AND · 18usc924:predicate.violence
Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.
Exact element source
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term "crime of violence" means an offense that is a felony and-Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec924; Unicode character offsets [6649:6752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 899fad466e76614e7f7b0bb794089010ef0af034312bcd194c76394228dbfdc4.(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, orSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec924; Unicode character offsets [6753:6880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 899fad466e76614e7f7b0bb794089010ef0af034312bcd194c76394228dbfdc4.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| asserted-without-analysis/kidnaping-and-carjacking | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f3d/319/0177-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2003 — satisfied | |
| borrowed-definition/felon-in-possession-for-early-release-eligibility | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp/966/0483-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 — comparator/merits |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp/966/0483-01 — United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 | Felony with the required force element | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (c)(3); theory: borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B); subject: theory=borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B) The court does NOT decide whether felon-in-possession is a 924(c)(3) crime of violence. It holds that (i) judicial review of the BOP's early-release decisions is limited to constitutional claims and conflict with well-settled case law, (ii) case law construing 924(c)(3) / 924(e) / the Guidelines for sentencing does not bind the BOP when it borrows the same words for 18 U.S.C. 3621, and (iii) no binding Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court authority holds 922(g) nonviolent. The fact lines are the agency's classification (polarity = toward "is a crime of violence"), not conduct of the petitioner and not a finding of the court. The rule lines are about 3621, not about 924(c). | borrowed-definition/felon-in-possession-for-early-release-eligibility | Your current offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon is determined to be a crime of violence as defined by the statute as it poses a substantial risk that physical force might be used against the person or property of another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [13749:13981] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The next section of PS 5162.02 is titled “CRIMINAL OFFENSES THAT ARE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN ALL CASES,” and a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is listed as one such offense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [11696:11867] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.It would be a “foolish consistency” to hold that a crime of violence for sentencing purposes must be the same as a crime of violence for early release purposes — even using the same definition.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [27228:27421] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The statute does not mandate a categorical approach to the determination of what is a “nonviolent offense.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [32231:32338] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Moreover, even if this Court were to subscribe to the Ninth Circuit’s view, the Sixth Circuit has not held that in the context of § 924(c)(3) a § 922(g) offense is nonviolent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29344:29519] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Thus, in this Circuit, the BOP’s interpretation does not contravene well-settled ease law and the conclusion mandated in Downey by prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 922(g) is thus not mandated here.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29520:29733] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286. |
| /f3d/319/0177-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2003 | Felony with the required force element | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (c)(1); party: Phipps and Gilley; count: kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)) and carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119(2)); subject: party=Phipps and Gilley; count=kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)) and carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119(2)) One sentence, uncontested, no elements-clause or residual-clause analysis; the defendants challenged only the number of 924(c)(1) convictions, never the status of the predicates, so the basis is [conceded], not a reasoned ruling of law. CAVEAT: thin and dated authority. A single unreasoned sentence from January 2003, long before Davis and Taylor, citing 924(c)(3) as a whole without choosing between the elements clause and the residual clause; federal kidnaping in particular rested largely on the residual clause later held void. Do not rely on this block as authority that kidnaping or carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence. | asserted-without-analysis/kidnaping-and-carjacking | The jury convicted defendants on all five counts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_319.jsonl#/f3d/319/0177-01; Unicode character offsets [2694:2743] (end exclusive); SHA-256 410aaa82568aa70a38c1453cbb5b2af50d068e8cb1e58133e8a057f9487ef545.Kidnaping and carjacking are crimes of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_319.jsonl#/f3d/319/0177-01; Unicode character offsets [8873:8944] (end exclusive); SHA-256 410aaa82568aa70a38c1453cbb5b2af50d068e8cb1e58133e8a057f9487ef545. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
In United States v. Davis , 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants' convictions cannot be upheld on that basis.
In United States v. Davis , 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants' convictions cannot be upheld on that basis.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [9347:9649] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6.Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.
interpretation
If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.
If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [9683:9833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca.Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.