AND · 18usc922:status.g1
McAdory applies the Ninth Circuit rule to Washington mandatory sentencing ranges; the actual sentence served alone is not the test, nor is the state felony label conclusive. Small, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005), judicially construes convicted in any court in section 922(g)(1) to exclude foreign convictions; this is not a textual exclusion enacted in section 921(a)(20).
Exact element source
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec922; Unicode character offsets [16170:16279] (end exclusive); SHA-256 69d6082896652ca704d8da56c0a01daa1d10b51846206764bf1140610c756b65.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unclassified route provisional; provisional (1 case) | no definition yet | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:United States v. Nance — 481 F.3d 882 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2007 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted |
| _comparator accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is used as a yardstick for another statute or question, not applied to this case's own conduct. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (2). Excluded context examples:United States v. Campbell — 28 F. Supp. 2d 805 (1998) · United States District Court for the Western District of New York · 1998 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted Hernandez v. Holder — 592 F.3d 681 (2009) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2009 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; 2 observed cases | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 1 | United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Moye — 422 F.3d 207 (2005) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2005 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc922: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · background/procedural · not counted |
| civil-rights-restoration provisional; provisional (1 case) | Whether restoration of civil rights removes the conviction as a predicate, and the "unless" clause for firearms restrictions (§ 921(a)(20)). | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 1 | United States v. Cassidy — 899 F.2d 543 (1990) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1990 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Cassidy — 899 F.2d 543 (1990) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1990 — not · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/superseded · not counted |
| proof-of-prior-conviction provisional; 5 observed cases | How the prior felony conviction is proved, including the effect of an offer to stipulate (Old Chief). | 2 Satisfied 2; not satisfied 0; excluded context 3 | 2 | United States v. Rogers — 41 F.3d 25 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1994 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Moye — 422 F.3d 207 (2005) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2005 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Rhodes — 32 F.3d 867 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 1994 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/procedural · not counted United States v. Kimble — 142 F.4th 308 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/lower-court · not counted Old Chief v. United States — 519 U.S. 172 (1997) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1997 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · rule-announced/procedural · not counted |
| qualifying-conviction provisional; 3 observed cases | Whether a given conviction counts as one "in any court" for a crime punishable by more than a year. | 2 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 2; excluded context 2 | 2 | United States v. McAdory — 935 F.3d 838 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc922: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted Small v. United States — 544 U.S. 385 (2005) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 — not · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted Small v. United States — 544 U.S. 385 (2005) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · applied/dissent · not counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Campbell — 28 F. Supp. 2d 805 (1998) · United States District Court for the Western District of New York · 1998 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (g)(1); theory: categorical characterization of the felon-in-possession offense as a Bail Reform Act crime of violence; subject: theory=categorical characterization of the felon-in-possession offense as a Bail Reform Act crime of violence The held line classifies the 922(g)(1) offense as a whole (felon status combined with possession) for another statute; it decides nothing about whether this defendant has a qualifying conviction. The prior-record sentence comes from the detention findings (3142(g)), on proffer, and is legally irrelevant to the categorical ruling; it is kept only as the alleged status fact. | categorical-nature/felon-in-possession-as-bail-act-crime-of-violence | Campbell has an extensive prior record with nine convictions including three felony convictions over the past decade.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_28.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/28/0805-01; Unicode character offsets [18209:18326] (end exclusive); SHA-256 bddd7660e5992492800b48b04183ba9f40e20eaa90c71e99be04e9adce960d44.Under the categorical approach, the court looks only to the intrinsic nature of the offense itself as it is defined by statute, and does not consider any of the specific facts surrounding the alleged offense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_28.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/28/0805-01; Unicode character offsets [3917:4125] (end exclusive); SHA-256 bddd7660e5992492800b48b04183ba9f40e20eaa90c71e99be04e9adce960d44.It is equally reasonable to infer that a person who has been convicted of a felony, yet is in unlawful possession of a firearm, is more likely to use that firearm in the course of committing a crime.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_28.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/28/0805-01; Unicode character offsets [11700:11899] (end exclusive); SHA-256 bddd7660e5992492800b48b04183ba9f40e20eaa90c71e99be04e9adce960d44.For all these reasons, then, I conclude that possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) constitutes a “crime of violence” as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_28.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/28/0805-01; Unicode character offsets [16064:16269] (end exclusive); SHA-256 bddd7660e5992492800b48b04183ba9f40e20eaa90c71e99be04e9adce960d44. |
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (g)(1); theory: parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates; subject: theory=parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates Not a ruling on the 922(g)(1) status element: the same words are construed as the ACCA / Guidelines predicate threshold. Recorded because the rule applied (statutory maximum, Murillo) is the opposite of the actual-exposure rule the law file attaches to status.g1 (McAdory). The cuts-against line is the defendant's legal contention, not a fact found. | punishable-term/statutory-maximum-not-state-guidelines-range | Each of Defendant’s prior convictions is for a Class C felony. Under ORS 161.605(3), a Class C felony is punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [32857:33013] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.Defendant contends that the court cannot rely on the maximum statutory term of imprisonment in determining whether a conviction meets the threshold requirement, but must look instead to Oregon’s sentencing grid and guidelines.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31029:31255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.The Ninth Circuit has held that, for the purposes of determining predicate convictions, courts must use the “potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute, not the maximum sentence that could have been imposed against the particular defendant for his commission of the crime according to the state’s sentencing guidelines.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31256:31609] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.Defendant’s prior convictions are therefore for crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [33014:33126] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd. |
| United States v. Cassidy — 899 F.2d 543 (1990) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1990 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (g)(1); count: Count II (receipt of a firearm, January 3, 1987, charged under 922(g)(1)); subject: count=Count II (receipt of a firearm, January 3, 1987, charged under 922(g)(1)) Two-step reading of the 921(a)(20) exclusion. (1) Civil rights were restored (vote, jury, public office; more than de minimis, not necessarily all rights). (2) But the "unless ... expressly provides" proviso is tested against the whole of the convicting state's law, not just the certificate: Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13 bars drug-trafficking convicts from firearms, so the conviction still counts. Dismissal reversed; the status element stands as a matter of law on undisputed facts. | state-statute-firearms-bar-outside-restoration-certificate | On September 29, 1983, Defendant Calvin Cassidy was convicted in the State of Ohio of trafficking in marijuana, a crime punishable by a prison term in excess of one year.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [512:682] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.Cassidy was released from prison on June 29, 1984 and received a “Restoration to Civil Rights” certificate (the “Restoration Certificate”) from the Ohio Adult Parole Authority which restored “the rights and privileges forfeited by [his] conviction; namely the right to serve on juries and to hold office of honor, trust, or profit.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [683:1015] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.The right to vote was restored automatically by operation of state law upon his release.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [24708:24796] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.Cassidy has not been relieved from state disabilities pursuant to § 2923.14Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [25247:25322] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.If state law has restored civil rights to a felon, without expressly limiting the felon’s firearms privileges, that felon is not subject to federal firearms disabilities.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [6116:6286] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.Hence, if a “convicted felon” has his civil rights restored by operation of state law, with or without a certificate or order documenting the event, we must look to the whole of state law of the state of conviction to determine whether the “convicted felon” is entitled to vote, hold public office and serve on a jury and also whether the “convicted felon” is entitled to exercise the privileges of shipping, transporting, possessing or receiving a firearm.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [16220:16677] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f.We also find, however, that because he was expressly restricted under state law from possessing a firearm, he has been convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [18360:18598] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f. |
| United States v. Cassidy — 899 F.2d 543 (1990) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1990 — not · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not Excluded from merits counts applied / superseded basis: law; claim: (g)(1); count: Counts II and III; opinion: district court (reversed); subject: count=Counts II and III; opinion=district court (reversed) The ruling below (look only to the certificate) that this court reverses. | certificate-silent-on-firearms | The district court held that since the Restoration Certificate did not expressly limit Cassidy’s firearms privileges, Cassidy did not fall within the statutory definition of “convicted felon,” thus requiring dismissal of Counts II and III.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_899.jsonl#/f2d/899/0543-01; Unicode character offsets [2594:2833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f870f0d29235944d266fa7b071046f89b649f06f3bd3e078252be02ac95f747f. |
| United States v. Rhodes — 32 F.3d 867 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 1994 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / procedural claim: (g)(1); count: Count Six (possession of a Beretta .380 pistol); subject: count=Count Six (possession of a Beretta .380 pistol) REAL RULING: evidentiary, on plain-error review - admission of the details of the prior convictions (indictments, complaints, sentencing transcript) is assumed arguendo to be error and held not to have affected substantial rights given overwhelming evidence. This court does not decide whether the status element was met: the jury found it on certified New York records and its sufficiency was never challenged on appeal. Hence not-reached, scope procedural; the fact lines record the trial proof, the held line is the no-prejudice ruling. | certified-records-with-offense-details-no-stipulation | Exhibits Six and Seven were certified copies of convictions on indictments returned in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of the Bronx.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [2327:2478] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.Pursuant to this indictment, Rhodes pleaded guilty in the New York court to first degree manslaughter.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [2839:2941] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.A jury found Rhodes guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree, and apparently not guilty of the remaining counts of the indictment which were not dismissed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [3450:3673] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.Rhodes’s counsel stated, “No objection” and the district court then ruled, “Be so admitted.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [4122:4214] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.The nature of the conviction is not an element of Section 922(g)(1).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [10647:10715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.However, when a defendant does not stipulate the fact of his prior conviction, the Government must prove it because it is an element of the offense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [10861:11009] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894.We do not find that the error we assume for purposes of deciding this case affected Rhodes’s substantial rights.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_32.jsonl#/f3d/32/0867-01; Unicode character offsets [12685:12797] (end exclusive); SHA-256 92e90cf7550f23e3c842be216d2d82bd4cf9e5cf3244710150d55f787a1c2894. |
| United States v. Rogers — 41 F.3d 25 (1994) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1994 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1) Felon status was never in dispute (the opinion calls possession "the only disputed element", reporting the defendant's own argument); the held line is the court's statement that possession was the decisive issue, not a ruling on status. | prior-felony/multiple-burglary-convictions-admitted | On direct examination, Rogers freely admitted that he had been convicted of burglary “[m]any times.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/0025-01; Unicode character offsets [13180:13280] (end exclusive); SHA-256 85f985c408d6972a8593dfc98e7958ec1913dfa92287125bda3a9ef7ab7586f4.Because he had committed at least five previous felonies, the district court imposed the statutory mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/0025-01; Unicode character offsets [2938:3081] (end exclusive); SHA-256 85f985c408d6972a8593dfc98e7958ec1913dfa92287125bda3a9ef7ab7586f4.The decisive issue at trial was possession, not how many rounds of ammunition were seized by the police.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/0025-01; Unicode character offsets [22497:22601] (end exclusive); SHA-256 85f985c408d6972a8593dfc98e7958ec1913dfa92287125bda3a9ef7ab7586f4. |
| United States v. Moye — 422 F.3d 207 (2005) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2005 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1); party: Moye; subject: party=Moye He did challenge admission of the certified record and fingerprint comparison (authenticity/hearsay); rejected in a footnote as meritless (self-authenticating public record). CAVEAT: rests on one sentence noting the point was unchallenged, in a panel opinion that was later reheard en banc (see first misfit); a record of an uncontested fact of this case, not authority on the status element. | prior-felony/certified-record-of-conviction | The Government also introduced a Certified Record of Conviction Under Seal showing that Moye had previously been convicted of a felony handgun violation as well as a certificate of the non-restoration of Moye’s civil rights.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [2212:2436] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37.Moye does not challenge his status as a convicted felon.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [5142:5198] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37. |
| United States v. Moye — 422 F.3d 207 (2005) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · 2005 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / procedural claim: (g)(1); party: Briggs and Cooper (the putative principals); count: Count I, aiding-and-abetting theory (18 U.S.C. 2); theory: aiding and abetting a felon in possession requires that the person aided be a felon; subject: party=Briggs and Cooper (the putative principals); count=Count I, aiding-and-abetting theory (18 U.S.C. 2); theory=aiding and abetting a felon in possession requires that the person aided be a felon REAL RULING: jury-instruction error on the aiding-and-abetting route (18 U.S.C. 2) - the instruction had no evidentiary foundation because nothing showed the putative principals (Briggs, Cooper) were felons; the AUSA conceded the error; it could not be harmless once principal-liability evidence was held insufficient (the court adds "sufficient evidence did not exist as to aiding and abetting in Count I"). Not a holding on the status.g1 element of the charged defendant - Moye's own felon status is conceded (block above) - and the law file declares no id for accomplice liability; hence not-reached, role background, scope procedural. CAVEAT: part of the panel opinion that was reheard en banc (see first misfit). | prior-felony/principal-in-aiding-and-abetting-theory | It is clear that no foundation in the evidence supported an aiding and abetting instruction as to this count because the Government introduced no evidence that Briggs or Cooper were felons.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [11552:11741] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37.During oral argument, the AUSA conceded that giving the jury an aiding and abetting instruction on Count I was error.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [11434:11551] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37.It is implicit in a charge of aiding and abetting that the underlying crime was committed by someone other than the defendant.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [8952:9078] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37.The district court erred as a matter of law in giving the instruction on this count as it was a logical impossibility for the instruction to apply to Count I, felon in possession.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_422.jsonl#/f3d/422/0207-01; Unicode character offsets [11742:11921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a985f283d54fe5655fcd55919e6391b76775cc7759c980788a6118f279f16e37. |
| United States v. Nance — 481 F.3d 882 (2007) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2007 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (g)(1) Felon status not contested; the prior convictions (two armed robberies, aggravated burglary, facilitation of armed robbery) are analysed only as ACCA predicates. | Unspecified route | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| United States v. Kitchen — 57 F.3d 516 (1995) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1995 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed; 21usc841: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1) "First element" = previous felony conviction; the opinion gives no facts about it. CAVEAT: rests on a single sentence saying the element was not contested on appeal; no facts and no reasoning - thin as authority on what satisfies status.g1. | prior-felony/uncontested-on-appeal | Kitchen does not contest the first and third elements of his conviction, but he does contend that evidence supporting the second element is lacking.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_57.jsonl#/f3d/57/0516-01; Unicode character offsets [6909:7057] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a7a3d46a84cc2303b7c7dbcb7479d9ff89a79dde3020c53fd81a6149a8c41cb5. |
| Hernandez v. Holder — 592 F.3d 681 (2009) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2009 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1); count: Texas offense of conviction, Tex. Penal Code 46.04(a); theory: categorical comparison of the state offense to 922(g)(1): substantive elements; subject: count=Texas offense of conviction, Tex. Penal Code 46.04(a); theory=categorical comparison of the state offense to 922(g)(1): substantive elements Element-to-element correspondence conceded by the petitioner; not a finding about his own prior felony (a 1997 Texas marijuana conviction, mentioned only as the ground of removability). | categorical-match/state-felon-in-possession-offense | TPC § 46.04(a) has two elements that are relevant to this decision: (1) prior felony conviction and (2) possession, of a firearm.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_592.jsonl#/f3d/592/0681-01; Unicode character offsets [13683:13812] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43af4e91a7ab3d7b0cad29056b92bb9e454fbd4cf5c3cd0f3ae4ce572c98f62f.18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) has three relevant elements: (1) prior felony conviction; (2) possession of a firearm; and (3) interstate commerce requirement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_592.jsonl#/f3d/592/0681-01; Unicode character offsets [13813:13962] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43af4e91a7ab3d7b0cad29056b92bb9e454fbd4cf5c3cd0f3ae4ce572c98f62f.Nieto concedes in his brief that TPC § 46.04(a)’s two elements correspond with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)'s first two elements.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_592.jsonl#/f3d/592/0681-01; Unicode character offsets [13963:14085] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43af4e91a7ab3d7b0cad29056b92bb9e454fbd4cf5c3cd0f3ae4ce572c98f62f. |
| United States v. McAdory — 935 F.3d 838 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc922: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Ahmad McAdory; count: 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); subject: party=Ahmad McAdory; count=18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Ninth Circuit reverses a § 922(g)(1) conviction: under Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme none of the prior convictions actually exposed the defendant to more than one year, so none is a predicate. The statutory-maximum fact and the plea admission supported the element under the overruled Murillo rule only. | Washington convictions with statutory maxima above one year but mandatory standard ranges of 0-90 days and no exceptional-sentence findings | Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [12584:12849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.For the Taking a Motor Vehicle without Permission conviction, McAdory pled guilty and had a standard range of actual confinement of 0-90 days.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [3420:3562] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.For the Residential Burglary conviction, McAdory pled guilty and had a standard sentencing range of 0-30 days of detention.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [3792:3915] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.The court imposed no confinement, and there is no indication the court made any special findings or sentencing enhancements.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [4353:4477] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.Thus, each of McAdory's prior offenses qualified as a felony because the statutory maximum for each offense exceeded one year in prison.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [7351:7487] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.McAdory pled guilty to violating § 922(g)(1) and admitted that each of these prior offenses was "punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year."Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [4478:4632] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.None of McAdory's prior convictions had standard sentencing ranges exceeding one year, nor were any accompanied by written findings of any of the statutory factors that would justify an upward departure. Thus, the district court convicted McAdory under § 922(g)(1) even though he had no predicate offenses within the meaning of the statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [12850:13190] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3. |
| United States v. Kimble — 142 F.4th 308 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · conceded (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / lower-court basis: conceded; claim: (g)(1) Established by the guilty plea accepted in the district court; the court of appeals recites the two felony convictions and never treats the status element as open. The predicate felonies matter on appeal only as the "criminal history" tested against the Second Amendment. | prior-felony/state-and-federal-drug-trafficking-convictions | He was sentenced to six years’ confinement for that state-level felony but served just one year.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/308; Unicode character offsets [1389:1485] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3ad9f2ba17f1e40b90ceae5e47c6bd323001ae5f9267eeaa22294306e0765460.He pleaded guilty to a federal felony: possession with intent to distribute a detectable quantity of cocaine. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison followed by four years of supervised release.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/308; Unicode character offsets [1618:1813] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3ad9f2ba17f1e40b90ceae5e47c6bd323001ae5f9267eeaa22294306e0765460.Kimble then pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/308; Unicode character offsets [3240:3307] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3ad9f2ba17f1e40b90ceae5e47c6bd323001ae5f9267eeaa22294306e0765460.Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for an individual to pos- sess a firearm if he “has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_142.jsonl#/f4th/142/308; Unicode character offsets [3730:3927] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3ad9f2ba17f1e40b90ceae5e47c6bd323001ae5f9267eeaa22294306e0765460. |
| Old Chief v. United States — 519 U.S. 172 (1997) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1997 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / procedural claim: (g)(1) Evidence ruling, not a ruling on whether the status element was met (it was never disputed: the defendant offered to admit it). What the opinion says about the element: only the fact of a qualifying conviction matters, not the name or nature of the offense, and status is independent of the events of the charged possession; hence a defendant's offer to admit felon status makes the full record of conviction excludable under Rule 403 when its only purpose is to prove status. Harmless error left for remand. | defendant-offers-to-stipulate-felon-status | The earlier crime charged in the indictment against Old Chief was assault causing serious bodily injury.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [1768:1872] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8.he offered to “solve the problem here by stipulating, agreeing and requesting the Court to instruct the jury that he has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) yea[r].”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [2590:2790] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8.At trial, over renewed objection, the Government introduced the order of judgment and commitment for Old Chief’s prior conviction.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [3901:4031] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8.Congress, however, has made it plain that distinctions among generic felonies do not count for this purpose; the fact of the qualifying conviction is alone what matters under the statute.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [27697:27884] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8.The statutory language in which the prior-conviction requirement is couched shows no congressional concern with the specific name or nature of the prior offense beyond what is necessary to place it within the broad category of qualifying feloniesSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [19619:19865] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8.In this ease, as in any other in which the prior conviction is for an offense likely to support conviction on some improper ground, the only reasonable conclusion was that the risk of unfair prejudice did substantially outweigh the discounted probative value of the record of conviction, and it was an abuse of discretion to admit the record when an admission was available.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_519.jsonl#/us/519/0172-01; Unicode character offsets [29620:29994] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c1dc51cfade98e51de456f71dd24d2a52253aa52d339b0d1d35df3ef3be561a8. |
| Small v. United States — 544 U.S. 385 (2005) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 — not · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (g)(1); opinion: majority; subject: opinion=majority The only predicate was a Japanese conviction; "any court" is read with an assumption of domestic reach (akin to, but not, the presumption against extraterritoriality), supported by anomalies a foreign reading would create in 921(a)(20), 921(a)(33) and 924(e). The length of the foreign sentence is irrelevant once the court is foreign. | convicted-in-any-court/foreign-court-conviction | In 1994 petitioner, Gary Small, was convicted in a Japanese court of having tried to smuggle several pistols, a rifle, and ammunition into Japan.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [571:716] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.Small was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [717:765] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.We consequently assume a congressional intent that the phrase “convicted in any court” applies domestically, not extraterri-torially.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [7904:8037] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.Thus, the key statutory phrase “convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” somewhat less reliably identifies dangerous individuals for the purposes of U. S. law where foreign convictions, rather than domestic convictions, are at issue.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [6334:6619] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.we conclude that the phrase “convicted in any court” refers only to domestic courts, not to foreign courts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [15090:15197] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.For these reasons, the judgment of the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [15287:15431] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62. |
| Small v. United States — 544 U.S. 385 (2005) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Excluded from merits counts applied / dissent basis: law; claim: (g)(1); opinion: Thomas, J., dissenting (joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.); subject: opinion=Thomas, J., dissenting (joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.) Dissent reads "any court" literally to include foreign courts. | convicted-in-any-court/foreign-court-conviction | Gary Small, having recently emerged from three years in Japanese prison for illegally importing weapons into that country, bought a gun in the United States.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [15591:15748] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.In concluding that “any” means not what it says, but rather “a subset of any,” the Court distorts the plain meaning of the statute and departs from established principles of statutory construction.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [16153:16350] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length.
United States v. McAdory — 935 F.3d 838 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 (18usc922: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
Accordingly, we consider McAdory's prior convictions to have been "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," such that they would serve as predicates under § 922(g)(1), only if McAdory's convictions actually exposed him to sentences of that length.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0838-01; Unicode character offsets [12584:12849] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9bb8a254e27f1293a67a4017fec4867d659bb434754432c1a62f37e970c11d3.McAdory applies the Ninth Circuit rule to Washington mandatory sentencing ranges; the actual sentence served alone is not the test, nor is the state felony label conclusive. Small, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005), judicially construes convicted in any court in section 922(g)(1) to exclude foreign convictions; this is not a textual exclusion enacted in section 921(a)(20).
interpretation
We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.
Small v. United States — 544 U.S. 385 (2005) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2005 (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed)
We hold that the phrase encompasses only domestic, not foreign, convictions.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_544.jsonl#/us/544/0385-01; Unicode character offsets [492:568] (end exclusive); SHA-256 1060dfdb181f03e6cd7c6634b2c1b274d424bfaa84320732c16c9078e0948c62.McAdory applies the Ninth Circuit rule to Washington mandatory sentencing ranges; the actual sentence served alone is not the test, nor is the state felony label conclusive. Small, 544 U.S. 385, 387 (2005), judicially construes convicted in any court in section 922(g)(1) to exclude foreign convictions; this is not a textual exclusion enacted in section 921(a)(20).