United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995-06-07
18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: criminal; jury conviction for felon in possession of two handguns found in the bedroom of his girlfriend's house (plus a 21 U.S.C. 841 cocaine count annotated separately); defendant appeals sufficiency of the evidence on possession only; firearm conviction affirmed; result: claimant-won; claim: (g)(1)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
The larger part of the opinion reverses the 21 U.S.C. 841 cocaine conviction for lack of possession; it is annotated in 21usc841/ and not recorded here. The opinion treats "possession" as one doctrine across both statutes (constructive possession affirmed for the guns, denied for the drugs); the notation has no cross-law link between the two blocks of one opinion. `result claimant-won` is for the 922(g) count only.
Temporal aspect of possession: the court holds the jury could find he constructively possessed the guns BEFORE his arrest although they were seized afterwards. "When" an element was satisfied (relative to seizure / custody) has no slot; it sits in a cuts-against fact and the gloss.
Known misfit 5: status and commerce are "not contested" on appeal after a jury verdict, i.e. both found by the jury and conceded; one basis ([conceded]) had to be chosen. The conceded blocks have no fact lines because the opinion states none.
Known misfit 6: the residence facts were disputed (he testified he lived with his mother); the court says the jury was free to disbelieve him. Fact lines cannot mark whose version was credited.
Role: applied; posture: criminal; jury conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (reverse-buy sting); defendant appeals sufficiency of the evidence on possession only; result: claimant-lost; claim: (a)(1)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
Roughly half the opinion (and the only constructive-possession holding in the government's favour) concerns 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) firearms found in a shared bedroom; that analysis defines "constructive possession" for both statutes but belongs to another law, so the affirmed firearm holding is not recorded here.
The court relates possession to a different offence (attempted possession under § 846) as the better fit; a "lesser/alternative offence would have been satisfied" relation cannot be expressed.
The key fact (holding the kilogram 2-3 seconds) was disputed; the court assumes the government's version on sufficiency review. Polarity ([supports]) does not help: a `fact` line cannot mark a fact as "assumed in the verdict-winner's favour".
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 12
| Case | One applicable prohibited category | Section 925(a)(1) government-use firearm or ammunition exception | Actual or constructive possession | Firearm or ammunition under section 921 | Possession in or affecting commerce | Knowledge of possessing the firearm or ammunition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: applied/merits |
Elements 7–12 of 12
| Case | Knowledge of the relevant disqualifying status | Second Amendment limit on the unlawful-user theory applied to Hemani | Ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce | Knowing shipping, transportation or receipt | Receipt of the prohibited object | Received object previously shipped or transported across borders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 18
Elements 7–12 of 18
| Case | Death or serious bodily injury results from the use of such substance (§ 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) 20-year mandatory minimum) | Recidivist enhancement for prior conviction for a serious drug felony or serious violent felony (§ 841(b)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 851) | Prohibited act under § 841(a)(1): manufacture, distribute, or dispense | Cross-statute route alias: see separate aiding-abetting (§ 2) and x-conspiracy-846 (§ 846) routes | Aiding and abetting route under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (cross-statute) | Categorical / modified categorical comparison of state drug offense to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (INA / ACCA / Guidelines) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–18 of 18
| Case | Drug conspiracy route under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (cross-statute) | Fifth Amendment Due Process / Equal Protection challenge to carrier-medium weight sentencing (Chapman) | Affirmative defense of entrapment (government inducement + lack of predisposition) | Rule of lenity in construing ambiguous penalty provisions of § 841(b) | Fifth Amendment void-for-vagueness challenge to "mixture or substance" or analogue provisions | Continuing-offense venue for § 841(a)(1) possession with intent to distribute / distribution (18 U.S.C. § 3237(a)) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Possession in or affecting commerce | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1) "Third element", expressly not contested (see the held line under status.g1); no facts given. CAVEAT: rests on that single uncontested sentence; the opinion says nothing about the firearms' origin or movement - thin as authority on what satisfies the commerce nexus. | prior-interstate-travel/uncontested-on-appeal | (3) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [6721:6790] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Knowledge of possessing the firearm or ammunition | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (g)(1) Appears only inside the quoted definition ("knowingly has the power and the intention"); whether he knew the guns were in the bedroom is not separately discussed. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — satisfied · proved (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Actual or constructive possession | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: proved; claim: (g)(1); count: felon-in-possession count (.357 revolver and 9 mm pistol in a first-floor bedroom); theory: constructive possession through residence in the home; joint with the girlfriend; subject: count=felon-in-possession count (.357 revolver and 9 mm pistol in a first-floor bedroom); theory=constructive possession through residence in the home; joint with the girlfriend Sufficiency upheld: residence in the home (his papers, gang bracelet, men's clothing in the same bedroom as the guns; phone number; sightings; paid for repairs) gives power to control firearms found there. Joint access by the girlfriend and his being in custody when the guns were seized (he was arrested at the drug deal earlier that day) are held immaterial. The opinion infers power to control from residence and does not separately analyse intention or knowledge of the guns. | firearm-in-bedroom-of-shared-residence | Both weapons were found in a bedroom on the first floor of the residence. The .357 magnum was discovered in the bed area, leaning up against the back of the headboard. The .9 millimeter was recovered from a dresser drawer along with an additional magazine of ammunition.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [3994:4264] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.The search revealed, in addition to the firearms, a number of Kitchen’s possessions — his El Rukn bracelet, bills and papers bearing his name and various articles of men’s clothing.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [8171:8352] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.In many of the recorded drug conversations with Kitchen, agents had reached him by calling the telephone number at that address. According to the government, Kitchen had stated that he lived at that address. Agents in fact saw Kitchen at that address on numerous occasions.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [7897:8170] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Kitchen argues that he in fact lived with his mother in Robbins, Illinois, and only visited Williams occasionally.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [8492:8606] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.It is not material, contrary to Kitchen’s assertions, that he was incarcerated at the time the agents actually seized the guns.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [9059:9186] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.The fact that Williams, too, had access to the firearms fails to negate the inference that Kitchen did as well.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [10186:10297] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others....Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [7417:7650] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.If he in fact resided at Williams’s home, then he had the power to exercise control over the two firearms.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [9351:9457] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.The jury might have determined that he lived at the residence and occupied the bedroom where the guns were located. Under these circumstances, we believe that Kitchen constructively possessed the guns in question.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [10513:10726] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Because the evidence established that Kitchen resided in the home in which the police located the firearms, it was sufficient to support Kitchen’s conviction for the possession of a firearm.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [27121:27311] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1) "First element" = previous felony conviction; the opinion gives no facts about it. CAVEAT: rests on a single sentence saying the element was not contested on appeal; no facts and no reasoning - thin as authority on what satisfies status.g1. | prior-felony/uncontested-on-appeal | Kitchen does not contest the first and third elements of his conviction, but he does contend that evidence supporting the second element is lacking.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [6909:7057] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Specific intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense the possessed controlled substance | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) Not contested on appeal; the court treats evidence of intent to purchase as irrelevant to possession. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Mens rea: "knowingly or intentionally" (including knowledge that the substance is a controlled substance) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) Not contested on appeal. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not · no-evidence (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Possession (actual, constructive, sole, or joint dominion and control) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: actual possession (holding a kilogram for 2-3 seconds); subject: theory=actual possession (holding a kilogram for 2-3 seconds) Sufficiency reversed: physical holding alone is not actual possession where the buyer in a reverse sting has neither paid nor assented; conduct was that of a prospective buyer inspecting goods. Court says payment, verbal assent, or acts consistent with carrying the drugs away would change the result. | momentary-handling-during-inspection-before-assent | Kitchen showed Casali the money and then handed it to his coconspirator, Dow-dell. Casali admitted that at no point did either Kitchen or Dowdell offer Griffin or him the money or attempt to hand the money over.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [16249:16460] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.The government suggests that Kitchen picked up one of the kilograms of cocaine for “two or three seconds.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [3454:3560] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.All agree that Kitchen made a comment expressing concern about the drug’s purity — that he was worried about “slabs” (apparently one of the most desirable forms of cocaine). At that point, Casali and Fernandez placed Kitchen under arrest.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [3561:3799] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Casali admitted that Kitchen never stated that he would complete the transaction or made a similar affirmative comment to that effect.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [17055:17189] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.And here, the essential proof of possession that we require is some factor indicating that Kitchen had the authority or the ability to exercise control over the contraband.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [20652:20824] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.In most cases of actual possession, because the defendant physically holds or carries the narcotics, his control over them is presumed. But to state that control is presumed is not to suggest that actual possession can be established when it is completely absent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [21556:21819] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Although Kitchen held the cocaine in his hand, he did not yet have a recognized authority to exert control over it.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [22766:22881] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Instead, Kitchen’s momentary holding was in the context of inspection, not delivery.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [20044:20128] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not · no-evidence (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Possession (actual, constructive, sole, or joint dominion and control) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); theory: constructive possession (intent to purchase + cash in hand); subject: theory=constructive possession (intent to purchase + cash in hand) Intent to buy (negotiations, prior dealing, arriving with $14,000) shows at most attempted possession; the court notes the case "fits more neatly into an attempt paradigm" (the jury had rejected attempt). | no-recognized-authority-over-sellers-drugs | After further negotiations, Kitchen agreed to purchase two kilograms of cocaine from Griffin.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [1801:1894] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Instead, Kitchen left the money with Dowdell and proceeded to another location with Casali to examine the drugs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [16470:16582] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.The constructive possession cases teach that a defendant must have ultimate control over the drugs. This requirement translates into the right, or the recognized authority within the “criminal milieu,” to possess the drugs in question.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [21871:22106] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Kitchen’s intent to purchase, without more, is insufficient to establish possession because it overlooks the required element of dominion or control.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [24433:24582] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.We believe that although Kitchen held the drugs for a moment, he neither controlled them nor had recognized authority over them.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [26670:26798] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Controlled substance (21 U.S.C. §§ 802(6), 812 Schedules I-V) or counterfeit substance (§ 841(a)(2)) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1) | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
And here, the essential proof of possession that we require is some factor indicating that Kitchen had the authority or the ability to exercise control over the contraband.
United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
And here, the essential proof of possession that we require is some factor indicating that Kitchen had the authority or the ability to exercise control over the contraband.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [20652:20824] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Constructive possession requires power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the contraband (directly or through others); mere proximity, association, or unconsummated inspection prior to payment does not suffice.
interpretation
The constructive possession cases teach that a defendant must have ultimate control over the drugs. This requirement translates into the right, or the recognized authority within the “criminal milieu,” to possess the drugs in question.
United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
The constructive possession cases teach that a defendant must have ultimate control over the drugs. This requirement translates into the right, or the recognized authority within the “criminal milieu,” to possess the drugs in question.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [21871:22106] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Constructive possession requires power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the contraband (directly or through others); mere proximity, association, or unconsummated inspection prior to payment does not suffice.
interpretation
Kitchen’s intent to purchase, without more, is insufficient to establish possession because it overlooks the required element of dominion or control.
United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Kitchen’s intent to purchase, without more, is insufficient to establish possession because it overlooks the required element of dominion or control.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [24433:24582] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5.Constructive possession requires power and intention to exercise dominion and control over the contraband (directly or through others); mere proximity, association, or unconsummated inspection prior to payment does not suffice.