/us/503/0115-01

Role: applied; posture: civil; widow's damages suit against city; Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal affirmed by CA5 on "no abuse of governmental power" theory; certiorari; affirmed on the different ground that no constitutional violation was alleged; result: claimant-lost; claim:

interpretation

In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

In Monell, the Court held that Congress intended municipalities and other local government entities to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.

Under Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (491 U.S. 58 (1989)), neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under § 1983 when sued for damages, though state officials sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief (or in their personal capacities for damages under Hafer) are "persons".

interpretation

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred (Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); sub-elements branch by the underlying constitutional/statutory provision.

interpretation

Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

Neither the text nor the history of the Due Process Clause supports petitioner’s claim that the governmental employer’s duty to provide its employees with a safe working environment is a substantive component of the Due Process Clause.

Protects fundamental rights and guards against executive abuse of power that "shocks the conscience" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis), but does not constitutionalize ordinary state tort law or impose an affirmative workplace-safety duty absent custody (DeShaney; Collins).

interpretation

we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

we have previously rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those traditionally imposed by state tort law

Protects fundamental rights and guards against executive abuse of power that "shocks the conscience" (County of Sacramento v. Lewis), but does not constitutionalize ordinary state tort law or impose an affirmative workplace-safety duty absent custody (DeShaney; Collins).

interpretation

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Satisfied by (1) an express municipal policy, (2) a widespread practice/custom so permanent and well settled as to have the force of law, (3) an act of an official with final policymaking authority (Pembaur; Praprotnik), or (4) deliberate indifference in failure to train/supervise (`policy.failure-to-train`).

interpretation

Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

Instead, we concluded that if a city employee violates another’s constitutional rights, the city may be liable if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional violation.

Under City of Canton v. Harris (489 U.S. 378 (1989)) and Connick v. Thompson (563 U.S. 51 (2011)), failure to train is actionable only where it amounts to "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact" and a municipal employee actually committed an underlying constitutional violation.

interpretation

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

More importantly, the statute does not draw any distinction between abusive and nonabusive federal violations.

Non-element rejected by the Supreme Court in Collins: § 1983 does not require proof of an "abuse of governmental power" separate and apart from proof of a constitutional violation.

interpretation

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

/us/503/0115-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 1992

The city is not vicariously liable under §1983 for the constitutional torts of its agents: It is only liable when it can be fairly said that the city itself is the wrongdoer.

Municipal responsibility (Monell policy/custom, including Canton deliberate indifference) and the underlying constitutional deprivation are separate inquiries; satisfying policy cannot supply the constitutional violation.