DEFENSE · 15usc1:x-single-entity
Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).
Exact element source
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracySource:
docroot/ir/usc/title15.jsonl#title15_sec1; Unicode character offsets [57:133] (end exclusive); SHA-256 9c248965c2c712de1e3f3d52a17be4c90dfdcac5d3f9fea0b7220b164e2c2973.All variants
| Variant | Description | Merits instance blocks | Distinct cases | Example cases (up to 3 per group) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| single-entity/sports-league-joint-venture | Sports league teams licensing intellectual property through a jointly owned entity are separate decisionmakers, not a single entity (American Needle) | 1 Satisfied 0; not satisfied 1; excluded context 0 | 1 | /us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 — not |
How courts decided this element
| Case | Element | Holding and scope | Variant | Exact source quotations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| /us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010 | Copperweld / American Needle single-entity incapacity to conspire | not Counted merits instance applied / merits basis: law Mirror image of the agreement element (Copperweld immunity pleaded as a defense); recorded separately because that is how it was litigated. | single-entity/sports-league-joint-venture | In their answer to the complaint, the defendants averred that the teams, the NFL, and NFLP were incapable of conspiring within the meaning of § 1 “because they are a single economic enterprise, at least with respect to the conduct challenged.”Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [2454:2697] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [23082:23195] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.But it is not dispositive that the teams have organized and own a legally separate entity that centralizes the management of their intellectual property.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [20601:20754] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.The mere fact that the teams operate jointly in some sense does not mean that they are immune.Source: docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [24094:24188] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781. |
Court interpretations
interpretation
The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.
/us/560/0183-01 — Supreme Court of the United States · 2010
The justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/us_560.jsonl#/us/560/0183-01; Unicode character offsets [23082:23195] (end exclusive); SHA-256 cf72a4ed4aef4713db524f26772ccec608b918010b615cbaa37484af6a480781.Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).
interpretation
it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.
/f2d/589/0451-01 — United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · 1979
it is fundamental that an agent cannot conspire with his principal.Source:
docroot/ir/caselaw/f2d_589.jsonl#/f2d/589/0451-01; Unicode character offsets [14913:14980] (end exclusive); SHA-256 dcc78648ee790f3f401c028b44fe4ccb6eb64e28866b5287e4b953cef8dfebb4.Mirror image of `agreement` plurality: a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary (Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)), or a corporation and its officers/employees/agents acting on its behalf (Harvey v. Fearless Farris), are a single economic actor incapable of conspiring under § 1; however, legally single joint ventures controlled by separate potential competitors acting on separate economic interests are not immune (American Needle).