AND · 42usc2000e-2:pretext
McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
Exact element source
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national originSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [320:395] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| disputed-factual-premise/leave-was-approved-by-decision-maker | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 — satisfied | |
| falsity-alone/exaggerated-or-shifting-reasons-but-nonracial-animus | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp/604/1450-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 — applied/alternative | |
| falsity-alone/reason-disbelieved-but-no-finding-of-discriminatory-motive | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 — applied/lower-court, rule-announced/merits | |
| falsity-and-animus | Showing that each of the employer's proffered reasons is unworthy of credence (fabricated) and a pretext for intentional discrimination | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 0 | No annotation uses in this snapshot |
| honest-belief/consistent-contemporaneous-reasons-after-fair-investigation | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — not | |
| honest-belief/employer-may-disagree-with-outside-consultant-and-use-subjective-criteria | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 — not | |
| inadequate-investigation/more-witnesses-should-have-been-interviewed | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 — applied/alternative | |
| no-evidence-of-pretext/plaintiff-offered-none | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 — applied/alternative | |
| Unspecified variant | No variant assigned in the database. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 3 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 — applied/merits; /us/539/0090-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 — rule-announced/merits; /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — applied/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp-2d/477/0041-01 — United States District Court for the District of Columbia · 2007 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: discrimination claim; subject: count=discrimination claim | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f-supp-2d/832/0539-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania · 2011 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1) Second ground, arguendo a prima facie case. A thin or one-sided investigation, without bias or coercion, does not show pretext; same-actor (hirer = firer within 8 months) noted as cutting against discrimination. | inadequate-investigation/more-witnesses-should-have-been-interviewed | To establish that Raymours’ reason for terminating Glenn was pretext, Glenn points to Raymours’ purported failure to conduct meaningful investigations in the Glenn-Faust incident, Adams-Copperthwaite incident, and Cynthia Stinson incident.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [34264:34503] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Raymours supervisor, Rob Mirth, went out and discussed the situation with Glenn, and gave him an opportunity to provide his side of the story.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [35352:35494] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Glenn is not making any such allegation here, but merely arguing that Raymours should have formally interviewed more witnesses and timely obtained witness statements.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [35778:35944] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.It should also be noted, as Raymours emphasizes, that the same person (Hazeldine) who terminated Glenn, hired him just eight months before, and that during that time, Hazeldine also provided Glenn with a favorable transfer and promotion.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [42290:42527] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.Regardless, courts in the Third Circuit have found similar challenges to the adequacy of an investigation insufficient to establish pretext.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [36224:36364] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.The record, therefore, lacks sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Raymours’ legitimate, non-diseriminatory reason for terminating Glenn was pretext for racial discrimination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [37229:37406] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f. |
| /f-supp/604/1450-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: proved; claim: (a) Court finds some stated reasons untrue or exaggerated (financial exigency told to EEOC; conduct allegations) yet no pretext FOR RACE -- the Hicks pattern before Hicks. Every captured fact supports falsity; the element fails on the second limb (racial motive), for which the facts sit under because-of. | falsity-alone/exaggerated-or-shifting-reasons-but-nonracial-animus | It is relevant, however, that on July 24, 1981, in response to the EEOC’s request for information, BSC stated that Turner was fired for financial exigency and discontinuance of major, and Goetzman was fired for financial exigency.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [13613:13843] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Therefore, BSC was not financially exigent in the sense that its financial survival required the firings, although the school’s financial situation is difficult.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [14377:14538] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Also, contrary to BSC’s claims, Goetzman was not responsible for the failure of the school newspaper, he did not refuse to serve in the communications lab or on the special recruitment committee, and he was never paid full-time wages for a part-time courseload.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [11288:11549] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Plaintiff’s evidence must support with “substantial” or “reasonable probability,” as distinguished from “possibility” or “speculation,” plaintiff's contention that defendant’s explanation is pretextual.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [18070:18272] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have failed to show that the reasons articulated for the firings were pretextual and that racial animus motivated the decision.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [29190:29348] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.And while there was animus between the school and the two professors, its roots were professional and philosophical.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [29546:29662] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8. |
| /f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1),(c)(3),(m); 2000e(j); 2000e-3(a) | no-evidence-of-pretext/plaintiff-offered-none | a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31044:31304] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.Breech never (1) came forth with evidence demonstrating that the adverse employment action was motivated by unlawful discriminatory intent or (2) attempted to show that APC’s proffered explanation was pretextual.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [34288:34500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf. |
| /f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: triable; claim: (a); 2000e(k) The employer's reason (no call, no approved leave) rests on a fact the plaintiff's witnesses contradict; the district court erred by weighing phone records against testimony at summary judgment. | disputed-factual-premise/leave-was-approved-by-decision-maker | Doe’s husband further testified that he talked to Kohl on Thursday, August 10th and got Kohl’s permission for his wife to take a vacation the following week.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [20485:20642] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.She further testified that, after that call, Kohl asked her to make sure she had the receptionist station covered by other employees during the lunch hour for the week in question (a task for which Doe was usually responsible).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [31368:31595] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.This statement contradicted Kohl’s statements to the EEOC wherein he testified to the EEOC investigator that employees “needed to call off every day.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [16119:16269] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.The conversation between Kohl and Babich, in which Kohl remarked that Doe had not taken responsibility for her abortion indicates that Kohl may have had other reasons for terminating Doe’s employment than her “abandonment” of her job.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [32278:32512] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [27758:28132] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.This testimony creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CARS’ proffered reasons for terminating Doe’s employment were a pretext.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [31965:32107] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb. |
| /f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: failure to reinstate supervisory duties; subject: count=failure to reinstate supervisory duties The second fact is the plaintiff's own pretext evidence (subjective reinstatement criteria in the provost's email), held insufficient. | honest-belief/employer-may-disagree-with-outside-consultant-and-use-subjective-criteria | In Dr. Kent’s view, Dr. Asher’s recommendation was equivocal.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [38266:38327] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.She pointed to the October 2013 email from Associate Provost for Student Life Patricia Helton, which called on Dr. Hiatt to have “better awareness about the power she holds” and “demonstrate[ ] appropriate professional boundaries in all contexts” before she could resume supervision.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [40226:40509] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [19839:20083] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.Dr. Hiatt has not shown DU’s reasons for refusing to reinstate her supervisory duties were pretextual for retaliation or discrimination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [40976:41112] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f. |
| /f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: demotion; subject: count=demotion Even a mistaken ethics assessment is not pretext if reached honestly after hearing both sides and consulting outside experts; reasons given at the time match the litigation reasons. | honest-belief/consistent-contemporaneous-reasons-after-fair-investigation | When Dr. Kent and Dr. Palmateer met with Dr. Hiatt on February 22, 2013, and presented the three options to her, the reasons they stated then are the same reasons that DU provides in this litigation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [28380:28579] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.Dr. Kent presented both Dr. Hiatt’s and Dr. Fogle’s timelines of events to Dr. Philinda Hutchings—the Dean of the Midwestern School of Professional Psychology—and Dr. Bill Bracker—the former Director of the Nova Southeastern University Consortium Internship.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [32876:33134] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.Consistent with Smothers, DU gave Dr. Hiatt multiple opportunities to explain her version of events.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [33947:34047] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.Indeed, Dr. Hiatt admitted in her deposition that supervisees even had a name for it—getting “Tawny-ed.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [35306:35410] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [20165:20354] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.Dr. Hiatt has not shown that DU’s reasons for removing her from her position as Training Director and demoting her to Outreach Coordinator were dishonest or made in bad faith, Swackhammer, 498 F.3d at 1169-70, or were “so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief,” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211 (brackets and quotations omitted).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [35699:36102] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f. |
| /us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1) The Court decides only what disbelief of the employer's reasons legally entails: "pretext" means pretext FOR DISCRIMINATION, and disbelief permits, never compels, that inference. It reverses CA8's judgment-as-a-matter-of-law rule and remands for ordinary clearly-erroneous review of the trial court's finding; it does not itself decide whether pretext was shown. | falsity-alone/reason-disbelieved-but-no-finding-of-discriminatory-motive | But a reason cannot be proved to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [19772:19934] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required,”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [11272:11545] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [27222:27370] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.But the Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the “ultimate burden of persuasion.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [11582:11927] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3. |
| /us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / lower-court basis: proved; claim: (a)(1); party: plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent); subject: party=plaintiff Melvin Hicks, shift commander (respondent) District Court as trier of fact (bench trial): falsity of the stated reasons was PROVED (selective discipline, manufactured confrontation), but it found personal animosity, not race. The Supreme Court reports the finding and leaves its review to CA8 on remand. | falsity-alone/reason-disbelieved-but-no-finding-of-discriminatory-motive | The District Court, acting as trier of fact in this bench trial, found that the reasons petitioners gave were not the real reasons for respondent’s demotion and discharge.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [6786:6957] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.It found that respondent was the only supervisor disciplined for violations committed by his subordinates; that similar and even more serious violations committed by respondent’s co-workers were either disregarded or treated more leniently; and that Powell manufactured the final verbal confrontation in order to provoke respondent into threatening him.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [6958:7311] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.In short, the District Court concluded that “although [respondent] has proven the existence of a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was racially rather than personally motivated.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [7534:7739] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3. |
| /us/539/0090-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2003 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits claim: (a)(1),(m) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 | Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
But a reason cannot be proved to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.
/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993
But a reason cannot be proved to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [19772:19934] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required,”
/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993
Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such rejection, “[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required,”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [11272:11545] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.
/us/509/0502-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1993
It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_509.jsonl#/us/509/0502-01; Unicode character offsets [27222:27370] (end exclusive); SHA-256 f6ba1643673c63e64401ed4ea3db1f6647ecf24cb97fdf31426b87eb7aa43ab3.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.
/f3d/527/0358-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · 2008
In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must submit evidence which (1) casts doubt upon the legitimate reason proffered by the employer such that a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that the reason was a fabrication; or (2) would allow the fact-finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employee’s termination.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_527.jsonl#/f3d/527/0358-01; Unicode character offsets [27758:28132] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7403bc10d85e1df0ad37ec6894b9137591d0949906c59e93cb1365fcf01b44bb.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017
“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [20165:20354] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017
“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [19839:20083] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
Regardless, courts in the Third Circuit have found similar challenges to the adequacy of an investigation insufficient to establish pretext.
Regardless, courts in the Third Circuit have found similar challenges to the adequacy of an investigation insufficient to establish pretext.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_832.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/832/0539-01; Unicode character offsets [36224:36364] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ad682cd3ab80d3bbd67d0ed1b42af8b4626a1b1756981872f0895f0ffadff61f.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
Plaintiff’s evidence must support with “substantial” or “reasonable probability,” as distinguished from “possibility” or “speculation,” plaintiff's contention that defendant’s explanation is pretextual.
/f-supp/604/1450-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina · 1985
Plaintiff’s evidence must support with “substantial” or “reasonable probability,” as distinguished from “possibility” or “speculation,” plaintiff's contention that defendant’s explanation is pretextual.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_604.jsonl#/f-supp/604/1450-01; Unicode character offsets [18070:18272] (end exclusive); SHA-256 43ff772c2e3fbfe3210fd8995743b1d10c89d6d34fc9ed5d5ad773f37cb94da8.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
interpretation
a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.
/f-supp/962/1447-01 — United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama · 1997
a plaintiff is entitled to survive summary judgment, and judgment as a matter of law, if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_962.jsonl#/f-supp/962/1447-01; Unicode character offsets [31044:31304] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c9d3cf4a8e3b5373cb13844fbe0d43429324dce0876d20c5fdba3f4d459c1acf.McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.
not-required
Showing merely that the employer was mistaken, conducted an imperfect investigation, or exercised poor business judgment if the employer honestly believed its proffered reason (Hiatt v. Colorado Seminary; Glenn v. Raymour)
No source quotation recorded.