Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected group

AND · 42usc2000e-2:impact

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

Exact element source

a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [8572:8754] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.
With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec2000e-2; Unicode character offsets [9124:9372] (end exclusive); SHA-256 7b026a9ac957c5491602d868578271db8730b4c98650f1a4007b2e7430194c8b.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994 — comparator/merits

general-population-statistics/minimum-height-requirement0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — applied/superseded

statistical-disparityFacially neutral selection device or pass-rate barrier causing a statistically significant adverse impact (e.g., below the EEOC four-fifths / 80% rule) on a protected group0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
0No annotation uses in this snapshot
statistical-disparity/exam-pass-rate-below-four-fifths0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009 — applied/hypothetical

statistical-disparity/neutral-barrier-applied-to-single-sex-applicant-pool1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982 — not

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected groupnot
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; claim: (a)(2); party: plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count: second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory: impact is measured in the hiring round at issue (women competed only with women); subject: party=plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count=second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory=impact is measured in the hiring round at issue (women competed only with women)

Height rule that would exclude ~80% of women vs ~20% of men has no sex-based impact where the hiring round was restricted to women: she lost to taller women, not to men. Teal's bar on the bottom-line defense presupposes an impact at some step. [law], not [no-evidence]: the statistics and the hiring sequence were undisputed; the reversal turns only on the legal unit of analysis.
statistical-disparity/neutral-barrier-applied-to-single-sex-applicant-pool
Because the city needed female officers to perform certain duties, related, for example, to female prisoners, and because there were no women high enough on the integrated list to be hired, the city sought and received approval from the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination to hire from a list of exclusively female applicants.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [35583:35921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The most recent integrated list was therefore separated and the city hired the top two women on the women-only list who also met the 5 feet 6 inches height requirement.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [35922:36090] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Without the height requirement, the city would still have hired only two women. The only difference is that plaintiff would have been one of them.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [37733:37879] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [39478:39646] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

On these facts, the height requirement cannot be viewed as having a disparate effect on women. In the absence of a discriminatory effect, Teal simply does not apply.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [37940:38105] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Plaintiff simply failed to make it over the initial hurdle of demonstrating that the challenged barrier had a discriminatory effect on women.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [36814:36955] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected groupsatisfied
Excluded from merits counts
applied / superseded

basis: law; claim: (a)(2); party: plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count: second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory: impact is measured by the rule in its general operation (national height statistics; one "police officer" job); opinion: panel (Bownes); subject: party=plaintiff applicant for police officer, 5 feet tall, first on the women-only list; count=second rejection, from the women-only list; the only count on appeal; theory=impact is measured by the rule in its general operation (national height statistics; one "police officer" job); opinion=panel (Bownes)

Panel measured impact by the rule's general operation (national height data, Dothard) rather than by the particular all-female round; treated "we hired only women" as a forbidden bottom-line defense. The women-only round (third fact) is the fact the employer relied on and the en banc court found dispositive.
general-population-statistics/minimum-height-requirement
Plaintiff produced undisputed evidence that eighty percent of the male population is at least five feet six inches tall, while less than twenty percent of the female population reaches this height.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [3943:4140] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Plaintiff’s name correctly appeared first on this list. Plaintiff, however, was again rejected because she failed to meet the height requirement.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [3179:3324] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [9397:9590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [12052:12344] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

We hold that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by making an undisputed showing that New Bedford’s use of its height requirement excluded far more women than men from competing for positions as police officers.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [13875:14130] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected groupnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
comparator / merits

claim: (a)(2); theory: ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick; subject: theory=ADEA (29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2)) disparate-impact claim by a job applicant; 2000e-2(a)(2) is only the yardstick

No Title VII claim. The court reads 2000e-2(a)(2) (which covers "applicants for employment") as the textual home of Griggs impact liability and uses the ADEA's omission of applicants, plus the RFOA clause and Hazen Paper, to refuse to carry Title VII impact theory over to an age claim by an applicant. The held line decides the ADEA claim, not this statute. The fact lines are ADEA facts (age, not a 2000e-2 trait); their polarity is stated relative to the ANALOGOUS impact showing (a neutral salary cap falling more harshly on older applicants), not relative to any Title VII element.
cited-by-analogy/adea-disparate-impact-contrasted-with-title-vii
The EEOC claims that due to the statistically significant relationship between age and work experience, by setting a low maximum salary limit, Parker excluded a disproportionate percentage of applicants over the age of forty from consideration for the teaching position.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4451:4721] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Johnson was sixty-three years old and claimed to have thirty years of experience.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1671:1752] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

One of the reasons given for the decision was that Johnson qualified for a salary higher than Parker could afford.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [1833:1947] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The “mirror” provision in the ADEA omits from its coverage, “applicants for employment.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [10810:10898] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

As the district court held, this statistical correlation alone is insufficient to sustain a finding of ADEA liability.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [12504:12622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009Particular employment practice causing a disparate impact on a protected groupsatisfied
Excluded from merits counts
applied / hypothetical

basis: conceded; claim: (a)(1),(k),(l),(h),(j); party: non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count: (k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory: strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative); subject: party=non-party minority candidates who would have held a disparate-impact claim against the City had the results been certified; defendant City of New Haven and the officials who opposed certification (respondents); count=(k) disparate-impact claim that would have followed certification; never brought; theory=strong-basis-in-evidence inquiry inside defense x-disparate-impact-compliance: would the City have been liable on impact-suit (step 1 = impact, step 2 = impact.business-necessity, step 3 = impact.alternative)

statistical-disparity/exam-pass-rate-below-four-fifths
On the captain exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 64 percent but was 37.5 percent for both black and Hispanic candidates.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49215:49346] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

On the lieutenant exam, the pass rate for white candidates was 58.1 percent; for black candidates, 31.6 percent; and for Hispanic candidates, 20 percent.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49347:49500] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The racial adverse impact here was significant, and petitioners do not dispute that the City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact liability.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49057:49214] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

hypothetical

Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.

/f3d/41/1073-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · 1994

Disparate impact is the result of more subtle practices, which on their face are neutral in their treatment of different groups but which in fact fall more harshly on one group than another.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_41.jsonl#/f3d/41/1073-01; Unicode character offsets [4123:4313] (end exclusive); SHA-256 c5f6327a944b972a04bf4a0728adebcc37a8b8f5a4bf7fa158c692521aa871fd.

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

hypothetical

The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.

/us/557/0557-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2009

The pass rates of minorities, which were approximately one-half the pass rates for white candidates, fall well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of Title VII.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_557.jsonl#/us/557/0557-01; Unicode character offsets [49501:49715] (end exclusive); SHA-256 260918fc09a3789f6fc5f393d32a8891037013cb975d044af335bcd3f84ab557.

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

hypothetical

The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.

/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982

The Court’s focus must be on the first step in the employment process that produces an adverse impact on a group protected by Title VII, not the end result of the employment process as a whole.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [9397:9590] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

hypothetical

In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.

/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982

In light of Teal, we hold that when, as here, an employer uniformly applies a rule to male and female applicants and applies it in one round of hiring decisions to a pool of only female applicants; the rule must be job-related if in its regular application it has a disparate effect on women.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [12052:12344] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

hypothetical

We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.

/f2d/706/0001-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1982

We remain unpersuaded that a hiring barrier can have a disparate impact on a protected group when competition for the job is only among members of that protected group.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_706.jsonl#/f2d/706/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [39478:39646] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a04ddf6b77ebbe1be45da604edab3afaa55f3443924aa30b820fa57e210b4ed1.

Prima facie disparate impact under Griggs and § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i): plaintiff identifies a specific employment practice that causes a significant disproportionate adverse impact on a protected group. RICCI_SCOPE: Ricci quotes in this block describe a hypothetical disparate-impact claim considered within the defense to intentional discrimination; they do not record adjudication of an actual subsection (k) claim against this employer.

not-required

Proof of subjective intent to discriminate (Griggs v. Duke Power Co.; EEOC v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 1994))

No source quotation recorded.