Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly — 550 U.S. 544 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007

Role: applied; posture: civil putative class action (telephone/internet subscribers v. incumbent local carriers); Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal reversed by CA2; certiorari on the standard for pleading a § 1 conspiracy through parallel conduct; result: claimant-lost; claim:

Uncertainty

None recorded

Misfit

The holding is primarily a PROCEDURAL rule (Rule 8 plausibility pleading, retiring Conley's "no set of facts") that is trans-substantive; the notation captures only its § 1 application, and the `rule` lines here are pleading standards rather than constructions of the statute.

Basis [pleaded] is defined as "allegations taken as true"; here the allegations were taken as true and still held insufficient — "not-satisfied [pleaded]" has to mean "inadequately pleaded", the opposite sense from a 12(b)(6) denial. A distinct basis (e.g. not-pleaded / implausible) would be clearer.

`fact` lines are the Court's paraphrase of complaint allegations. The decisive ABSENCE (no allegation of agreement beyond parallel conduct) is now tagged [cuts-against absent] for the first theory; for the second theory the Court's "obvious alternative explanation" (former monopolists sitting tight) is the Court's own inference, quoted as `held`, and has no fact-line home.

Text is capped at 60000 chars: the majority opinion and its footnotes are complete, but Justice Stevens's dissent (which reads the same allegations as sufficient) is truncated early in its Part II. v1 has `scope dissent`, but no dissent block was added (no new quote lines in this migration, and the dissent's conclusion lies beyond the cap).

The Court's evidentiary ladder (directed verdict / summary judgment / pleading each require something excluding independent action — Theatre Enterprises, Monsanto, Matsushita) is a stage-dependent proof rule for one element; no place to attach per-stage standards to an element.

The opinion relies on judicially noticed parts of articles cited in the complaint (Notebaert's fuller statement, footnote) to undercut an allegation. Polarity is relative to the element, so the Notebaert allegation is [supports]; that another passage is counter-evidence to THAT fact (fact-to-fact rebuttal) cannot be marked.

Result: judgment "reversed and remanded" but the effect is dismissal of the § 1 claim; recorded as claimant-lost rather than remanded.

interpretation

we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly — 550 U.S. 544 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))

we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.

Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita). The Copperweld / American Needle "single entity" argument is this element, route capacity-to-conspire, not a separate defense (it was modelled twice until taxonomy v1.2: also as `defense x-single-entity`). Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).

interpretation

Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly — 550 U.S. 544 (2007) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 (15usc1: author: Fable · QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md))

Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita). The Copperweld / American Needle "single entity" argument is this element, route capacity-to-conspire, not a separate defense (it was modelled twice until taxonomy v1.2: also as `defense x-single-entity`). Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).