Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairment

AND · 42usc1981:state-remedial-route

Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.

Exact element source

The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1981; Unicode character offsets [823:967] (end exclusive); SHA-256 5e5aa212ab2f30dd84c80b0b228057e2c583768ee608c391e0ac73d92e609577.

All variants

Recorded DB variant labels, including zero-count variants
VariantDescriptionMerits instance blocksDistinct casesExample cases (up to 3 per group)
municipal-liability/sole-discriminator-exonerated1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1/f3d/935/0633-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019 — not
state-remedy/section1983-pleaded1
Satisfied 1; not satisfied 0; excluded context 0
1/f3d/935/0510-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019 — satisfied
Unspecified variantNo variant assigned in the database.0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 1
0No counted merits examples

Excluded context examples: /f3d/927/0081-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019 — applied/merits

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopeVariantExact source quotations
/f3d/927/0081-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · 2019Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairmentnot_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

State officials and the City are defendants, but the captured §1981 holding addresses only comparator pleading. Availability of a direct remedy versus §1983 is not decided here; Jett and the law file remain applicable.
Unspecified variantNo source quotation recorded for this block.
/f3d/935/0510-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairmentsatisfied
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: Individual judges and court administrator; subject: party=Individual judges and court administrator

Satisfied means Boxill pleaded the proper remedial vehicle, not that any official committed a §1981 violation.
state-remedy/section1983-pleaded
Boxill worked at FCMC as its Specialty Dockets Coordinator. Four of the Defendants below-Michael Brandt, Carrie Glaeden, James Green, and James O'Grady-were state court judges at FCMC. The remaining Defendant, Emily Shaw, was FCMC's Court Administrator.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [409:662] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: supports; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

That is what Boxill did here-her complaint makes a claim "pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate ... her correlative rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13655:13808] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

/f3d/935/0633-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019Judicial section 1983 remedial route for state-law impairmentnot
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: City of Pine Bluff; theory: Liability premised on Mayor Hollingsworth’s actions; subject: party=City of Pine Bluff; theory=Liability premised on Mayor Hollingsworth’s actions

Record-specific rejection of liability through the sole alleged discriminator. It does not establish a universal rule insulating municipalities whenever any individual defendant wins.
municipal-liability/sole-discriminator-exonerated
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Hollingsworth but against the City on Ridgell's claims of race discrimination and awarded damages of $24,080.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [3573:3722] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The only municipal official or employee whom Ridgell cited to the jury as a wrongdoer was Hollingsworth.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [9312:9416] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [4620:5033] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Insofar as the case rests entirely on alleged wrongdoing by Hollingsworth, the City is entitled to judgment. The jury's finding that Hollingsworth did not racially discriminate against Ridgell means that the City cannot be held liable based on discrimination by Hollingsworth.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [9417:9693] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").

/f3d/935/0510-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · 2019

The district court dismissed these claims because " § 1981 does not provide a cause of action against state actors in their individual capacities." While that is true, plaintiffs may still bring § 1983 claims premised on violations of § 1981. See, e.g., McCormick v. Miami Univ. , 693 F.3d 654, 661-62 (6th Cir. 2012) ("[T]he more specific and express cause of action contained in § 1983 provide[s] a mechanism to address a violation of § 1981.").
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0510-01; Unicode character offsets [13207:13654] (end exclusive); SHA-256 a74c128916e884a9f9a943b6da6821746f2cb0222551b7ea22ce8541aac7705b.

Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.

interpretation

A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).

/f3d/935/0633-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · 2019

A municipality can act only through its employees, so a plaintiff seeking damages against a municipality under § 1983, for race discrimination that violated § 1981, must show that a municipal official or employee racially discriminated against him. See Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 735-36, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989) ; Russell v. Hennepin County , 420 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2005).
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/f3d_935.jsonl#/f3d/935/0633-01; Unicode character offsets [4620:5033] (end exclusive); SHA-256 fbf6dcd13eb0bdda26113728d6940a1477a3c2c1e8440f032f7c91b9d8e994be.

Boxill recognizes §1983 as the vehicle even though direct §1981 claims against state actors fail. Ridgell’s city verdict failed because the only alleged discriminatory official was exonerated on that record; do not turn that outcome into immunity whenever any individual wins for any reason.