United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997-04-29
18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: comparator; posture: civil; 28 U.S.C. 2241 habeas petition by a federal prisoner convicted of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) (felon in possession), challenging the Bureau of Prisons' classification of that offense as a "crime of violence" (hence not a "nonviolent offense" eligible for early release under 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B)); magistrate judge's report adopted as the opinion of the court; petition denied. No 924(c) charge exists: the BOP program statement borrowed the 924(c)(3) definition; result: not-decided; claim: (c)(3)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
Pure comparator: 924(c)(3) is only the text an agency copied into a program statement interpreting another statute (18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B)). There is no prosecution, no claimant under 924(c), and no element is applied; `result not-decided` and a single not-reached block are the honest encoding. The role cannot name the compared law (known item 10), and the notation has no way to say "definition borrowed by an agency; court holds sentencing case law on the definition non-binding in the borrowing context".
The clause the BOP actually relied on is the residual clause, 924(c)(3)(B) ("substantial risk that physical force ... may be used"), which the law file treats as invalid after United States v. Davis (2019) and gives no id. Filed under `predicate.violence` (the (c)(3)(A) elements clause id) for want of a declared residual-clause id; no temporal flag marks the 1997 reasoning as resting on a clause since struck down.
The opinion repeatedly miscites the provisions ("924(e)(3)", "924(e)(3) and (e)" for 924(c)(3) and 924(e) — OCR or original error) and leans on 924(e) (ACCA "violent felony", Taylor's categorical approach), a sibling subsection outside this law file; the 924(c)(3)/924(e) relation is prose only.
The IR record is a short district-judge order adopting a magistrate judge's report, followed by the report itself; all quotes are from the report (adopted "as and for the opinion of the Court"). No `opinion` value distinguishes order from adopted report.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 13
| Case | Qualifying federal predicate offense | Firearm object | Active employment of a firearm | Knowingly possess and convey the firearm | During and in relation to the predicate | Knowing actual or constructive possession |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 7–12 of 13
| Case | Possession advances the specific predicate | Armor-piercing ammunition object | Use or carry the armor-piercing ammunition | Possess the armor-piercing ammunition | Section 2 aiding and abetting route | Greater minimum for the same firearm conduct displaces the lower minimum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 13–13 of 13
| Case | Sentencing consequences after offense proof |
|---|---|
| Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 — not reached (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Felony with the required force element | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (c)(3); theory: borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B); subject: theory=borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B) The court does NOT decide whether felon-in-possession is a 924(c)(3) crime of violence. It holds that (i) judicial review of the BOP's early-release decisions is limited to constitutional claims and conflict with well-settled case law, (ii) case law construing 924(c)(3) / 924(e) / the Guidelines for sentencing does not bind the BOP when it borrows the same words for 18 U.S.C. 3621, and (iii) no binding Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court authority holds 922(g) nonviolent. The fact lines are the agency's classification (polarity = toward "is a crime of violence"), not conduct of the petitioner and not a finding of the court. The rule lines are about 3621, not about 924(c). | borrowed-definition/felon-in-possession-for-early-release-eligibility | Your current offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon is determined to be a crime of violence as defined by the statute as it poses a substantial risk that physical force might be used against the person or property of another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [13749:13981] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The next section of PS 5162.02 is titled “CRIMINAL OFFENSES THAT ARE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN ALL CASES,” and a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is listed as one such offense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [11696:11867] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.It would be a “foolish consistency” to hold that a crime of violence for sentencing purposes must be the same as a crime of violence for early release purposes — even using the same definition.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [27228:27421] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The statute does not mandate a categorical approach to the determination of what is a “nonviolent offense.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [32231:32338] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Moreover, even if this Court were to subscribe to the Ninth Circuit’s view, the Sixth Circuit has not held that in the context of § 924(c)(3) a § 922(g) offense is nonviolent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29344:29519] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Thus, in this Circuit, the BOP’s interpretation does not contravene well-settled ease law and the conclusion mandated in Downey by prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 922(g) is thus not mandated here.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29520:29733] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286. |