OR · 15usc1:restraint.per-se
Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
Exact element source
in restraint of trade or commerceSource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [135:168] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ancillary-restraint/cooperative-buying-through-common-agent | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — rule-announced/merits | |
| group-boycott/horizontal-buyers-boycotting-non-competitor-supplier | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f3d/496/0403-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 — rule-announced/merits | |
| horizontal-customer-allocation/no-solicitation-of-existing-accounts | Naked horizontal agreement between competitors not to solicit each other's existing customers (Cooperative Theatres) | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 — satisfied |
| horizontal-price-fixing/competing-intermediaries-fixing-reimbursement-rates | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 — rule-announced/merits | |
| no-per-se/single-price-set-by-lawful-integrated-joint-venture | Unified pricing by an economically integrated joint venture is not per se unlawful (Texaco v. Dagher) | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 0 | No annotation uses in this snapshot |
| per-se-rejected/closed-panel-ppo-effect-not-obvious | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /f-supp/864/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 — rule-announced/alternative | |
| per-se-rejected/cooperation-essential-to-product | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 — rule-announced/merits | |
| per-se-rejected/single-price-set-by-lawful-integrated-joint-venture | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 — not | |
| per-se-rejected/vertical-minimum-resale-price-maintenance | 0 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1 | 0 | No counted merits examples Excluded context examples: /us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 — rule-announced/merits | |
| per-se/vertical-agreements-to-exclude-class-of-resellers | 1 Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0 | 1 | /f2d/361/0874-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 — satisfied | |
| quick-look-rejected/single-price-set-by-lawful-integrated-joint-venture | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 — not |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Plan Sponsors, acting through Caremark as their common agent; count: Claim I (common-agent claim); subject: party=Plan Sponsors, acting through Caremark as their common agent; count=Claim I (common-agent claim) Buyer-side price setting by competing payors through a shared intermediary is a real horizontal restraint, but it is bundled with claims processing, formularies, rebates and network building, and its immediate effect is lower consumer prices; the per se label in the complaint does not bind the court. Mode of analysis only: per se treatment is refused and the rule of reason selected for Claim I; whether the restraint is unreasonable is expressly left open, so this is not a not-satisfied finding. Polarity here is relative to "per se treatment applies". The court's general naked-vs-ancillary rule sentence (@16295) is filed under the Claim II block. | ancillary-restraint/cooperative-buying-through-common-agent | Over 1,200 of such Plan Sponsors have hired Care-mark to help control the cost of prescription drugs for their employees or members (“Plan Subscribers”) (SAC ¶¶15, 29).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [3665:3833] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.In return for inclusion in Caremark’s network and access to the large volume of business that such inclusion brings, North Jackson must agree to dispense drugs to Plan Subscribers at a discount from prices charged to its cash-paying customers (SAC ¶ 30).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [4612:4866] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.By negotiating prescription drug reimbursement rates on behalf of the 1,200 Plan Sponsors it represents, Caremark acts on behalf of what is essentially a cooperative purchasing group.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [13830:14013] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.Caremark specializes in various functions of benefit plan administration and is likely able to achieve economies of scale in the performance of those functions that would otherwise be unavailable to Plan Sponsors.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [22123:22336] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.And the creation of retail pharmacy networks, which necessarily involves the setting of reimbursement rates, undoubtedly contributes to the success of that larger endeavor.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [22337:22509] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.But where in contrast buyers join together in a productive venture, cooperative buying is rarely viewed as a per se unlawful restraint under Section 1 so long as it contributes to the productive enterprise.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [18624:18830] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.And because the alleged anticompetitive agreement between Plan Sponsors is ancillary to that arrangement, it will be assessed under the more probing analysis offered by the rule of reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [24868:25056] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9. |
| /f-supp-2d/385/0740-01 — United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · 2005 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Caremark and rival PBMs; count: Claim II; subject: party=Caremark and rival PBMs; count=Claim II Only the mode of analysis is conceded, and only conditionally ("if proved"); existence of the PBM-PBM agreement is untested, so nothing is satisfied. The rule line is the court's general statement that naked restraints get per se treatment; its second sentence is the ancillary-restraint rule the court applies to Claim I. | horizontal-price-fixing/competing-intermediaries-fixing-reimbursement-rates | Claim II charges a conspiracy between Caremark and PBMs with which it competes to fix those same prices.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [6373:6477] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.Naked restraints are unlikely to have any redeeming value and so are usually accorded per se treatment. But ancillary restraints that “may contribute to the success of a cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and output” (id. at 189) demand the more thorough analysis provided by the rule of reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [16295:16610] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9.Caremark implicitly concedes that the conspiracy alleged in Claim II — ’that between Caremark and other PBMs to fix drug prices — would if proved constitute a naked horizontal price-fixing agreement subject to per se treatment.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_2d_385.jsonl#/f-supp-2d/385/0740-01; Unicode character offsets [8548:8775] (end exclusive); SHA-256 061c34d0b500376f04d011b5ab2e2f1ac60dba2bb321f15089be5be4b7c5e5d9. |
| /f-supp/864/1175-01 — United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida · 1994 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / alternative count: Count I; subject: count=Count I Dictum (the court: "these observations are not essential to disposition"): the court says it would be unwilling to apply a per se approach and that the plaintiff would therefore have to define the market and prove market power. It decides only the would-be mode of analysis, not whether the closed panel is unreasonable. `scope alternative` is the nearest v1 scope for dictum. | per-se-rejected/closed-panel-ppo-effect-not-obvious | Some PPOs, including Healthc/ioice, use a limited or closed panel of providers. Healthc/mice determines the size of its provider panel under a need analysis system.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [2037:2201] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Instead, statistics indicate purchasers are buying more managed care plans.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [34166:34241] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Plaintiff must, therefore, define the market and establish market power.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [34369:34441] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3.Since the competitive effect is not immediately obvious, the Court would be unwilling to apply a per se approach in this case.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f_supp_864.jsonl#/f-supp/864/1175-01; Unicode character offsets [34242:34368] (end exclusive); SHA-256 06c1960d1dc678061d6eacfba6f9a02c11fb0fa2859d08dc7ca865e6700f0fb3. |
| /f2d/361/0874-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · 1966 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; party: Ford and its collaborating dealers (the vertical agreements found above); subject: party=Ford and its collaborating dealers (the vertical agreements found above) Extends United States v. General Motors (1966) boycott rule to a purely vertical series of agreements; protecting the franchised distribution system is no justification. Plaintiff offered no rule-of-reason evidence, so per se classification was outcome-determinative. | per-se/vertical-agreements-to-exclude-class-of-resellers | It has been brought to our attention that large quantities of units have been resold to used car dealers in towns other than that of the purchasing dealer. In the future, this situation cannot be tolerated.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_361.jsonl#/f2d/361/0874-01; Unicode character offsets [4112:4318] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8e08a932e895de43a7032f3e31321a87a2b612988a02f8668089d2496e25d3.The agreements here, however, go beyond the attempt to keep dealers geographically in their place and have as their objective the total elimination of one class of Ford competitor.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_361.jsonl#/f2d/361/0874-01; Unicode character offsets [21624:21804] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8e08a932e895de43a7032f3e31321a87a2b612988a02f8668089d2496e25d3.To permit a used car dealer to sell these nearly new Fords, defendant contends, would amount practically to the operation of an unfranchised Ford dealership in competition with franchised dealers and, thus, disrupt its established system of distribution.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_361.jsonl#/f2d/361/0874-01; Unicode character offsets [22169:22423] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8e08a932e895de43a7032f3e31321a87a2b612988a02f8668089d2496e25d3.we find no controlling significance in the fact that such a boycott takes its shape and strength from a series of vertical agreements rather than from a single vertical-horizontal agreement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_361.jsonl#/f2d/361/0874-01; Unicode character offsets [23978:24168] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8e08a932e895de43a7032f3e31321a87a2b612988a02f8668089d2496e25d3.We hold the agreements between defendant and its collaborating dealers to be per se violations of the Sherman Act.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_361.jsonl#/f2d/361/0874-01; Unicode character offsets [24552:24666] (end exclusive); SHA-256 3e8e08a932e895de43a7032f3e31321a87a2b612988a02f8668089d2496e25d3. |
| /f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | satisfied Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law A limited allocation (existing accounts only, unsolicited switches arguably still allowed, new customers open) is still naked customer allocation; novelty of the "no-solicitation" label and absence of proven market effect do not take it out of the per se rule when no procompetitive justification is offered. | horizontal-customer-allocation/no-solicitation-of-existing-accounts | This case involves an alleged agreement not to compete between two movie theater booking agents, Co-Operative Theatres of Ohio, Inc. (Co-Op), and Tri-State Theatre Services, Inc. (Tri-State).Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [984:1175] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.each of the two competing corporations agreed to refrain from competing for customers who were currently being serviced by the other rival corporationSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [250:400] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Under the terms of the alleged agreement, the companies remained free to compete for new customers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [402:501] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.As noted by the district court, the defendants failed to articulate a single pro-competitive justification for the horizontal restrictions imposed by the alleged agreement.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19623:19795] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.There is a general presumption in favor of applying the rule of reason standard except in those cases where the alleged agreement or activity is “manifestly anticompetitive.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [9969:10143] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19471:19622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Therefore, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that the agreement between the defendants not to call on each other’s customers was an unreasonable restraint of trade as a matter of law.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [21585:21786] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04. |
| /f3d/496/0403-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · 2007 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / meritsCourt corrects the legal test (victim need not compete with a conspirator; horizontality is among the boycotters) but does not decide whether per se treatment applies; the three Northwest Wholesale factors go to the district court. | group-boycott/horizontal-buyers-boycotting-non-competitor-supplier | Under the definition of “horizontal” found in NYNEX and Business Electronics Corp., the casinos’ alleged agreement to not do business with TWA is clearly a horizontal agreement, as the casinos are direct competitors of one another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [19744:19975] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.We agree with the district court that TWA and the casinos are not in competition with each other. TWA operates a website. The casinos own and operate casinos, hotels, and other leisure-related activities.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [31853:32057] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.Thus, although direct competition with the victim will frequently exist in cases of per se unlawful boycotts, nothing in Northwest Wholesale Stationers indicates that it is an absolute prerequisite to a finding of per se illegality if the agreement in question is marked by any of the other traits identified in that case.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [23605:23927] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.Instead, to determine the applicability of the per se rule in this case, the district court should have analyzed the following factors: (1) whether the casinos hold a dominant position in the relevant market; (2) whether the casinos control access to an element necessary to enable TWA to compete; and (8) whether there exist plausible arguments concerning pro-competitive effects.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [26138:26519] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201.Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that the per se rule only applies in situations where one of the conspirators is a direct competitor of the victim.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_496.jsonl#/f3d/496/0403-01; Unicode character offsets [25934:26137] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2e7bf47d83c34c0b4e79ec63d6ed3cf9a5e59ba0f90c9fd20bec55b9f6416201. |
| /us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law Parents no longer compete in the relevant market; the venture's pricing of its own products is "price fixing in a literal sense" only. Lawfulness of the venture itself is presumed, not decided. Kept as a merits not-satisfied (not rule-announced): respondents disclaimed any rule-of-reason claim, so closing the per se route defeats the claim itself ("respondents' antitrust claim cannot prevail"). | per-se-rejected/single-price-set-by-lawful-integrated-joint-venture | In 1998, Texaco and Shell Oil formed- a joint venture, Equilon, to consolidate their operations in the western United States, thereby ending competition between the two companies in the domestic refining and marketing of gasoline.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [1136:1366] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Under the joint venture agreement, Texaco and Shell Oil agreed to pool their resources and share the risks of and profits from Equilon’s activities.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [1367:1515] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Respondents, a class of Texaco and Shell Oil service station owners, allege that petitioners engaged in unlawful price fixing when Equilon set a single price for both Texaco and Shell Oil brand gasoline.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [279:482] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.The formation of Equilon was approved by consent decree, subject to certain divestments and other modifications, by the Federal Trade CommissionSource: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [1714:1858] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Price-fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [4525:4701] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [6453:6688] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.These cases do not present such an agreement, however, because Texaco and Shell Oil did not compete with one another in the relevant market — namely, the sale of gasoline to service stations in the western United States — but instead participated in that market jointly through their investments in Equilon.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [4739:5046] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Because the pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture do not fall within the narrow category of activity that is per se unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act, respondents’ antitrust claim cannot prevail.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [8857:9066] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3. |
| /us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law; theory: quick look (abbreviated rule of reason); subject: theory=quick look (abbreviated rule of reason) Respondents' fallback route, rejected "for the same reasons"; like the per se block, a merits loss because no other mode was pursued. | quick-look-rejected/single-price-set-by-lawful-integrated-joint-venture | we have applied the quick look doctrine to business activities that are so plainly anticompetitive that courts need undertake only a cursory examination before imposing antitrust liabilitySource: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [10393:10581] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.But for the same reasons that per se liability is unwarranted here, we conclude that petitioners cannot be held liable under the quick look doctrine.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [10646:10795] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3. |
| /us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / merits party: Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (manufacturer of Brighton goods; defendant, petitioner); PSKS, Inc., d/b/a Kay's Kloset (terminated discounting retailer; plaintiff, respondent); theory: vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers; subject: party=Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (manufacturer of Brighton goods; defendant, petitioner); PSKS, Inc., d/b/a Kay's Kloset (terminated discounting retailer; plaintiff, respondent); theory=vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements between manufacturer and retailers Overrules Dr. Miles (1911): the judgment below rested solely on per se illegality, so it is reversed without any finding on whether this policy was unreasonable. Mode of analysis only — the case continues under the rule of reason on remand — hence not-reached / rule-announced rather than not-satisfied. Fact polarity is relative to "per se treatment applies" as the law stood under Dr. Miles; the District Court's exclusion of the expert (@5344) is procedural context, hence [neutral]. | per-se-rejected/vertical-minimum-resale-price-maintenance | Following the policy, Leegin refused to sell to retailers that discounted Brighton goods below suggested prices.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [2638:2750] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.In December 2002, Leegin discovered Kay’s Kloset had been marking down Brighton’s entire line by 20 percent.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [4485:4593] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Its request refused, Leegin stopped selling to the store.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [4808:4865] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue,Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [10049:10185] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are formed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [25368:25540] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.As the rule would proscribe a significant amount of procompetitive conduct, these agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [26022:26157] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.is now overruled. Vertical price restraints are to be judged according to the rule of reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [52662:52755] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37. |
| /us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 | Per se illegality for naked restraints manifestly anticompetitive and lacking redeeming virtue | not_reached Excluded from merits counts rule-announced / meritsCourt directs Rule of Reason on remand (stated in the first paragraph as well) without analysing the exclusive license itself; a mode-of-analysis direction, arguably dictum, not a finding about the restraint. | per-se-rejected/cooperation-essential-to-product | When “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [28918:29134] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.What role it properly plays in applying the Rule of Reason to the allegations in this case is a matter to be considered on remand.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [30540:30670] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
Price-fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.
/us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006
Price-fixing agreements between two or more competitors, otherwise known as horizontal price-fixing agreements, fall into the category of arrangements that are per se unlawful.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [4525:4701] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price.
/us/547/0001-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2006
As a single entity, a joint venture, like any other firm, must have the discretion to determine the prices of the products that it sells, including the discretion to sell a product under two different brands at a single, unified price.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_547.jsonl#/us/547/0001-01; Unicode character offsets [6453:6688] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5084a5ea36bd7dae778624421ca275b1bb30e1f70daa750450037b732cb132a3.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue,
/us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue,Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [10049:10185] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are formed.
/us/551/0877-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are formed.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_551.jsonl#/us/551/0877-01; Unicode character offsets [25368:25540] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6dc0b5ffec12ec474152aa4935b052042835b8bd19a739a908c122c1a115df37.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
When “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.
/us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010
When “restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all,” per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [28918:29134] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
To be per se illegal, a defendant's conduct has to be so obviously anticompetitive that it has no plausibly procompetitive features-a high hurdle for plaintiffs claiming restraint of trade.
To be per se illegal, a defendant's conduct has to be so obviously anticompetitive that it has no plausibly procompetitive features-a high hurdle for plaintiffs claiming restraint of trade.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_922.jsonl#/f3d/922/0713-01; Unicode character offsets [1312:1501] (end exclusive); SHA-256 52b18aaeeab3bbac5a98f6f0309c8611637b1f238b1c1a5bcb726b6c3994b6b0.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.
/f2d/845/1367-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 1988
This is plainly a form of customer allocation and, hence, is the type of “naked restraint” which triggers application of the per se rule of illegality.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_845.jsonl#/f2d/845/1367-01; Unicode character offsets [19471:19622] (end exclusive); SHA-256 6de135bb995241e5b5920b922fd1d37a36df556878ae18ce5aacbff66b08be04.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
As to the former, the Defendants acknowledged that customer allocation agreements are generally analyzed under the per se rule, but nonetheless they argued that "in the atypical context of the heir location business the [agreement] is far from an ordinary customer allocation, and instead bears more in common with joint ventures analyzed under the rule of reason[.
As to the former, the Defendants acknowledged that customer allocation agreements are generally analyzed under the per se rule, but nonetheless they argued that "in the atypical context of the heir location business the [agreement] is far from an ordinary customer allocation, and instead bears more in common with joint ventures analyzed under the rule of reason[.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_907.jsonl#/f3d/907/1264-01; Unicode character offsets [4890:5255] (end exclusive); SHA-256 90b1eba2924d8097713c34ef541c9dd5a86baf811954761d9ca9f6e93944276e.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
interpretation
Then, the court inquired whether the challenged provision brought about facially, or per se , unlawful restraints on trade, in which case they are preempted, or restraints that are subject to rule of reason scrutiny, in which case they are not.
Then, the court inquired whether the challenged provision brought about facially, or per se , unlawful restraints on trade, in which case they are preempted, or restraints that are subject to rule of reason scrutiny, in which case they are not.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_916.jsonl#/f3d/916/0160-01; Unicode character offsets [11677:11921] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cd0e367f5845bbda844f06ccfcc8c7200ee4c47266959fc0c10dd9bf088d2fd2.Reserved for horizontal price fixing (Socony-Vacuum), bid rigging, horizontal market/customer allocation (Palmer v. BRG; Cooperative Theatres), certain horizontal group boycotts denying access to an essential facility/market (Northwest Wholesale Stationers; Tunica Web), and tying where the seller has appreciable economic power in the tying product market (Jefferson Parish). Vertical minimum and maximum resale price maintenance are no longer per se unlawful (Leegin, 551 U.S. 877 (2007); State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997)).
not-required
Proof of relevant market definition, market power, or actual anticompetitive effects once a restraint is properly classified as per se unlawful (Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Cooperative Theatres)
No source quotation recorded.