United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016-02-12
18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed
Case and law context
Role: background; posture: criminal; sentencing opinion after a jury conviction for felon-in-possession; the only questions are whether three Oregon prior convictions (Robbery III, Assault III, Coercion) are ACCA "violent felonies" (18 U.S.C. 924(e)) and Guidelines "crimes of violence", plus PSR objections; 922(g) is the offense of conviction and no element of it is in dispute; result: not-decided; claim: (g)(1)
Uncertainty
None recorded
Misfit
Known (penalty provisions / sibling statutes are not elements): the whole opinion is 18 U.S.C. 924(e) and U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 / 4B1.2 - categorical and modified-categorical analysis of three Oregon statutes (Robbery III not a violent felony: overbroad and indivisible; Assault III and Coercion are), so ACCA does not apply. No declared id; not recorded. A citation to 922(g) here does not make the case an instance of 922(g).
New: the two comparator blocks run in the unusual direction - 922(g) text and 922(g)(9) case law are the SOURCE of a rule applied to a different statute (ACCA), rather than the yardstick a state offense is measured against. `role comparator` does not distinguish "922(g) measured against" from "922(g) borrowed from", and cannot name the borrowing statute.
Good-law / conflict flag (known gap): the status.g1 comparator block follows United States v. Murillo (statutory maximum controls), whereas the law file's status.g1 rule quote (McAdory) looks to the sentence the defendant was actually exposed to. The notation cannot mark the block as in tension with the law-side rule or as superseded.
The opinion's own paraphrase of 922(g) merges the possession and receipt branches ("to possess or receive 'any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce'"), which the law file keeps apart (commerce-possession vs commerce-receipt); not quoted as a rule for that reason.
Sentencing-only rulings with no element: stolen-firearm enhancement applies without knowledge that the gun was stolen (U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(4)(A)); acceptance of responsibility; Brady/Giglio sanction and Eighth Amendment arguments mooted.
B · Case × element grid
Top-level elements follow claim order in panels of up to six elements. Case rows repeat across panels. Every recorded block retains its holding and basis; multiple blocks are not merged into a case-level verdict. ✓ satisfied · ✗ not satisfied · ○ not reached · · not addressed. Muted blocks are not counted. Sub-element evidence remains on case and element pages.
Elements 1–6 of 12
| Case | One applicable prohibited category | Section 925(a)(1) government-use firearm or ammunition exception | Actual or constructive possession | Firearm or ammunition under section 921 | Possession in or affecting commerce | Knowledge of possessing the firearm or ammunition |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | ○ not reached · basis not recordedNot counted: background/merits | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Elements 7–12 of 12
| Case | Knowledge of the relevant disqualifying status | Second Amendment limit on the unlawful-user theory applied to Hemani | Ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce | Knowing shipping, transportation or receipt | Receipt of the prohibited object | Received object previously shipped or transported across borders |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed | · not addressed |
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Pattern | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Actual or constructive possession | not_reached Excluded from merits counts background / merits claim: (g)(1) The jury verdict is recited as the premise of sentencing; this opinion neither describes the possession nor reviews it. | Unspecified route | The indictment in this case alleged that on January 13, 2014, Defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed a handgun and that Defendant had at least three prior convictions for violent felonies.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [2718:2912] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.Defendant was tried before a jury and, on May 15, 2015, Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [2913:3064] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd. |
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — satisfied · law (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Conviction punishable by more than one year | satisfied Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits basis: law; claim: (g)(1); theory: parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates; subject: theory=parallel phrase in ACCA 924(e)(2)(B) and U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) ("punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year"), applied to Oregon Class C felony predicates Not a ruling on the 922(g)(1) status element: the same words are construed as the ACCA / Guidelines predicate threshold. Recorded because the rule applied (statutory maximum, Murillo) is the opposite of the actual-exposure rule the law file attaches to status.g1 (McAdory). The cuts-against line is the defendant's legal contention, not a fact found. | punishable-term/statutory-maximum-not-state-guidelines-range | Each of Defendant’s prior convictions is for a Class C felony. Under ORS 161.605(3), a Class C felony is punishable by a maximum of five years imprisonment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [32857:33013] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.Defendant contends that the court cannot rely on the maximum statutory term of imprisonment in determining whether a conviction meets the threshold requirement, but must look instead to Oregon’s sentencing grid and guidelines.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31029:31255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.The Ninth Circuit has held that, for the purposes of determining predicate convictions, courts must use the “potential maximum sentence defined by the applicable state criminal statute, not the maximum sentence that could have been imposed against the particular defendant for his commission of the crime according to the state’s sentencing guidelines.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [31256:31609] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.Defendant’s prior convictions are therefore for crimes punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [33014:33126] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd. |
| United States v. Dunlap — 162 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (2016) · United States District Court for the District of Oregon · 2016 — not reached (18usc922: author: Fable · not independently reviewed) | Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (g)(1); theory: Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause; subject: theory=Castleman's reading of the 921(a)(33) force element borrowed to construe the ACCA force clause 922(g)(9) case law is used by analogy to hold that Oregon Assault III (and, by extension, Coercion) has the use of force as an element under ACCA; nobody here was charged under (g)(9). The court notes Castleman left open whether causing injury entails ACCA-level "violent force". | causing-bodily-injury-entails-use-of-force | § 922(g)(9) prohibits anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from possessing firearms.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [18585:18693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd.In assessing .whether a statute that prohibits causing injury meets the requirement of having as an element, the use or attempted use of force, the Court held that “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense,” and that “the knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_3d_162.jsonl#/f-supp-3d/162/1106-01; Unicode character offsets [19560:19895] (end exclusive); SHA-256 724e82ff14e758797381730d2553ea63be3230b27287e6a7a94f3ed860082bbd. |