21ba5d381b857bedf61b49ebebe3105ca6c58f886ee116633ba2f2342bd8f22f.

Under Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters (459 U.S. 519 (1983)), courts balance: (1) causal connection and antitrust injury, (2) directness of the injury (and the Illinois Brick bar on indirect-purchaser damages suits), (3) speculative nature of damages, (4) risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and (5) existence of more direct victims ("efficient enforcer" factors).

interpretation

To be a proper party, a plaintiff must have suffered an antitrust injury and must be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.

Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

To be a proper party, a plaintiff must have suffered an antitrust injury and must be an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [4861:4990] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Under Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters (459 U.S. 519 (1983)), courts balance: (1) causal connection and antitrust injury, (2) directness of the injury (and the Illinois Brick bar on indirect-purchaser damages suits), (3) speculative nature of damages, (4) risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and (5) existence of more direct victims ("efficient enforcer" factors).

interpretation

A second factor is the nature of the plaintiffs damages claims. Id. If the claims are highly speculative,' the plaintiff may not have standing.

Levine v. Central Florida Medical Affiliates, Inc. — 864 F. Supp. 1175 (1994) · United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 (15usc1: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)

A second factor is the nature of the plaintiffs damages claims. Id. If the claims are highly speculative,' the plaintiff may not have standing.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [23502:23645] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.

Under Associated General Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Carpenters (459 U.S. 519 (1983)), courts balance: (1) causal connection and antitrust injury, (2) directness of the injury (and the Illinois Brick bar on indirect-purchaser damages suits), (3) speculative nature of damages, (4) risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment, and (5) existence of more direct victims ("efficient enforcer" factors).