AND · 18usc924:predicate.violence
Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.
Exact element source
(3) For purposes of this subsection the term "crime of violence" means an offense that is a felony and-Source:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec924; Unicode character offsets [6649:6752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 899fad466e76614e7f7b0bb794089010ef0af034312bcd194c76394228dbfdc4.(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, orSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title18.jsonl#title18_sec924; Unicode character offsets [6753:6880] (end exclusive); SHA-256 899fad466e76614e7f7b0bb794089010ef0af034312bcd194c76394228dbfdc4.Routes and case patterns
| Route | Definition | Merits instance blocks | Distinct merits cases | Examples (up to 3 cases per count group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| _comparator accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is used as a yardstick for another statute or question, not applied to this case's own conduct. | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | Used only in non-merits blocks (1). Excluded context examples:Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 — not reached · basis not recorded (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) · comparator/merits · not counted |
| _whole accepted; provisional (1 case) | The element is decided as a whole: the reasoning turns on no narrower doctrinal sub-question that distinguishes it from any other application of this element. | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | United States v. Phipps — 319 F.3d 177 (2003) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2003 — satisfied · conceded (18usc924: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted |
| elements-clause provisional; 4 observed cases | Whether the predicate offence categorically has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force (§ 924(c)(3)(A)). | 4 Satisfied 2; not satisfied 2; excluded context 0 | 4 | United States v. Brazier — 933 F.3d 796 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Begay — 934 F.3d 1033 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted United States v. Butler — 141 F.4th 1136 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · counted |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Davis v. Beeler — 966 F. Supp. 483 (1997) · United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky · 1997 — not reached (18usc924: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Felony with the required force element | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (c)(3); theory: borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B); subject: theory=borrowed definition: BOP Program Statement 5162.02 uses the 924(c)(3) "crime of violence" definition to construe "nonviolent offense" in 18 U.S.C. 3621(e)(2)(B) The court does NOT decide whether felon-in-possession is a 924(c)(3) crime of violence. It holds that (i) judicial review of the BOP's early-release decisions is limited to constitutional claims and conflict with well-settled case law, (ii) case law construing 924(c)(3) / 924(e) / the Guidelines for sentencing does not bind the BOP when it borrows the same words for 18 U.S.C. 3621, and (iii) no binding Sixth Circuit or Supreme Court authority holds 922(g) nonviolent. The fact lines are the agency's classification (polarity = toward "is a crime of violence"), not conduct of the petitioner and not a finding of the court. The rule lines are about 3621, not about 924(c). | borrowed-definition/felon-in-possession-for-early-release-eligibility | Your current offense of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon is determined to be a crime of violence as defined by the statute as it poses a substantial risk that physical force might be used against the person or property of another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [13749:13981] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The next section of PS 5162.02 is titled “CRIMINAL OFFENSES THAT ARE CRIMES OF VIOLENCE IN ALL CASES,” and a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is listed as one such offense.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [11696:11867] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.It would be a “foolish consistency” to hold that a crime of violence for sentencing purposes must be the same as a crime of violence for early release purposes — even using the same definition.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [27228:27421] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.The statute does not mandate a categorical approach to the determination of what is a “nonviolent offense.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [32231:32338] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Moreover, even if this Court were to subscribe to the Ninth Circuit’s view, the Sixth Circuit has not held that in the context of § 924(c)(3) a § 922(g) offense is nonviolent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29344:29519] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286.Thus, in this Circuit, the BOP’s interpretation does not contravene well-settled ease law and the conclusion mandated in Downey by prior decisions of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 922(g) is thus not mandated here.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_966.jsonl#/f-supp/966/0483-01; Unicode character offsets [29520:29733] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cc98346f0d17908b87daa37b5fb889ee66155440897698bcb44fcce5fc689286. |
| United States v. Phipps — 319 F.3d 177 (2003) · United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2003 — satisfied · conceded (18usc924: author: Fable · historical QA: FIX (QA2, neov2/qa/wave2-cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) | Felony with the required force element | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: conceded; claim: (c)(1); party: Phipps and Gilley; count: kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)) and carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119(2)); subject: party=Phipps and Gilley; count=kidnaping (18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1)) and carjacking (18 U.S.C. 2119(2)) One sentence, uncontested, no elements-clause or residual-clause analysis; the defendants challenged only the number of 924(c)(1) convictions, never the status of the predicates, so the basis is [conceded], not a reasoned ruling of law. CAVEAT: thin and dated authority. A single unreasoned sentence from January 2003, long before Davis and Taylor, citing 924(c)(3) as a whole without choosing between the elements clause and the residual clause; federal kidnaping in particular rested largely on the residual clause later held void. Do not rely on this block as authority that kidnaping or carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence. | asserted-without-analysis/kidnaping-and-carjacking | The jury convicted defendants on all five counts.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_319.jsonl#/f3d/319/0177-01; Unicode character offsets [2694:2743] (end exclusive); SHA-256 410aaa82568aa70a38c1453cbb5b2af50d068e8cb1e58133e8a057f9487ef545.Kidnaping and carjacking are crimes of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_319.jsonl#/f3d/319/0177-01; Unicode character offsets [8873:8944] (end exclusive); SHA-256 410aaa82568aa70a38c1453cbb5b2af50d068e8cb1e58133e8a057f9487ef545. |
| United States v. Brazier — 933 F.3d 796 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Felony with the required force element | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (c)(3); party: Derek Fields and Lindani Mzembe (the two defendants convicted under § 924(c); co-appellant Ivan Brazier was not); count: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), using and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (predicates: kidnapping, § 1201, and ransom demand, § 875(a)); subject: party=Derek Fields and Lindani Mzembe (the two defendants convicted under § 924(c); co-appellant Ivan Brazier was not); count=18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), using and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (predicates: kidnapping, § 1201, and ransom demand, § 875(a)) Decided as a question of law on plain-error review: the residual clause is void under Davis and, under circuit precedent (Jenkins), kidnapping and ransom lack a force element. The violent actual conduct is recorded as [neutral] because the court holds the categorical method does not consider it. The opinion notes that Jenkins itself was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court on the residual-clause question, and states that this does not cast doubt on its elements-clause analysis. | federal kidnapping and holding for ransom can be committed by inveigling or decoying and by confinement without threat of force | The other way to satisfy § 924(c) is the elements clause, but we explained in United States v. Jenkins that kidnapping and holding a person for ransom does not categorically satisfy the elements clause.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [9650:9852] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6.In United States v. Davis , 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants' convictions cannot be upheld on that basis.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [9347:9649] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6.The categorical method focuses on the essential elements of the counts of conviction, requiring courts in essence to focus on the least culpable conduct that could violate the relevant statutes, without considering the actual facts of the defendants' conduct.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [10448:10707] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6.Under the categorical method of analysis that applies to both the elements and residual clauses of the definition of crimes of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), Mzembe's and Fields' convictions for kidnapping and demanding ransom cannot support the mandatory consecutive sentences imposed under § 924(c).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [10145:10447] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6. |
| United States v. Begay — 934 F.3d 1033 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Felony with the required force element | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (c)(3)(A); party: Randly Irvin Begay; count: Count Two, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (predicate: second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153); subject: party=Randly Irvin Begay; count=Count Two, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (predicate: second-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1153) Panel majority: a § 924(c)(3)(A) crime of violence requires intentional force; malice aforethought includes depraved-heart recklessness, and "extreme" recklessness is still not intent, so second-degree murder is not categorically a crime of violence. The shooting itself is [neutral]: the court says the categorical approach does not look to it. Judge N.R. Smith dissented from this part (span `dis`): extreme-recklessness murder should qualify. No dissent block is recorded. | federal second-degree murder can rest on depraved-heart (extreme) recklessness | It follows from our precedent that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) requires the intentional use of force.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_934.jsonl#/f3d/934/1033-01; Unicode character offsets [15195:15316] (end exclusive); SHA-256 296f7331e155fff0bcbb638fc4d685d682305bd81bd0ee1654e10ca5f1115821.As such, second-degree murder may be committed recklessly-with a depraved heart mental state-and need not be committed willfully or intentionally.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_934.jsonl#/f3d/934/1033-01; Unicode character offsets [15808:15954] (end exclusive); SHA-256 296f7331e155fff0bcbb638fc4d685d682305bd81bd0ee1654e10ca5f1115821.Second-degree murder does not constitute a crime of violence under the elements clause- 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) -because it can be committed recklessly.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_934.jsonl#/f3d/934/1033-01; Unicode character offsets [10303:10456] (end exclusive); SHA-256 296f7331e155fff0bcbb638fc4d685d682305bd81bd0ee1654e10ca5f1115821.Begay's § 924(c) conviction for discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence therefore cannot stand under either the elements clause or residual clause of § 924(c)(3).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_934.jsonl#/f3d/934/1033-01; Unicode character offsets [20145:20335] (end exclusive); SHA-256 296f7331e155fff0bcbb638fc4d685d682305bd81bd0ee1654e10ca5f1115821. |
| United States v. Butler — 141 F.4th 1136 (2025) · Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2025 — satisfied · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Felony with the required force element | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (c)(3)(A); party: G’Ante Butler; count: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (predicate: forcible assault on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b)); subject: party=G’Ante Butler; count=18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), use of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence (predicate: forcible assault on a federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 111(b)) Decided by stare decisis: Kendall (10th Cir. 2017) held § 111(b) a crime of violence under the modified categorical approach because § 111 requires an intent to assault; Borden removed only offenses that can be committed recklessly, so Kendall controls. The shooting itself is [neutral] (categorical approach). The argument was adopted by reference from a co-defendant's companion appeal (Fed. R. App. P. 28(i)), which the court permitted. Identity (whether Butler was one of the shooters) was the trial issue and reaches this court only through harmless-error review, so no use / discharge block is recorded. | forcible assault on a federal officer under § 111(b) requires intent, not recklessness; bound by circuit precedent after Borden | Thus, for § 111(b) to be a crime of violence, it must criminalize only intentional conduct.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/1136; Unicode character offsets [38249:38340] (end exclusive); SHA-256 44e92d7ca620e1aabb0f0d1a3f3ac4f0355314f73a450318025ee9174dabcc59.To decide whether an offense is a crime of violence, we apply the categorical approach.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/1136; Unicode character offsets [38363:38450] (end exclusive); SHA-256 44e92d7ca620e1aabb0f0d1a3f3ac4f0355314f73a450318025ee9174dabcc59.“a ‘conviction under § 111(b) necessarily requires a finding that the defendant intentionally used, attempted to use, or threatened to use physical force against the person of another.’”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/1136; Unicode character offsets [40304:40490] (end exclusive); SHA-256 44e92d7ca620e1aabb0f0d1a3f3ac4f0355314f73a450318025ee9174dabcc59.Kendall remains good law after Borden and controls our decision in this case.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/1136; Unicode character offsets [41911:41988] (end exclusive); SHA-256 44e92d7ca620e1aabb0f0d1a3f3ac4f0355314f73a450318025ee9174dabcc59.In Kendall, we held that § 111(b) is a crime of violence. We therefore reject G’Ante’s arguments to the contrary.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f4th_141.jsonl#/f4th/141/1136; Unicode character offsets [41989:42102] (end exclusive); SHA-256 44e92d7ca620e1aabb0f0d1a3f3ac4f0355314f73a450318025ee9174dabcc59. |
| Delligatti v. United States — 604 U.S. 423 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 — satisfied · law (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) | Felony with the required force element | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; claim: (c)(3)(A); party: Salvatore Delligatti; count: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (predicate: VICAR attempted murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), resting on New York second-degree murder); subject: party=Salvatore Delligatti; count=18 U.S.C. § 924(c), using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (predicate: VICAR attempted murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5), resting on New York second-degree murder) Castleman's principle (knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force) extends to § 924(c)(3)(A) and has no exception for harm caused by omission; New York second-degree murder, and the VICAR offense premised on it, therefore qualifies. The murder-for-hire plot is [neutral]: under the categorical approach the court does not examine actual conduct. Two points are assumed, not decided: that the attempt qualifies if the completed offense does (undisputed before the Court, fn. 2), and that "physical force" in § 924(c) means Johnson violent force (fn. 3). The Court also expresses no view on whether a VICAR offense can qualify independently of its state predicate (fn. 1). | intentional murder that state law allows to be committed by omission of a legal duty | If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [9683:9833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca.There is no excep- tion to this principle when an offender causes bodily injury by omission rather than affrmative act.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [14738:14857] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca.Thus, second-degree murder in New York—and, by extension, Delligatti's VICAR offense premised on it—is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s elements clause.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [23758:23914] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca.The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the use of physical force against another person.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [36143:36298] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
In United States v. Davis , 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants' convictions cannot be upheld on that basis.
United States v. Brazier — 933 F.3d 796 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 2019 (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
In United States v. Davis , 588 U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split and held that the residual clause in the § 924(c) definition of a crime of violence is unconstitutionally vague, so the defendants' convictions cannot be upheld on that basis.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_933.jsonl#/f3d/933/0796-01; Unicode character offsets [9347:9649] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3c380e31e40a1a143dbc7f2e33e8aba9ba905e4f30336bffe710c0f903f2a8f6.Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.
interpretation
If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.
Delligatti v. United States — 604 U.S. 423 (2025) · Supreme Court of the United States · 2025 (18usc924: author: Flash3 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))
If the offense can be committed without the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of force, it is not a crime of violence under the elements clause.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/clus_604.jsonl#/us/604/423; Unicode character offsets [9683:9833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ce075d84ebc48a2f0e1db83c84e8b1293c79422fd00858fbb16f45620d9ad8ca.Delligatti, 604 U.S. 423 (2025), reaffirms the categorical method and holds that deliberate injury or death can involve force even by omission of a legal duty. Taylor does not exclude every attempt offense; compare attempted murder. Davis invalidates (c)(3)(B). Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), requires the categorical elements inquiry and holds attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify; actual violent facts cannot repair a missing statutory force element. These rulings do not erase the separate drug-trafficking alternative. Official opinions and local-IR availability are recorded in NOTES.