United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994-10-21
Case and law context
Role: comparator; posture: civil; ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623) refusal-to-hire suit by EEOC; summary judgment for employer on disparate impact affirmed by CA7; Title VII cited only by analogy/contrast; result: not-decided; claim: (a)(2)
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 | Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or status | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 | Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 | Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2); theory: ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick; subject: theory=ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick No Title VII claim. The court reads 2000e-2(a)(2) (which covers "applicants for employment") as the textual home of Griggs impact liability and uses the ADEA's omission of applicants, plus the RFOA clause and Hazen Paper, to refuse to carry Title VII impact theory over to an age claim by an applicant. The held line decides the ADEA claim, not this statute. The fact lines are ADEA facts (age, not a 2000e-2 trait); their polarity is stated relative to the ANALOGOUS impact showing (a neutral salary cap falling more harshly on older applicants), not relative to any Title VII element. | cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii | The EEOC claims that due to the statistically significant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a low maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate percentage of applicants over the age of forty from consideration for the teaching position.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4451:4721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Johnson was sixty-three years old and claimed to have thirty years of experience.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1671:1752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.One of the reasons given for the decision was that Johnson qualified for a salary higher than Parker could afford.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1833:1947] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [10810:10898] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [12504:12622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd. |
| /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 | Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national origin | not_reached Excluded from merits counts comparator / merits claim: (a)(2) The trait is age, which is not a 2000e-2 trait. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
hypothetical
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
/f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994
Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.