OR · 15usc1:restraint.rule-of-reason
Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
Exact element source
in restraint of trade or commerceSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [135:168] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| anticompetitive-effect/single-competitor-excluded-no-market-proof | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp/864/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — applied/alternative | |
| rule-of-reason/vertical-minimum-resale-price-maintenance | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — rule-announced/merits | |
| Unspecified variant | No variant assigned in the database. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 5 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — rule-announced/merits; /f2d/361/0874-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — applied/merits; /f3d/496/0403-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — applied/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits count: Claim I; subject: count=Claim I Selected as the governing standard for Claim I (the selection itself is recorded in the restraint.per-se Claim I block); the court expressly withholds any view on ultimate lawfulness. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f-supp/864/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not Excluded from merits counts applied / alternative basis: no-evidence; count: Count III; subject: count=Count III Alternative merits holding ("Even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff has standing"): privilege suspension is not a per se group boycott; with no actual detrimental effects shown, market definition and market power were required and wholly absent. The mode-of-analysis choice (first held line) and the failure of proof under it (second held line) are one block because the claim fails under the selected mode. | anticompetitive-effect/single-competitor-excluded-no-market-proof | Plaintiff has suggested that this ease involves a group boycott, which traditionally has been categorized as a per se violation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18005:18133] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.As Defendants note, Plaintiff has not attempted to define the relevant market or provide evidence of market power.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18816:18930] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.After his suspension, he went on to compete effectively in Orlando.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [20199:20266] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17680:17911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Upon review of relevant caselaw, the Court concludes that the proper analysis in this case is the rule of reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [18247:18360] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Unlike the plaintiff in Boczar, Plaintiff must establish market power in order to maintain a claim under Section 1. This he has not done.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [20267:20404] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3. |
| /f2d/361/0874-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f3d/496/0403-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsPlaintiffs disclaimed a rule of reason claim, which is why losing the per se question ends the case. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits theory: vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers; subject: theory=vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers Court supplies guidance factors for remand (breadth of use in the industry, source of the restraint, market power) but does not apply them to Leegin. | rule-of-reason/vertical-minimum-resale-price-maintenance | Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32031:32164] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32676:32880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37. |
| /us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 | Presumptive Rule of Reason burden-shifting analysis (antitrust market + anticompetitive effect vs procompetitive justification) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsReasonableness of the exclusive headwear license left for remand; competitive balance flagged as a possible justification. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [9969:10143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.
/us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32031:32164] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.
/us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [32676:32880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.
interpretation
If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.
/f-supp/864/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994
If the antitrust violation involves “ ‘a naked restriction on price or output’ ” or, similarly, if a plaintiff can provide “‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ ” failure to prove market power will not defeat a plaintiff’s claim.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [17680:17911] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.