United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988

Role: applied; posture: criminal; jury convictions of one corporation and its vice president; defendants appeal the per se instruction and sufficiency of the evidence; result: claimant-won; claim:

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

The intent holding is a RELATION between elements: because the restraint is per se, the intent element collapses to knowing joinder in the agreement. Recorded as intent not-reached / rule-announced (the law file states it as constraint per-se-presumes-intent), but a case block cannot point at a law-side constraint or say "conditional on restraint.per-se".

Mixed outcomes per defendant at trial (two corporations and one officer convicted, two presidents acquitted, one convicted corporation did not appeal): the acquittals are unreviewed jury verdicts, which `scope lower-court` + `party` could now carry, but the opinion offers no quotable sentence per acquitted defendant beyond a passing mention, so no block was added.

Basis is mixed inside a single element: restraint.per-se was decided as law on the indictment's description of the agreement (pretrial), while the existence of that agreement was proved to a jury; fact lines under restraint.per-se therefore quote the charged terms, not findings.

The negative fact that defendants offered no procompetitive justification is tagged [supports absent] (the spec's example is [cuts-against absent]; here the absence helps the element). It is really the failure of a rebuttal/justification step, for which there is still no slot.

interpretation

This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.

Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).

interpretation

There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”

Default standard under § 1 (Ohio v. American Express Co., 585 U.S. 529 (2018); Leegin): three-step burden-shifting framework: (1) plaintiff proves substantial anticompetitive effect in a defined relevant product and geographic market (directly via reduced output/supercompetitive prices, or indirectly via market power + anticompetitive structure); (2) defendant proffers nonpretextual procompetitive justifications; (3) plaintiff shows the efficiencies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means.

interpretation

the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy

In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.

interpretation

In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.

In civil cases, unlawful intent or anticompetitive effect suffices (United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978)). In non-per-se criminal prosecutions (Gypsum), the government must prove either knowledge that the conduct would produce anticompetitive effects or purpose to produce them; in per se criminal prosecutions, knowing joinder in the price-fixing/allocation agreement suffices.

interpretation

the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

the government need only prove (1) the existence of the alleged agreement and (2) that defendants knowingly entered into the conspiracy

In criminal per se prosecutions, intent to restrain trade is satisfied by knowing participation in the conspiracy without separate proof of intent to produce anticompetitive effects.

interpretation

In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.

United States v. Cooperative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. — 845 F.2d 1367 (1988) · United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 (15usc1: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

In cases involving an alleged per se violation, intent to restrain trade is presumed.

In criminal per se prosecutions, intent to restrain trade is satisfied by knowing participation in the conspiracy without separate proof of intent to produce anticompetitive effects.