OR · 21usc841:x-categorical-match
Frequently litigated when § 841 serves as the generic federal comparator in immigration (Moncrieffe), Armed Career Criminal Act, or Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.2) cases.
Exact element source
to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; orSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title21.jsonl#title21_sec841; Unicode character offsets [151:282] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ebaba73bf6e21a591f44bf851f24a052a5687813c505030cd9483e17753e9420.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _whole accepted; 3 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 4 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (4). Excluded context examples:United States v. Teran-Salas — 767 F.3d 453 (2014) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2014 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted Guillen v. U.S. Attorney Gen. — 910 F.3d 1174 (2018) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2018 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · comparator/merits · not counted United States v. Rashun Suncar — 142 F.4th 259 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted United States v. Rashun Suncar — 142 F.4th 259 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Teran-Salas — 767 F.3d 453 (2014) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2014 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Categorical / modified categorical comparison of state drug offense to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (INA / ACCA / Guidelines) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1); count: prior Texas conviction, Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a) possession with intent to deliver; theory: categorical comparison to the federal distribute/dispense definition; subject: count=prior Texas conviction, Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a) possession with intent to deliver; theory=categorical comparison to the federal distribute/dispense definition Texas "deliver" includes "administer" by a practitioner's agent in the practitioner's presence without a "lawful order", which is theoretically broader than federal "dispense"; but with no Texas prosecution on an administering theory, and 4-200 g of cocaine being implausible as medical administration, the state offence is treated as a match. The aggravated-felony limb runs through 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) to "felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act", i.e. § 841(a)(1). | state-predicate-matches-federal-offence/overbreadth-only-theoretical-no-realistic-probability | It identified a 2011 Texas conviction for possession with intent to deliver between four and 200 grams of cocaine.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [772:886] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.Accordingly, one can possess with the intent to deliver by possessing with the intent to either distribute, dispense, or administer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [8226:8358] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.Like the defendants in Ruiz-Sanchez and Villedar-Mejia, Teran-Salas does not identify any case that applied § 481.112(a) in such a manner.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [16218:16356] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.Under the federal scheme, any administering of a controlled substance that falls under the federal definition for “dispense” must be “by, or pursuant to the lawful order of, a practitioner.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [9699:9889] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). This wording tracks the relevant parts of the guidelines definition for “drug trafficking offense.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [18669:19020] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.It is not a realistic probability that someone would engage in medical care or research that involved administering cocaine in such amounts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [16953:17093] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.We hold that the district court was correct in determining that Teran-Salas’s Texas conviction was both a drug trafficking offense and an aggravated felony.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [17534:17690] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d. |
| Guillen v. U.S. Attorney Gen. — 910 F.3d 1174 (2018) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · 2018 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Flash2 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Categorical / modified categorical comparison of state drug offense to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (INA / ACCA / Guidelines) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1) Not a categorical match (Florida's schedules are broader, undisputed), but Fla. Stat. § 893.13(6)(a) is divisible by the identity of the substance; under the modified categorical approach the conviction records show cocaine, a federally scheduled substance, so the convictions "relat[e] to a controlled substance" as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802. The comparison is to the § 802(6) definition, not to the elements of § 841(a)(1). | divisible-state-drug-schedule-matches-federal | The Florida controlled substance schedules undeniably are broader than the definition of "controlled substance" under federal law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_910.jsonl#/f3d/910/1174-01; Unicode character offsets [10858:10988] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0bd3b4a61335f502649efbd5ed1e34c70281500a9d907b47b404145b85f2c0fd.Each relevant criminal information specifically identified the substance involved in Guillen's offenses, and they report that Guillen was charged with "unlawfully and feloniously possess[ing] a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_910.jsonl#/f3d/910/1174-01; Unicode character offsets [32735:32968] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0bd3b4a61335f502649efbd5ed1e34c70281500a9d907b47b404145b85f2c0fd.The modified categorical approach applies when a statute is "divisible," that is, "when it lists a number of alternative elements that effectively create several different crimes."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_910.jsonl#/f3d/910/1174-01; Unicode character offsets [13941:14121] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0bd3b4a61335f502649efbd5ed1e34c70281500a9d907b47b404145b85f2c0fd.We hold that the Board was correct in concluding that the statute is divisible and in finding that Guillen's convictions for possession of cocaine relate to a controlled substance as defined by federal law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_910.jsonl#/f3d/910/1174-01; Unicode character offsets [11216:11422] (end exclusive); SHA-256 0bd3b4a61335f502649efbd5ed1e34c70281500a9d907b47b404145b85f2c0fd. |
| United States v. Rashun Suncar — 142 F.4th 259 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Categorical / modified categorical comparison of state drug offense to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (INA / ACCA / Guidelines) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(C); count: prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"; theory: offer-to-sell overbreadth argument; subject: count=prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"; theory=offer-to-sell overbreadth argument A non-precedential intermediate state decision (Walker) reading offers into the statute is treated as dicta; the court predicts the state supreme court would follow the text. Statutes that expressly reach offers (e.g. Texas "deliver") are overbroad; this one is not. | state-predicate-matches-federal-offence/no-implied-offer-to-sell | Suncar’s two prior state drug convictions were for delivery of cocaine under 35 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [3428:3551] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.The Pennsylvania statute, of course, says nothing about offers to sell, but Suncar asks us to read in that language based on a single non-precedential decision from a Pennsylvania court.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [9844:10030] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another must mean something.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [16947:17123] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.All said, we reject Suncar’s argument that section 780- 113(a)(30) includes offers to sell.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [18844:18935] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e. |
| United States v. Rashun Suncar — 142 F.4th 259 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (21usc841: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Categorical / modified categorical comparison of state drug offense to 21 U.S.C. § 841 (INA / ACCA / Guidelines) | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (a)(1),(b)(1)(C); count: prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"; theory: attempted-transfer overbreadth argument; subject: count=prior Pennsylvania convictions, 35 Pa. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30) delivery, vs Guidelines "distribution"; theory=attempted-transfer overbreadth argument Turns on whether the jurisdiction criminalises attempt separately (then "attempted transfer" inside "delivery" is a completed offence); contrast Campbell (W. Va. statute treated as embedding an inchoate attempt, not a predicate). | state-predicate-matches-federal-offence/attempted-transfer-is-completed-delivery | And the statute defines “delivery” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [8800:9020] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.But Pennsylvania does criminalize attempts separately, as do North Carolina and South Carolina.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [23155:23250] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.If a court read the drug distribution provision as criminalizing attempt offenses when a separate provision already did so, it would render that separate provision superfluous.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [21410:21586] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.and criminalizes only the completed offense of “attempted transfer,” section 780–113(a)(30) isn’t categorically overbroad as compared to the guidelines.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [23976:24128] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.
Moncrieffe v. Holder — 569 U.S. 184 (2013) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2013 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
In other words, to satisfy the categorical approach, a state drug offense must meet two conditions: It must "necessarily" proscribe conduct that is an offense under the CSA, and the CSA must "necessarily" prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_569.jsonl#/us/569/0184-01; Unicode character offsets [9133:9383] (end exclusive); SHA-256 83d74d149cfb2b77011039cc127c0214d4fc14fb10708357fa68e3629127e81b.Frequently litigated when § 841 serves as the generic federal comparator in immigration (Moncrieffe), Armed Career Criminal Act, or Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.2) cases.
interpretation
Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). This wording tracks the relevant parts of the guidelines definition for “drug trafficking offense.”
United States v. Teran-Salas — 767 F.3d 453 (2014) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2014 (21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)
Under the Controlled Substances Act, it is "unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ... to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). This wording tracks the relevant parts of the guidelines definition for “drug trafficking offense.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_767.jsonl#/f3d/767/0453-01; Unicode character offsets [18669:19020] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7bf3b1d827eec8d7df6358d4749a34a273906690b6835d5cd27a842407c6624d.Frequently litigated when § 841 serves as the generic federal comparator in immigration (Moncrieffe), Armed Career Criminal Act, or Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.2) cases.
interpretation
we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another must mean something.
United States v. Rashun Suncar — 142 F.4th 259 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2025 (21usc841: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
we agree with Glass that the Pennsylvania legislature’s choice to include offers to sell in one provision of section 780-113 and to exclude them in another must mean something.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/259; Unicode character offsets [16947:17123] (end exclusive); SHA-256 334f66557f769d0766ebfd4e174c7501ca28424a1c56e12881d1271af5081f1e.Frequently litigated when § 841 serves as the generic federal comparator in immigration (Moncrieffe), Armed Career Criminal Act, or Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 2L1.2, 4B1.2) cases.