Supreme Court of the United States · 2007-05-21
Case and law context
Role: applied; posture: civil putative class action (telephone/internet subscribers v. incumbent local carriers); Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal reversed by CA2; certiorari on the standard for pleading a § 1 conspiracy through parallel conduct; result: claimant-lost; claim:
Instances and excluded annotation blocks
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; theory: conspiracy among the ILECs to thwart competitive entry by CLECs; subject: theory=conspiracy among the ILECs to thwart competitive entry by CLECs Each incumbent had its own unilateral incentive to resist entrants it was forced to subsidize, so parallel resistance does not suggest a prior agreement. | parallel-conduct/parallel-resistance-to-new-entrants | Plaintiffs say, first, that the ILECs “engaged in parallel conduct” in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [3545:3686] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Their actions allegedly included making unfair agreements with the CLECs for access to ILEC networks, providing inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to sabotage the CLECs’ relations with their own customers.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [3714:3965] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.To begin with, the complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [25437:25629] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [13170:13306] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [14304:14548] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.we agree with the District Court that nothing in the complaint intimates that the resistance to the upstarts was anything more than the natural, unilateral reaction of each ILEC intent on keeping its regional dominance.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [26876:27095] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a. |
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Concerted action ("contract, combination ... or conspiracy") between separate economic decisionmakers | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: pleaded; theory: agreement among the ILECs not to compete in one another's territories; subject: theory=agreement among the ILECs not to compete in one another's territories Obvious alternative explanation (legacy regulated monopolists staying on their own turf) defeats the inference; the Court notes sparse competition among territorial incumbents could suggest agreement in a traditionally unregulated, low-entry-barrier industry. | parallel-conduct/parallel-non-entry-into-each-others-territories | Second, the complaint charges agreements by the ILECs to refrain from competing against one another.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [4457:4557] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.The complaint quoted a reported statement of Qwest’s CEO, Richard Notebaert, to suggest that the ILECs declined to compete against each other despite recognizing that it “ ‘might be a good way to turn a quick dollar.’”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [46961:47179] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [14125:14303] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the former Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their neighbors tp do the same thing.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [30554:30734] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [34127:34265] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a. |
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Private antitrust injury and fact of damage (Clayton Act §§ 4, 16; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Unreasonable restraint of trade (Standard Oil Co. v. United States) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / meritsMarket allocation among competitors would be a classic per se restraint if an agreement were adequately alleged; nobody disputed the substantive law. | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
| /us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007 | Antitrust standing / efficient enforcer test (Associated General Contractors; Illinois Brick) | not_reached Excluded from merits counts applied / merits | Unspecified variant | No source quotation recorded for this block. |
Court interpretations recorded from this case
interpretation
we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.
/us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [13170:13306] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita).
interpretation
Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.
/us/550/0544-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2007
Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_550.jsonl#/us/550/0544-01; Unicode character offsets [14304:14548] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9a1e8901cd5646f436f7e803d69e6d2c3947fe5f100e2c593b2d6da8bddba88a.Encompasses two distinct sub-inquiries: (1) capacity/plurality of actors (Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); American Needle), and (2) existence/proof of an actual agreement rather than unilateral conduct (United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)) or mere conscious parallelism (Twombly; Matsushita).