Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (protected liberty/property interest + inadequate process)

OR · 42usc1983:deprivation.procedural-due-process

Two-step inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest (see `.due-process-property` and `.due-process-liberty`), and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient (Mathews v. Eldridge).

Exact element source

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
Source: docroot/ir/usc/title42.jsonl#title42_sec1983; Unicode character offsets [306:402] (end exclusive); SHA-256 88fe01322b9d94860a669ec452f558146e2745845070bc43583671ce12acb2bb.

Routes and case patterns

Curated routes and observed case patterns
RouteDefinitionMerits instance blocksDistinct merits casesExamples (up to 3 cases per count group)
Unclassified route
provisional; 2 observed cases
no definition yet0
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 0; excluded context 2
0

Used only in non-merits blocks (2).

Excluded context examples:

Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. — 567 F. Supp. 1159 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of Delaware · 1983 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · not counted
Pattern: not recorded

Bird v. Hawaii — 935 F.3d 738 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not reached · basis not recorded (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md)) · applied/merits · not counted
Pattern: not recorded

property-interest
provisional; provisional (1 case)
Whether the plaintiff had a protected property interest to which process attaches.1
Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0
1

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed) · applied/merits · counted
Pattern: benefit-entitlement-not-yet-established

How courts decided this element

Annotation blocks, including explicitly excluded context
CaseElementHolding and scopePatternExact source quotations
Thompson v. Community Action of Greater Wilmington, Inc. — 567 F. Supp. 1159 (1983) · United States District Court for the District of Delaware · 1983 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA2, neov2/qa/cases-QA2.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (protected liberty/property interest + inadequate process)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
Bird v. Hawaii — 935 F.3d 738 (2019) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 2019 — not reached (42usc1983: author: Flash1 · QA: FIX (Fable, neov2/cases/TRIAGE-Flash.md))Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (protected liberty/property interest + inadequate process)not_reached
Excluded from merits counts
applied / merits

party: Courtney Bird; count: procedural due process challenge to listing on the Central Child Abuse Registry without notice or hearing; subject: party=Courtney Bird; count=procedural due process challenge to listing on the Central Child Abuse Registry without notice or hearing

Merits of the due process claim not reached by the per curiam opinion because the action was time-barred (Judge Bybee's concurrence would find a plain due process violation; not controlling).
Unspecified routeNo source quotation recorded for this block.
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 — not · law (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)Deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process (protected liberty/property interest + inadequate process)not
Counted merits instance
applied / merits

basis: law; party: private workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers (petitioners); state officials administering the Act and the director of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (own certiorari petitions denied); theory: property interest in payment of medical bills before reasonableness and necessity are determined; opinion: majority (Rehnquist); subject: party=private workers' compensation insurers and self-insured employers (petitioners); state officials administering the Act and the director of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (own certiorari petitions denied); theory=property interest in payment of medical bills before reasonableness and necessity are determined; opinion=majority (Rehnquist)

State law conditions the entitlement on reasonableness/necessity, so withholding pending review deprives of nothing; property interest in the claim itself (Logan) expressly not addressed.
benefit-entitlement-not-yet-established
While they indeed have established their initial eligibility for medical treatment, they have yet to make good on their claim that the particular medical treatment they received was reasonable and necessary.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [30615:30822] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Evidence kind: fact; polarity: cuts-against; absent flag: 1; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in “property” or “liberty.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [27361:27504] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Thus, for an employee’s property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [30072:30393] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Evidence kind: rule; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Consequently, they do not have a property interest — under the logic of their own argument — in having their providers paid for treatment that has yet to be found reasonable and necessary.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [30823:31011] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Evidence kind: held; polarity: not recorded; absent flag: 0; quoted-rule flag: 0 (1 = tagged; 0 = not tagged)

Court interpretations

interpretation

The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in “property” or “liberty.”

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in “property” or “liberty.”
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [27361:27504] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Two-step inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest (see `.due-process-property` and `.due-process-liberty`), and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient (Mathews v. Eldridge).

interpretation

Thus, for an employee’s property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan — 526 U.S. 40 (1999) · Supreme Court of the United States · 1999 (42usc1983: author: Fable · historical QA: PASS (QA1, neov2/qa/cases-v1-QA1.md) · changed after review; current content not independently reviewed)

Thus, for an employee’s property interest in the payment of medical benefits to attach under state law, the employee must clear two hurdles: First, he must prove that an employer is liable for a work-related injury, and second, he must establish that the particular medical treatment at issue is reasonable and necessary.
Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_526.jsonl#/us/526/0040-01; Unicode character offsets [30072:30393] (end exclusive); SHA-256 2f09bb34600ef67ab16a649c9f0dbc25827219d340838e2c2ae98add5e866c97.

Two-step inquiry: (1) whether plaintiff was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest (see `.due-process-property` and `.due-process-liberty`), and (2) whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient (Mathews v. Eldridge).