Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers

basis: pleaded; count: Claim I; subject: count=Claim I

Claim I asserts a conspiracy between Plan Sponsors, using Caremark as their “common agent,” to fix the prices paid independent pharmacies for dispensing prescription drugs to Plan Subscribers.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Under United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 276, 62 S.Ct. 1070, 86 L.Ed. 1461 (1942) the Plan Sponsors’ knowledge of and acquiescence in that common strategy could reasonably support a finding of conspiracy under Section 1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For purposes of Pharmacy’s common agent claim, the relevant agreement is that alleged to exist among the Plan Sponsors. And that agreement, between firms that would normally compete with each other for the purchase of prescription drugs, may fairly be said to constitute a horizontal restraint.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: pleaded; theory: existence of a Dealer conspiracy whose objects included trueEX's platform; subject: theory=existence of a Dealer conspiracy whose objects included trueEX's platform

The Dealers provided only limited liquidity to multiple trueEX's platforms-both its CLOB and RFQ platforms-with the effect of denying it enough volume in IRS transactions in general to eat into the Dealers' IRS market share.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Dealers created unreasonable delays and erected artificial barriers to the progress of the trueEX platform.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Dealers conditioned their provision of liquidity to all-to-all trading platforms upon the platforms use of "name give up."

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Dealers attempted to placate trueEX with minor business opportunities designed to create the illusion of cooperation or progress.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It has held that the original plaintiffs (Javelin, Tera, and the putative class) have convincingly pled a boycott by the same Dealers of Javelin and Tera's all-to-all trading platforms.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The claimed Dealer behavior towards trueEX thus must be evaluated, not myopically as the Dealers' brief largely proceeds, but against the backdrop of a contemporaneous Dealer plot against entities that posed a similar threat to the Dealers' business model and profitability.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To be plausibly pled, a conspiracy to marginalize a looming competitive threat does not require that allegations that each conspirator acted at every turn maximally to ice that threat,

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

On its review, the Court holds, trueEX has plausibly pled a § 1 boycott conspiracy aimed at harming, marginalizing, and/or destroying-along with the other two platforms-its platform.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: pleaded; party: each individual Dealer defendant (ruled on collectively); theory: joinder in the conspiracy's third object (trueEX's platform); subject: party=each individual Dealer defendant (ruled on collectively); theory=joinder in the conspiracy's third object (trueEX's platform)

Defendants argue that as to a number of Dealers, the affirmative acts of obstruction towards trueEX that are pled are "razor thin."

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But trueEX pleads that checking its platform's advance was but one object of a broader Dealer conspiracy, in which, as IRS I held , each of the surviving Dealer Defendants have been plausibly implicated.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Do the facts pled plausibly support that the individual Dealer, already implicated in a conspiracy against two like platforms, was aware of the conspiracy's third and parallel object (as to trueEX's platform)?

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

the Court's assessment is that the inferences urged by trueEX are plausible enough to preclude granting a motion to dismiss its AC as to any one Defendant Dealer

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: proved; party: Ford and Automobile Sales Company (the complaining Springfield dealer); subject: party=Ford and Automobile Sales Company (the complaining Springfield dealer)

He asked what defendant could do about seeing to it that no more factory Fords found their way to plaintiff’s Springfield lot.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Mr. Boutelle acknowledged that the situation was not good for Automobile Sales and directed the officer in charge of distribution of factory Fords, Mr. Saunders, to “correct the situation.”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We ask that a dealer not bid on these units for the purpose of reselling them to a wholesaler.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Following the first mailing of this letter on September 22, 1960, Mr. Daniel Kossick discussed the letter with Mr. Saunders at the District Sales Office and stated that he was “in agreement” with its terms.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As long as Colgate has any life in it, however, a simple announcement of policy followed by customer acquiescence based solely on the individual self-interest of the customer in continued dealings with the manufacturer is not an agreement within the reach of the Sherman Act.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The essential fact is that defendant’s action in imposing the restrictions was not unilateral but was instigated by one of its dealers and cannot, therefore, be said to fall within the rule of Colgate.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: proved; party: Ford and each of its other complying dealers; theory: series of vertical agreements ("announcement plus" dealer compliance); subject: party=Ford and each of its other complying dealers; theory=series of vertical agreements ("announcement plus" dealer compliance)

The record further shows the return of bids by Ford dealers on the very letters which requested the resale restrictions, and in some cases actual discussions with dealers concerning the terms of the letter, though there is no evidence that the restrictions themselves were discussed specifically.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Following defendant’s letter, which was repeated in three later mailings, several Ford dealers from whom plaintiff sought to obtain factory Fords either refused to sell to him or responded equivocally and evasively to his requests to buy.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Plaintiff testified that when he asked Dow when the next factory Fords were to be sold Dow replied, “Perley, I am sorry I cannot sell you those cars any more. We received a letter with the bid which forbids us from selling them.”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

the Court cautioned that when a manufacturer goes beyond a simple refusal to deal in attempting to effect compliance with announced policies, the necessary element of agreement may be found.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

When defendant, at the instigation of one'of its dealers, sought to impose resale restrictions on all of its dealers, it entered the “announcement plus” area which, coupled with evidence in this record of dealer compliance, constitutes a wider agreement.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We cannot say on this record that a finding that these dealers acted pursuant to an agreement with defendant was clearly erroneous.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: no-evidence; party: the Ford dealers among themselves; theory: tacit horizontal agreement implied from the vertical agreements; subject: party=the Ford dealers among themselves; theory=tacit horizontal agreement implied from the vertical agreements

Plaintiff, however, argues that a tacit horizontal agreement among dealers is implied from the vertical relationships existing between defendant and dealers individually.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

“Conscious parallelism” in business behavior has not yet been held to be per se conspiratorial conduct.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Clearly, there is no evidence here of a direct horizontal agreement among dealers.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

At this stage we would be slow to infer a horizontal conspiracy from evidence of parallelism in this non-price-fixing context.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: no-evidence; party: Fearless Farris Wholesale and the five Retail Companies (the only defendants); theory: conspiracy in fact among the commonly owned corporations; subject: party=Fearless Farris Wholesale and the five Retail Companies (the only defendants); theory=conspiracy in fact among the commonly owned corporations

Defendant-appellee Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. (“Wholesale”) was a wholesaler of petroleum products and is wholly owned by Farris C. Lind. The other five named corporate defendants-appellees were retail gasoline service station companies (“Retail Companies”), also wholly owned by Lind.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Beginning in January 1973, Wholesale reduced deliveries to U-Serve; later in that year Wholesale completely cut off U-Serve and six other retail customers, which included J. C. Penney Co., the Seven-Eleven chain, and Circle K.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Here the defendants have presented probative evidence that only a single person, Mr. Lind, made the decision to refuse to deal with certain customers of Wholesale.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

the most that can be plausibly inferred from the evidence presented is that Mr. Olson, in his capacity as general manager, carried out on a day-to-day basis the policy decisions of Farris C. Lind, the man who was sole owner and chief executive officer of Fearless Farris Wholesale.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It is fundamental that a single person or economic entity cannot combine or conspire in isolation: there must be concerted action by a plurality of actors.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For even if the defendant corporations, acting through their officers or agents, were deemed theoretically capable of conspiring, here in fact no conspiracy, no meeting of two or more minds, occurred.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Plaintiffs have failed to controvert the defendants’ showing that the decision to discontinue gasoline supplies was made by Mr. Lind alone, and that this decision was only subsequently communicated to Mr. Olson for implementation.I

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; party: Lind (sole owner) and Olson (general manager); neither named as a defendant; theory: owner and his general manager as the co-conspirators; subject: party=Lind (sole owner) and Olson (general manager); neither named as a defendant; theory=owner and his general manager as the co-conspirators

that it was Mr. Olson who advised plaintiffs that Wholesale would not make further deliveries of gasoline in 1973;

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Mr. Olson’s subsequent implementation of this decision does not make him a participant in a conspiracy.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; theory: "constructive plurality": the sole owner embodies six corporations; subject: theory="constructive plurality": the sole owner embodies six corporations

and that accounting convenience and tax benefits were the original reasons for doing business through separate corporations.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

this court has in two recent cases taken the position that the mere formality of separate incorporation is not, without more, sufficient to provide the capability for conspiracy.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

However, that position is conceptually indistinguishable from the position that mere separate incorporation is alone determinative of the question of in-tra-enterprise conspiracy.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: proved; party: Co-Op and Beaupain (appellants); subject: party=Co-Op and Beaupain (appellants)

In November, 1981, a luncheon meeting was held in Dayton, Ohio, and attended by Handler, Borack, Beaupain, and Beaupain’s boss, Blair Mooney.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Handler replied that “Tri-State would not call on any Co-Operative Theatres’ accounts.”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The government also called on three other theater owners who testified that Tri-State had called on them prior to November, 1981, but had subsequently refused their business on the grounds that Tri-State and Co-Op had an agreement not to take each other’s customers.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

One of the theater owners further testified that he also contacted the President of Co-Op, Blair Mooney, who confirmed the existence of the agreement between Co-Op and Tri-State.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

the standard of review is whether the relevant evidence could be accepted by a reasonably minded jury as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

we find that the direct evidence presented through Handler’s testimony when viewed in favor of the government was sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that defendants had entered into an illegal agreement not to seek business from each other’s accounts

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; count: the casinos' May 30, 2001 joint rejection of TWA's collective lease proposal; subject: count=the casinos' May 30, 2001 joint rejection of TWA's collective lease proposal

In May 2001, TWA appeared before the TCTC and proposed to lease “tunica.com” collectively to all of the casinos in Tunica County, Mississippi.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

None of the casinos agreed to TWA’s proposal, and the casinos apparently reached a consensus to not jointly utilize the “tunica.com” domain name.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Given the joint nature of TWA’s initial proposal, which invited the casinos to respond together as a single entity, the casinos’ decision to reject that proposal is not concerted action subject to section 1.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: triable; count: the casinos' alleged agreement to refuse to deal with TWA individually (May 2001 and November 2002); subject: count=the casinos' alleged agreement to refuse to deal with TWA individually (May 2001 and November 2002)

Shortly after the TCOA meeting, Clyde Callicott, the marketing director for Gold Strike, allegedly told Graziosi that the casinos had entered into a “gentlemen’s agreement” to not do business with TWA, either individually or as a group.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

I wish I could do more but my hands have been officially tied by the TCOA on this issue.”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Graziosi asserts that Callicott told her that, at the May 30, 2001 meeting, Robert McQueen, General Manager of the Horseshoe Casino, stated that the domain name would be worthless if none of the casinos dealt with TWA.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

According to another email from Callicott to Graziosi, the casinos met in November 2002 and again decided to refuse to advertise on “tunica.com,” in the hopes that the value of the domain name would decrease and the casinos could buy it at a later date.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To establish concerted action, the plaintiff must present “evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the [defendants] had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

If TWA can establish concerted action by the casinos through this sort of direct evidence, then it is not required to provide circumstantial evidence, such as the details surrounding its later proposals to the casinos, from which a concerted refusal to deal can be inferred.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it found that TWA’s proffered evidence did not create any issue of fact on the element of concerted action.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: pleaded; theory: conspiracy among the ILECs to thwart competitive entry by CLECs; subject: theory=conspiracy among the ILECs to thwart competitive entry by CLECs

Plaintiffs say, first, that the ILECs “engaged in parallel conduct” in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Their actions allegedly included making unfair agreements with the CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs’ relations with their own customers.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

To begin with, the complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

we agree with the District Court that nothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: pleaded; theory: agreement among the ILECs not to compete in one another's territories; subject: theory=agreement among the ILECs not to compete in one another's territories

Second, the complaint charges agreements by the ILECs to refrain from competing against one another.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The complaint quoted a reported statement of Qwest’s CEO, Richard Notebaert, to suggest that the ILECs declined to compete against each other despite recognizing that it “ ‘might be a good way to turn a quick dollar.’”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors tp do the same thing.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: conceded; party: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (manufacturer of Brighton goods; defendant, petitioner); PSKS, Inc., d/b/a Kay's Kloset (terminated discounting retailer; plaintiff, respondent); theory: vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers; subject: party=Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (manufacturer of Brighton goods; defendant, petitioner); PSKS, Inc., d/b/a Kay's Kloset (terminated discounting retailer; plaintiff, respondent); theory=vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers

In 1997, Leegin instituted the “Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy.”

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

It offered retailers incentives to become Heart Stores, and, in exchange, retailers pledged, among other things, to sell at Leegin’s suggested prices.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Leegin responded that it had established a unilateral pricing policy lawful under § 1, which applies only to concerted action.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

On appeal Leegin did not dispute that it had entered into vertical price-fixing agreements with its retailers.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; party: the 32 NFL teams, acting directly among themselves; subject: party=the 32 NFL teams, acting directly among themselves

Originally organized in 1920, the NFL is an unincorporated association that now includes 32 separately owned professional football teams.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Each team has its own name, colors, and logo, and owns related intellectual property.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In December 2000, the teams voted to authorize NFLP to grant exclusive licenses, and NFLP granted Reebok International Ltd. an exclusive 10-year license to manufacture and sell trademarked headwear for all 32 teams.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The teams compete with one another, not only on the playing field, but to attract fans, for gate receipts, and for contracts with managerial and playing personnel.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The key is whether the alleged “contract, combination ... , or conspiracy” is concerted action — that is, whether it joins together separate decisionmakers.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Because the inquiry is one of competitive reality, it is not determinative that two parties to an alleged § 1 violation are legally distinct entities. Nor, however, is it determinative that two legally distinct entities have organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decision-making quality or the single aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Directly relevant to this case, the teams compete in the market for intellectual property. To a firm making hats, the Saints and the Colts are two potentially competing suppliers of valuable trademarks.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

basis: law; party: the teams acting through NFLP (their jointly owned licensing corporation); subject: party=the teams acting through NFLP (their jointly owned licensing corporation)

In 1963, the teams formed National Football League Properties (NFLP) to develop, license, and market their intellectual property.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

NFLP’s licensing decisions are made by the 32 potential competitors, and each of them actually owns its share of the jointly managed assets.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Unlike typical decisions by corporate shareholders, NFLP licensing decisions effectively require the assent of more than a mere majority of shareholders.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The 32 teams capture individual economic benefits separate and apart from NFLP profits as a result of the decisions they make for NFLP.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted action covered by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act on interests separate from those of the firm itself,

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For that reason, decisions by NFLP regarding the teams’ separately owned intellectual property constitute concerted action.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In making the relevant licensing decisions, NFLP is therefore “an instrumentality” of the teams.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)