29 U.S.C. § 158(a) · A outline

A · Element outline

Labels preserve the recorded AND / OR / EXCEPTION / DEFENSE structure.

Claim structure

Expression key: & = AND; | = OR; ! = exclusion / negation. Parentheses preserve grouping.

29usc158:a1-interference

employer and covered-employee and protected-right and interference and not protected-speech and not special-circumstances

Independent §8(a)(1) route; the special-circumstances defense is scoped to the insignia-restriction variant, not all interference.

29usc158:a2-domination-support

employer and covered-employee and organization-interference and not working-hours-conference and not construction-agreement

§8(a)(2): domination, interference or financial/other support are alternative statutory acts.

29usc158:a3-discrimination

employer and covered-employee and employment-discrimination and union-purpose and not same-decision and not lawful-union-security and not construction-agreement

Motivating-factor/same-decision sequence models the sampled discharge cases, not every possible §8(a)(3) proceeding.

29usc158:a4-retaliation

employer and covered-employee and board-participation and retaliatory-action

Separate statutory route for charges/testimony; no dedicated §8(a)(4) interpretation was resolved by this six-case sample.

29usc158:a5-refusal

employer and covered-employee and representative and refusal-to-bargain

§8(a)(5) with §8(d)/§9(a); majority/representation, impasse, waiver and bargaining-subject questions require their own case-specific inquiry.

Constraints

Section 8(a)(5) violation also violates Section 8(a)(1)

These are related statutory routes, not two independent factual findings.

Protected noncoercive expression alone cannot constitute or evidence an unfair labor practice

Section c applies throughout the subchapter; it does not protect threats, force, promises of benefit or independent unlawful acts.

Special circumstances applies only to the protected employee-insignia restriction theory

In-N-Out supplies a judge/Board-made balancing defense for that variant, not a universal defense to interrogation, discrimination, or statutory bargaining duties.

Any applicable employer-duty breach can establish the refusal element; the routes are not cumulative requirements.

Each child is an alternative failure predicate: satisfaction means breach of an actually applicable employer duty, not the existence or performance of the duty. Contract notices require a party seeking termination/modification of an existing agreement; health-care modifications require the institution/contract conditions. Paragraph d(B) initial-dispute notice is a union duty, and d(C) FMCS communication is an agency duty: those are contextual anchors, not independent employer breaches. The employer's d(C) participation duty remains distinct. Striker-status effects inform coverage but do not independently prove employer refusal.

Ordinary union-security permission requires all applicable statutory safeguards, not merely a membership clause.

Independence, the ordinary waiting period, representative/rescission conditions and final equal-membership/financial safeguards qualify the a(3) exception together. Section f's distinct construction-agreement allowance supplies only its enumerated alternatives and preserves the final a(3) proviso. State section164(b) limits and the financial-core interpretation remain applicable as recorded under the parent.