/f3d/858/1307-01

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017-06-02

Original case on neochart.com

Case and law context

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2

Role: applied; posture: civil; sex-discrimination and retaliation claims (Title VII and Title IX) by demoted university psychologist; summary judgment for employer affirmed by CA10 on lack of pretext (alternative ground as to discrimination); result: claimant-lost; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Instances and excluded annotation blocks

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or statussatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: demotion (Feb.-Mar. 2013); failure to reinstate supervisory duties (Aug. 2013); subject: count=demotion (Feb.-Mar. 2013); failure to reinstate supervisory duties (Aug. 2013)

demotion/removal-of-supervisory-role-with-small-pay-cut
Dr. Kent presented Dr. Hiatt with three options: (1) resign; (2) be demoted and undergo six months of outside counseling about her supervisory style; or (3) remain in her position and allow Human Resources (“HR”) to handle the matter.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In her new position as Staff Psychologist/Outreach Coordinator, Dr. Hiatt was paid $58,000— a $2,000 reduction in pay from her previous position.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [6946:7091] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For discrimination claims, “[a]n adverse employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
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Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

A reasonable person in Dr. Hiatt’s position would view her demotion to Outreach Coordinator, coupled with a salary decrease of $2,000, as an adverse employment action.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [21957:22124] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For the foregoing reasons, the only actions that qualify as adverse employment actions against Dr. Hiatt were (1) the demotion and (2) the failure to reinstate her supervisory duties.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25940:26123] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or statusnot
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: resignation (May 2014); theory: constructive discharge; subject: count=resignation (May 2014); theory=constructive discharge

constructive-discharge/conditions-not-objectively-intolerable
Upon her return, Dr. Palma-teer increased Dr. Hiatt’s weekly clinical hours from 22 to 24 hours.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

She also required Dr. Hiatt to provide a doctor’s note to justify non-Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) sick leave, obtain permission before “blocking her schedule” (i.e., make certain blocks of time in her calendar unavailable for clinical appointments), and make up for missed clinical time.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [11776:12069] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

On May 30, 2014, Dr. Hiatt submitted a letter of resignation, in which she complained of retaliation for filing her internal EEO and EEOC complaints.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

“To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that she had no other choice but to quit.”
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Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The working conditions she describes—such as being required to work two extra hours per week, turn in timely case notes, and justify non-FMLA sick time—do not amount to an objectively intolerable working environment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [23477:23693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Adverse employment action affecting compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, or statusnot
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: differential workplace requirements after return from leave (2014); subject: count=differential workplace requirements after return from leave (2014)

Plaintiff recast "differential treatment" (normally because-of/pretext evidence) as a free-standing adverse action; the court rejects it for want of comparators either way.
differential-treatment/no-similarly-situated-comparator-identified
She suggests Ross Artwohl and Kimberly Mercer as relevant comparators because, like she did, they reported to Dr. Palmateer.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25415:25539] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Hiatt also proposes Dr. Fogle and Dr. Mathewson because Dr. Palmateer supervised them and the same professional standards applied to them as to Dr. Hiatt.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25673:25831] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

But because Dr. Hiatt supervised these two individuals, they were not in positions comparable to Dr. Hiatt.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25832:25939] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25042:25291] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Hiatt has failed to identify any other similarly situated employees who allegedly received differential treatment.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25296:25414] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Discriminatory causation ("because of" protected trait)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Prima facie case assumed without deciding; the district court had held it failed for lack of comparators, and the panel affirms on the alternative pretext ground instead.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Covered entity: employer, employment agency, or labor organizationsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

private-employer/private-university
Colorado Seminary owns and operates the University of Denver (“DU”), including DU’s Health and Counseling Center (“HCC”), which provides wellness services such as counseling to DU’s student body.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In November 2011, DU hired Dr. Hiatt to be a Staff Psychologist and the Training Director at the HCC.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [767:868] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: demotion; subject: count=demotion

performance/loss-of-trainee-confidence-ethics-concern-and-supervisory-style
First, Dr. Fogle, Dr. Mathewson, and Dr. Shanley elected to end supervision with Dr. Hiatt.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Based on those conversations, Dr. Kent determined Dr. Hiatt was in an “ethical grey area.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [4616:4706] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Further, rather than take personal responsibility for the supervisees’ reactions, Dr. Hiatt blamed the supervi-sees’ pathologies as causing their strong reactions, including their decisions to stop supervision with her.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [5277:5496] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

DU’s proffered reasons satisfy its burden to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons for the demotion.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [27136:27267] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (McDonnell Douglas step 2)satisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: failure to reinstate supervisory duties; subject: count=failure to reinstate supervisory duties

performance/unchanged-supervisory-style-and-negative-trainee-feedback
Based on her sessions with Dr. Hiatt, Dr. Asher opined that Dr. Hiatt “likely could return” to a supervisory role, but also noted that she was not likely to change her supervisory style.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In their exit interviews after she was demoted, several supervisees described “troubling interactions” with Dr. Hiatt during supervision that gave DU further reason to believe Dr. Hiatt had “very poor boundaries.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [39169:39382] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Once again, Dr. Hiatt does not contest these were legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and nonretaliatory reasons.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [36990:37098] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Impermissible motivating factor in mixed-motive cases (§ 2000e-2(m))not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: failure to reinstate supervisory duties; subject: count=failure to reinstate supervisory duties

The second fact is the plaintiff's own pretext evidence (subjective reinstatement criteria in the provost's email), held insufficient.
honest-belief/employer-may-disagree-with-outside-consultant-and-use-subjective-criteria
In Dr. Kent’s view, Dr. Asher’s recommendation was equivocal.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

She pointed to the October 2013 email from Associate Provost for Student Life Patricia Helton, which called on Dr. Hiatt to have “better awareness about the power she holds” and “demonstrate[ ] appropriate professional boundaries in all contexts” before she could resume supervision.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”
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Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Hiatt has not shown DU’s reasons for refusing to reinstate her supervisory duties were pretextual for retaliation or discrimination.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [40976:41112] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Pretext for discrimination (McDonnell Douglas step 3)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: demotion; subject: count=demotion

Even a mistaken ethics assessment is not pretext if reached honestly after hearing both sides and consulting outside experts; reasons given at the time match the litigation reasons.
honest-belief/consistent-contemporaneous-reasons-after-fair-investigation
When Dr. Kent and Dr. Palmateer met with Dr. Hiatt on February 22, 2013, and presented the three options to her, the reasons they stated then are the same reasons that DU provides in this litigation.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Kent presented both Dr. Hiatt’s and Dr. Fogle’s timelines of events to Dr. Philinda Hutchings—the Dean of the Midwestern School of Professional Psychology—and Dr. Bill Bracker—the former Director of the Nova Southeastern University Consortium Internship.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [32876:33134] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Consistent with Smothers, DU gave Dr. Hiatt multiple opportunities to explain her version of events.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [33947:34047] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Indeed, Dr. Hiatt admitted in her deposition that supervisees even had a name for it—getting “Tawny-ed.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [35306:35410] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”
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Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Hiatt has not shown that DU’s reasons for removing her from her position as Training Director and demoting her to Outreach Coordinator were dishonest or made in bad faith, Swackhammer, 498 F.3d at 1169-70, or were “so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational factfinder could conclude they are unworthy of belief,” Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211 (brackets and quotations omitted).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [35699:36102] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Protected trait: race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy/abortion), or national originsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: assumed; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

The opinion never says how the demotion is claimed to be sex-based (the trigger was a romantic relationship with a former private supervisee); the whole prima facie case is assumed.
sex/unspecified-theory
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [16142:16285] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We assume without deciding that Dr. Hiatt could make a prima facie McDonnell Douglas showing of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and Title IX.
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Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Qualified for the position / meeting legitimate employer expectationsnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a)

Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017Retaliation for protected Title VII activity (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a))not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: no-evidence; claim: (a)(1); 2000e-3(a); count: 2000e-3(a) retaliation claim (demotion; failure to reinstate); subject: count=2000e-3(a) retaliation claim (demotion; failure to reinstate)

Retaliation prima facie case also assumed; resolved on the same pretext analysis as discrimination, with timing (reasons given five days before the first protected activity) as an extra point.
pretext/adverse-decision-communicated-before-protected-activity
On February 27, 2013, before Dr. Hiatt chose an option, her attorney sent DU a letter claiming DU’s request for Dr. Hiatt to leave her position as Training Director amounted to sex discrimination.
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Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Kent and Dr. Palmateer initially gave Dr. Hiatt the reasons for her demotion in their February 22, 2013 meeting.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [30590:30706] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

For retaliation claims, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would .have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [18900:19165] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 1 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

DU could not retaliate for Dr. Hiatt’s protected activity until she had engaged in such activity.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [31017:31114] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Dr. Hiatt cannot, therefore, create a triable issue that DU’s reasons for any adverse employment actions were pretextual for sex discrimination or retaliation.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [41719:41878] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations recorded from this case

interpretation

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from discriminating against an individual “because of such individual’s ... sex.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [16142:16285] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Every individual has a race, color, religion, sex, and national origin; in circuits applying a modified McDonnell Douglas prima facie prong to majority-group ("reverse discrimination") plaintiffs, background circumstances suggesting inclination to discriminate against the majority group are required.

interpretation

For discrimination claims, “[a]n adverse employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

For discrimination claims, “[a]n adverse employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [18344:18609] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Actionable harm to employment status or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment under § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).

interpretation

“To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that she had no other choice but to quit.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

“To establish constructive discharge, a plaintiff must show that she had no other choice but to quit.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [23022:23124] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Actionable harm to employment status or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment under § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).

interpretation

An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee shares the same supervisor, is subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline, and has similar relevant employment circumstances, such as work history.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [25042:25291] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Ultimate causation/intent requirement under § 2000e-2(a): the protected trait was a determinative cause of the adverse employment action.

interpretation

“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

“The relevant inquiry is not whether the employer’s proffered reasons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [20165:20354] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.

interpretation

“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

“Evidence that the employer should not have made the [adverse employment] decision—for example, that the employer was mistaken or used poor business judgment—is not sufficient to show that the employer’s explanation is unworthy of credibility.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [19839:20083] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

McDonnell Douglas step 3: plaintiff shows that the employer's proffered reason is false / unworthy of credence, permitting (though not compelling) the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination.

interpretation

For retaliation claims, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would .have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

For retaliation claims, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would .have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [18900:19165] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.

interpretation

DU could not retaliate for Dr. Hiatt’s protected activity until she had engaged in such activity.

/f3d/858/1307-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · 2017

DU could not retaliate for Dr. Hiatt’s protected activity until she had engaged in such activity.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_858.jsonl#/f3d/858/1307-01; Unicode character offsets [31017:31114] (end exclusive); SHA-256 ea359a0c941889caa6fcc8ffe43892de16d825e7dd18ad2136f26ed9b3f89b2f.

Title VII anti-retaliation claim (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) routinely litigated alongside § 2000e-2 discrimination claims: requires (1) protected activity, (2) materially adverse action under the Burlington Northern dissuasion standard, and (3) causal connection.