Supreme Court of the United States · 2009-06-29
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil; cross-motions for summary judgment, granted for employer and affirmed by CA2; certiorari by firefighters; Supreme Court reverses and holds plaintiffs entitled to summary judgment on disparate treatment; result: claimant-won; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j)
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; subject: party=plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results Loss of promotion eligibility (not a certain promotion) is treated as the adverse action without discussion. | failure-to-promote/promotion-exam-results-discarded | The plaintiffs — who are the petitioners here — are 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations but were denied a chance at promotions when the CSB refused to certify the test results.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [25021:25238] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The results would determine which firefighters would be considered for promotions during the next two years, and the order in which they would be considered.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [752:909] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; subject: party=plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results Benign objective (avoiding disparate-impact liability) does not negate intent: acting on the racial distribution of outcomes is itself "because of race". No McDonnell Douglas inference needed; the motive is undisputed on the record. | express-race-based-decision/results-discarded-because-of-racial-distribution | When the examination results showed that white candidates had outperformed minority candidates, the mayor and other local politicians opened a public debate that turned rancorous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [993:1172] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.As the rule of three operated, this meant that the top 10 candidates were eligible for an immediate promotion to lieutenant. All 10 were white.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [8394:8537] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.With one member recused, the CSB deadlocked 2 to 2, resulting in a decision not to certify the results.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [24569:24672] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.All the evidence demonstrates that the City chose not to certify the examination results because of the statistical disparity based on race— i. e., how minority candidates had performed when compared to white candidates.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [33723:33943] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Whatever the City’s ultimate aim — however well intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed — the City made its employment decision because of race. The City rejected the test results solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [35257:35500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organization | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); subject: party=defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents) | public-employer/municipal-fire-department | When the City of New Haven undertook to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions in its fire department (Department), the promotion and hiring process was governed by the City charter, in addition to federal and state law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [3526:3752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / hypothetical basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) | statistical-disparity/exam-pass-rate-below-four-fifths | On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49215:49346] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49347:49500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49057:49214] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Less discriminatory alternative employment practice that the employer refuses to adopt (§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / hypothetical basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) | alternative-practice/reweighting-banding-assessment-center | But respondents have produced no evidence to show that the 60/40 weighting was indeed arbitrary.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [55121:55217] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Had the City reviewed the exam results and then adopted banding to make the minority test scores appear higher, it would have violated Title VIPs prohibition of adjusting test results on the basis of race.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [57209:57414] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.But Hornick’s brief mention of alternative testing methods, standing alone, does not raise a genuine issue of material fact that assessment centers were available to the City at the time of the examinations and that they would have produced less adverse impact.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [58152:58413] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [32904:33148] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Respondents also lacked a strong basis in evidence of an equally valid, less discriminatory testing alternative that the City, by certifying the examination results, would necessarily have refused to adopt.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [54425:54631] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity (§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / hypothetical basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) "satisfied" = the employer's business-necessity showing would have succeeded, which is why the defense to the treatment claim FAILS. The missing validation report is the one gap in the showing; the Court charges it to the City, which never asked for it. | business-necessity/job-related-exam-professionally-developed-from-job-analysis | In order to fit the examinations to the New Haven Department, IOS began the test-design process by performing job analyses to identify the tasks, knowledge, skills, and abilities that are essential for the lieutenant and captain positions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [5283:5522] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.IOS devised the written examinations, which were the focus of the CSB’s inquiry, after painstaking analyses of the captain and lieutenant positions — analyses in which IOS made sure that minorities were overrepresented.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [51919:52138] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Although the City’s contract with IOS contemplated that IOS would prepare a technical report consistent with EEOC guidelines for examination-validity studies, the City made no request for its report.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [53796:53995] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [32736:32897] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.There is no genuine dispute that the examinations were job related and consistent with business necessity.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [51534:51640] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners); subject: party=plaintiff 17 white firefighters and 1 Hispanic firefighter who passed the examinations (petitioners) | race/white-and-hispanic-majority-plaintiffs | Certain white and Hispanic firefighters who likely would have been promoted based on their good test performance sued the City and some of its officials.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [1742:1895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Strong-basis-in-evidence defense for race-conscious action taken to avoid disparate-impact liability (Ricci v. DeStefano) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(a)(1) disparate-treatment claim for the refusal to certify the examination results; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative) Judge-made justification reconciling (a)(1) with (k): good-faith fear is not enough, actual violation is not required. Fails here because only the prima facie disparity existed; both business-necessity and less-discriminatory-alternative pointed the employer's way. Two rulings in one block: the standard itself (strong basis in evidence) is announced as a matter of law, then applied on the summary-judgment record ("no support", "no genuine dispute"); the basis records the application. | strong-basis-in-evidence/statistical-disparity-alone | The City and the officials defended their actions, arguing that if they had certified the results, they could have faced liability under Title VII for adopting a practice that had a disparate impact on the minority firefighters.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [2256:2484] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ude stated that under federal law, “a statistical demonstration of disparate impact,” standing alone, “constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of racial discrimination to serve as a predicate for employer-initiated, voluntar[y] remedies — even . . . race-conscious remedies.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [9982:10258] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [46788:47141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [50531:50879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Even if respondents were motivated as a subjective matter by a desire to avoid committing disparate-impact discrimination, the record makes clear there is no support for the conclusion that respondents had an objective, strong basis in evidence to find the tests inadequate, with some consequent disparate-impact liability in violation of Title VII.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [47316:47665] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
Without some other justification, this express, race-based decisionmaking violates Title VIPs command that employers cannot take adverse employment actions because of an individual’s race.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [34306:34494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.
hypothetical
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
An employer may defend against liability by demonstrating that the practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [32736:32897] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Employer's rebuttal burden under § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Under § 2000e-2(k)(2), business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
hypothetical
Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
Even if the employer meets that burden, however, a plaintiff may still succeed by showing that the employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [32904:33148] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Plaintiff's surrebuttal under § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii): even if a practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity, liability attaches if the employer refuses to adopt a less discriminatory alternative. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.
interpretation
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [46788:47141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ricci v. DeStefano standard reconciling § 2000e-2(a) disparate treatment and § 2000e-2(k) disparate impact: good-faith fear of disparate-impact litigation or a raw statistical disparity alone is insufficient; the employer must show a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.
interpretation
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
The problem for respondents is that a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability — essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U. S. 440, 446 (1982), and nothing more — is far from a strong basis in evidence that the City would have been liable under Title VII had it certified the results.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [50531:50879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Ricci v. DeStefano standard reconciling § 2000e-2(a) disparate treatment and § 2000e-2(k) disparate impact: good-faith fear of disparate-impact litigation or a raw statistical disparity alone is insufficient; the employer must show a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact liability.
interpretation
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.
/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009
We hold only that, under Title VII, before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [46788:47141] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.Intentional race-based action (`because-of`) cannot be justified by business necessity (§ 2000e-2(k)(2)) and can be justified by avoiding disparate-impact liability (`x-disparate-impact-compliance`) only upon a strong basis in evidence. Ricci's strong-basis rule is a hypothetical disparate-impact defense nested inside an intentional-discrimination dispute; it does not turn the case into an adjudicated § 2000e-2(k) claim.